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The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an organisation that has for a long 
time had a regional policy to create an economic as well as a political bloc. The 
theory of optimum currency areas provides the economic foundation for this research. 
Previous studies focused largely on the eight prerequisites of an optimum currency 
area. Political events in the Gulf region for the decade up to 2016 have underscored 
the importance of political factors in delaying the commencement of a single currency 
area in the GGC member nations. Therefore, this research looks at the political and 
historic factors affecting greater economic integration. To achieve a better 
understanding of the economic and political context and relationships the research 
uses a mixed research methodology. The qualitative research aspect uses an interview 
instrument for data collection, with content analysis as the technique for data 
analysis. The quantitative research segment relies on secondary data from the GCC 
and international financial agencies, and tests for cointegration. Cointegration tests 
are an econometric technique, which allows the testing of hypotheses, and the 
cointegration of economic relationships contained in a model involving non-
stationary stochastic variables. The cointegration test is able to determine a stable 
long-term relationship among multiple economic series/variables (Shin, 1994); it is 
valuable for testing and estimating macroeconomic model where long-run 
relationships among variables affect present/future observed values. 
As a contribution to optimum currency theory and economic integration, the 
research proposes a politico-economic framework (PEF) as the ideal framework for 
understanding the dynamics of the common currency agenda in the Arab Gulf Region 
with specific reference to the GCC. The research contributes to an existing body of 
knowledge on a GCC single currency region by providing the empirical evidences for 
delay in implementing a single currency. The delay of a single currency is mainly due 
to political factors. Regarding the economic factors the study found that there are 
indications of cointegration among the factors; while the political factor has a 
complex dynamic linked to fear of losing autonomy over monetary and fiscal policy 
measures and fear of surrendering sovereignty to supra-national institutions on the 
one hand compared to security concerns. On the other hand, the finding indicates that 
there is a strong historical pressure supporting the concept of a single currency 
system in the Gulf States because of its religious and cultural connection to Muslim 
countries based on the Dinar currency. The research concludes with far reaching 
recommendations on the circumstances needed to carry forward the GCC single 
currency. The main finding in this thesis is that the delay in achieving the single 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
1.0. Background of the Study 
Economic integrations through the formation of economic blocs are a growing 
phenomenon as a result of the wave of globalisation. Economic blocs exist in Europe, 
East Asia, North America and Africa. In the Middle East the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) was originally founded as a security organization with the intention to 
counter the threats from Islamic Revolutionary Iran, Baathist socialist Iraq, and the 
Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. However, as new economic and political events 
unfolded in the region, the scope of the GCC was broadened and the charter of GCC 
was amended to form an economic bloc. The GCC embraced the economic 
integration as a regional policy to create an economical and a political bloc. 
The GCC includes six independent countries in the Gulf region, namely: 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. The GCC 
adopted an economic integration to create a strategic move towards an optimum 
currency area (OCA), which may transform the region faster and better in terms of 
economic openness and competitiveness (Aljadani, Mear and Raimi, 2015a). The 
GCC countries possess huge natural resources in the form of oil, gas and other still 
untapped mineral resources (Al-Rawashdeh, Al-Nawafleh and Al-Shboul, 2013). The 
region has witnessed long impressive social and economic developments, mainly 
driven by huge revenue (large resources per capita income) obtained from the crude 
oil exploration and sale (Krane, 2012).  
The process of economic integration usually takes a very long time to be 
implemented as the policymakers often follow systematic procedure in achieving the 
required integration. This appears in the pace of economic integration among the 
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GCC countries. There are five stages of economic integration to be implemented, 
namely: free trade zone, custom union, common market, economic union and political 
union (Mutasa, 2003). The GCC has reached the fourth stage (i.e. economic union), 
which includes a common monetary policy, a single currency, budgetary and fiscal 
policies as well as socio-cultural policies that may result in boosting the integration 
process (Laabas and Limam, 2002; Patrick, 2011; Aljadani, Mear and Raimi, 2014). 
The idea to have a single currency has been conceived across the region to unite GCC 
countries in the fields of finance and economic development. This will enhance the 
efforts of the GCC countries to overcome the economic issues and achieving an 
optimum stability and better development in the region (Al Tayer, 2011). These 
benefits motivated GCC to consider the optimum currency area (OCA) as a result of 
their economic integration. A common currency usually promotes the cooperation and 
the development, especially for small and medium sized enterprises. The OCA 
becomes an important stage as it may resolve the difficulties that the governments 
face in trading and international investment policies (Willett and Auerbach, 2009). 
This makes many research studies to focus on analysing the economic factors that 
affect achieving the single currency while neglecting the political factors. This was 
the real motivation behind this research to investigate both the political and the 
economic factors.  
1.1. Problem Statement 
The monetary integration of the GCC has remained in debate for a very long 
time (since the 1980s) due to the internal and the external challenges. The 
implementation of a common currency was initially proposed to be implemented in 
1999, however, it was delayed due to political concerns and precautions (Lawson, 
2012). In 2006, Oman rejected the idea and the UAE withdrew in 2009, the decision 
3 
 
was linked to the relocation of the monetary council in Saudi Arabia. Kuwait is the 
only country that still prefers not to peg its currency to the U.S. dollar while the rest 
members of GCC countries decided to announce fresh commitments to a single 
currency to be effective in 2010 (Lawson, 2012).  
However, the 2010 kick-off date was missed. The major reasons that caused 
the delay in adopting a single currency within GCC are the mutual precautions and 
fear of domination by Saudi Arabia (Lohade, 2013). Also there were disagreements 
between the members on the name of the new currency, the convertible exchange, the 
launch date, and the autonomy of regional banks, base rates and independency.  More 
importantly, on March 4, 2014, the political crisis between Qatar on one side and 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other side deepened. This leads to 
withdrawing the ambassadors of these three countries to show objection on Qatar’s 
support to Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian-sponsored Hizbullah (World Tribune, 
2014a). 
Based on the literature review (discussed in chapter two), the economic 
integration among the GCC countries showed that many challenges face the adoption 
of a single currency. The work of Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006) pointed out that even 
though the economic integration can be very difficult, however, when the medium and 
small scale of economies combined with free trade zone may generate forces that 
encourage the geographic clustering of economic activities. Based on the highlighted 
issues discussed above, the main issues facing GCC counties in achieving the OCA, 
which this research will study and investigate. On the top of that this research will 
investigate the historical and cultural factors, which may accelerate the formation of 
single currency project of GCC. Previous studies on a single currency agenda in the 
GCC region looked at the issue from either economic or political lenses.  However, in 
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this study we investigated the effect of both economic and political factors on 
achieving the single currency project of GCC.  
Furthermore, there was no study investigated the link between the single 
currency and the history of the regions as most of these regions have no such kind of 
this relation. The present study explored the historical connection between the Dinar 
currency system and the contemporary move by the GCC to embrace a single 
currency for the first time. Since the first Islamic state up to 1924 the Dinar served as 
the unifying medium of exchange across Muslim world. Colonisation of the Muslim 
world and subsequent splitting of the region into small independent states made these 
nations adopt their own national currencies within the last 90 years. These gaps in the 
literature, motivated us in this research to propose a politico-economic framework 
(PEF) as the ideal framework for understanding the dynamics of the common 
currency agenda in the GCC. These issues motivated   the current study to model the 
relationship between the eight prerequisites of an optimum currency area in the GCC 
countries using mixed research methods. Based on this motivation the following three 
measurable objectives are listed in next section.   
1.2. Research Objectives 
Based on the reviewed literature and the defined problem statement, the following 
objectives of this research are listed below:  
1) Evaluating the effect of the historical factors on achieving a single currency in 
GCC bloc.  
2) Evaluating the appropriateness of the economic integration of GCC to form an 
optimum currency area using a quantitative study.; and 
3) Investigating the political factors, which effect the adoption of the OCA in 
GCC bloc through a qualitative study. 
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1.3. Research Questions 
The above stated research objectives have led the research to ask the following 
four research questions: 
1) The GCC countries have a common culture, language and history, to what 
extent these factors affect the achieving of the single currency in GCC? 
2) Is the GCC bloc appropriate medium for establishing economic integration? 
3) Does the GCC meet the economic criteria for a single currency to be 
introduced? 
4) What are the political factors that affected the adoption of a single currency in 
the GCC? 
1.4. Research Propositions  
1) The Islamic culture and the history of GCC countries have a significant impact 
in supporting the idea of achieving the single currency project, (new 
dimension added to OCA). 
2) There is economic convergence (in the six quantitative prerequisites factors of 
OCA) in the GCC countries. 
3) The GCC meets the criteria set for an Optimum Currency Area. 
4) Political factors are responsible for the delay in the adoption of a single 
currency in the GCC bloc (two qualitative prerequisites factors of OCA). 
1.5. Scope of the Study  
This research provides an updated concept for OCAs in the GCC bloc for 
utilisation within a practical and academic environment. As a contribution to optimum 
currency theory and economic integration, the research proposes a politico-economic 
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framework (PEF) for understanding the dynamics of the common currency agenda in 
the Arab Gulf Region, with specific reference to the GCC. In other words, the 
research develops a framework to encapsulate the economic, political and social 
factors that are grounded in the beliefs and traditions of the Gulf region. The 
framework is expected to assist policymaking in the GCC bloc.   
The research contributes to an existing body of knowledge on a GCC single 
currency region by providing the empirical evidence for the reason behind the delay 
in implementing a single currency. The delay of a single currency is a combination of 
economic and political factors. The economic reason is an absence of cointegration in 
some factors; while the political factor has a complex dynamic linked to fear of losing 
autonomy over monetary and fiscal policy measures and fear of surrendering 
sovereignty to supra-national institutions on the one hand compared to security 
concerns. Historical and cultural factors are also investigated and explored in the light 
of single currency theory. The research concludes with recommendations to be taken 
into consideration, which will assist the GCC to move forward towards the single 
currency agenda. 
1.6. Areas of Novelty and Originality 
There has been considerable research on the GCC and single currencies, but 
none of them have examined the inter relationships of Politics, Economics and 
cultural contexts. The primary goal of this research was to bring together that rich 
variety of factors to develop more realistic model that can be applied to achieve single 
currency project in the GCC. This research investigated the effect of the historical 
factor on the formation of single currency project of GCC by modifying the OCA 
theory. The areas of original work within this research are listed below: 
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1) In this research the historical factor has been critically reviewed in the light of 
its effectiveness on achieving the single currency.  
2) Based on the study in point 1, the historical factor has been added to the theory 
of OCA as a new qualitative dimension. 
3) A new descriptive analysis study was used to model the OCA quantitative 
factors using the Johansen’s cointegration method. 
4) In this research, for the first time, the relation between the economic activities 
and the political factor has been investigated in order to identify the main 
reasons that cause the delay in achieving the single currency in the GCC. 
5) In this study high ranked people were interviewed in order to assess and 
evaluate the current situation of achieving the single currency. 
1.7. Organisation of the Work  
There are eight chapters in this thesis. Chapter two reviews the relevant 
literature on the economic, political and historical factors affecting the single currency 
in the GCC bloc. The previous studies, which investigated the Socio economic and 
the current political issues in GCC were discussed. The fundamentals of OCA and the 
economic benefits and cost of OCA were presented. Furthermore the empirical studies 
of OCA in both cases before and after the 2008 financial crises were critically 
reviewed followed by the introducing the GCC bloc political formation.  
Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework for OCA based on the 
works of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) also the theoretical 
framework of political integration. The adopted theory of this research discussed and 
scientifically described. Also a critical discussion on the OCA theory and its factors 
were presented. Furthermore OCA prerequisite and its modelling was introduced 
followed by the preformed empirical studies on the OCA. 
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Chapter four explains the research methodology. For the avoidance of 
ambiguity, methodological issues of ontology, epistemology, research paradigm, 
research approach, research methods and techniques are explained.   
Chapter five extends the discussion further with a discussion on the historical 
antecedent of a single currency in the Gulf States dating back to the periods of Islamic 
caliphacy up to the present time. The chapter also explains the Gold Currency System, 
the Dinar Currency System in Period of the first Islamic State while the history of 
Dinar during the Period of the four Caliphs (Khaliph’s) and Kings is also explored. 
The recent calls for adopting the Gold Dinar as monetary system were also reviewed. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with the main findings that have been reached 
regarding the single currency agenda in the Islamic history. 
Chapter six focuses on the quantitative aspects. The outcomes of the 
Johansen’s cointegration method on the quantitative prerequisites of OCA were 
presented.  
Like chapter six above, chapter seven focuses on the qualitative aspects of the 
study. Here the outcomes of the interviews granted by thirteen professionals, 
economists and experts on GCC affairs are presented. The concluding chapter 
provides a summary, recommendations and conclusions.  
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Chapter Two   
Literature Review 
2.0. Introduction 
The current research aimed to investigate the economic and political factors, 
which affect achieving the single currency agenda in the GCC bloc. This chapter 
provides a comprehensive discussion and a critical review of previous studies 
(especially empirical and theoretical works). This leads to a clear understanding of the 
research problem from several dimensions such as economic integration, political 
integration, optimum currency area (OCA) and associated economic benefits and 
costs compared with European Union and other Economic Blocs. This chapter looks 
at the GCC bloc formation taking into consideration its environmental and political 
undercurrents in Gulf region as well as the conceptual definitions of economic 
integration and typologies on integration. It further explicates the benefits and costs of 
economic integration.  In sections 2.1 and 2.2 the Socio economic and the current 
political issues in GCC are discussed, respectively. In sections 2.3 and 2.4 the concept 
of OCA and the economic benefits and cost of OCA are presented. The empirical 
studies of OCA both before and after the 2008 financial crises are critically reviewed 
in sections 2.5 and 2.6 followed by the introducing the GCC political formation in 
section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes the main findings and presents a brief summary of 
this chapter.  
2.1. Socio-Economic and Political Profiles 
The Arab Gulf is located in a shallow basin and holds two-thirds of the proven 
oil reserves in the world. By supplying the world with required energy resources, the 
Arab Gulf has become a region of growing international importance and relevance. 
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The Strait of Hormuz is the gateway to the Arab Gulf and is one of the most important 
international waterways with more than a hundred oil-carrying vessels passing 
through it daily (Fattouh, 2007). The Arab Gulf is bordered by a semi-enclosed sea 
and controls the shipping routes that can influence the international economy, given 
that the Arab Gulf region location connects the three continents Asia, Europe and 
Africa. The proximity of the GCC countries countries is depicted in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1: The Proximity of the GCC Countries (World Tribune, 2014b) 
 
The global dependence on oil reveals the strategic growing value of oil 
resources in the international community. The international importance of oil became 
apparent when the commander of the British Navy, Winston Churchill, made the 
decision in 1910 to adopt oil instead of coal as fuel for the British naval fleet. At that 
point, oil became a source of cash earnings and has since become a huge industry for 
the giant international companies. Furthermore, oil gives the largest economic returns 
and affects the balance of payments for all countries around the world. The bulk of 
foreign currency reserves of GCC countries are denominated by US dollars. 
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There is a potential area of cooperation between the GCC countries that has 
been grossly under-exploited, which is the stock market trading. There is a prospect 
for more foreign direct investments (FDIs), which can be enhanced by increasing the 
number of quoted companies through a greater monetary and financial cooperation 
under a single currency.  
To enhance the diversity in the economies of the GCC countries, Rutledge 
(2006) prescribes a currency union to optimise a number of indirect economic benefits 
such as reducing the transaction costs and eliminating the exchange rate risk, greater 
budgetary transparency, increased fiscal discipline and deeper economic diversity.  
Based on the key role of stock markets in the economic integration process, 
Bley (2011) examined the predictability of GCC stock markets to provide a 
justification for the importance of a single currency. The study used daily, weekly, 
and monthly stock market index for the 10-year period 2000–2009. The study found 
an evidence of nonlinear dependence for the daily data, but there was no evidence of 
nonlinear dependence for stock markets using weekly and monthly data. 
2.2. Current Central Bank Institutional Arrangements for GCC countries  
Coordinating macroeconomic policies is a pre-requisite to a successful launch 
of the common currency in the GCC countries; hence the Central Bank put in place 
institutional arrangements for all the GCC countries. These institutional arrangements 
show a clear coordination of monetary policy, fiscal policy, government consumption, 
and openness across the GCC member countries (Kamar and Ben Naceur, 2007). 
Currently, the other GCC countries have informal mechanisms for coordination 
among the regulators in each of the six member countries. However, each country has 
effective institutional arrangement for implementation of the financial stability 
objective. In other words, the central banks in Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and the 
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UAE have set up a separate financial stability office and publish financial stability 
reports. However, the regulatory structure in several GCC countries needs to be 
strengthened through creation of a formal framework for coordination and 
information-sharing across regulatory agencies to close the loopholes for regulatory 
arbitrage. The financial system in the GCC countries is regulated and supervised by 
several regulators, with the banking system in all these countries under the regulation 
and supervision of the central bank (Al-Jasser and Al-Hamidy, 2003). Highlight of the 
institutional arrangements for all the GCC countries are discussed below: 
In Bahrain, the Central Bank of Bahrain is the single regulator for the financial 
system in line with the country’s central bank law. In Kuwait, the legal framework, 
the regulation and the supervision of the banking sector are coordinated by the Central 
Bank of Kuwait (CBK), while the country’s Capital Markets Authority (CMA) 
regulates capital market institutions and investment companies. However, the Central 
Bank of Oman is the single integrated regulator of Oman's financial services industry, 
with the exception of capital markets, which are regulated and supervised by a Capital 
Markets Authority. For Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
is vested with the responsibility for regulating commercial banks, insurance 
companies and exchange dealers, and mortgage, leasing and finance companies. 
However, the Capital Markets Authority exercises supervision strictly over the capital 
markets. In Qatar, the Qatar pistachio (QCB) regulates the banking system and 
insurance sector, while the Qatar Financial Markets Authority regulates the securities 
market. The Qatar Financial Center Regulatory Authority regulates the institutions 
licensed by the Qatar Financial Center. However, the QCB is responsible for ensuring 
financial stability, and the recommendations made by the Financial Stability 
Committee (chaired by the governor of the QCB) are implemented by the respective 
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regulators, consistent with the legal and regulatory mandates under their respective 
laws. Whereas, UAE has multiple regulators of the financial system in the financial 
system. The Central Bank of the UAE regulates the banking system. Of the three 
stock exchanges in the country, the Dubai Financial Market and the Abu Dhabi 
Securities Exchange are both governed and regulated by the Securities and 
Commodities Authority. Nasdaq Dubai, located in the Dubai International Financial 
Centre, is governed by an independent regulator called the Dubai Financial Services 
Authority, but the country’s insurance sector is regulated by the Insurance Authority 
(Al-Jasser and Al-Hamidy, 2003). 
Table 2-1: GCC Countries, Currency and Exchange Rate 
SN COUNTRY CURRENCY CENTRAL 
BANKS 
Currency Peg 
1 Oman Omani Riyal Central Bank of 
Oman 




Saudi Riyal Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority 
$1 USD = 3.75 SR 
3 UAE UAE Dirham Central Bank of the 
UAE 
1 USD = 3.6725 
AED 
4 Qatar Qatari riyal Qatar Central Bank $1 USD = 3.64 QR 
5. Bahrain Bahraini 
dinar 
Central Bank of 
Bahrain 
$1 USD = 0.376 BD 
6 Kuwait Kuwaiti 
Dinar 
Central Bank of 
Kuwait 
$1 USD = 0.29963 
KD 
Source: The World Factbook (2011) 
2.3 Exchange Rate Alternatives to GCC Countries  
There are four exchange Rate alternatives with regards to a single currency 
from, which the GCC could hinge its exchange rate system. These four exchange Rate 
alternatives include: (a) Pegging to the Dollar, (b) Managed Floating, (c) Basket peg 




A) Pegging to the Dollar: It has been reported that in pursuance of the goal of 
monetary integration, the GCC countries, excluding Kuwait, pegged their national 
currencies to the US dollar and it was effective from January 1st, 2003. The rationale 
for this pegging alternative was to strengthen the confidence in their economies and 
maintain stability for the purpose of improving the possibility of having a successful 
monetary union. The region’s pegging to the dollar has been beneficial for mitigating 
nominal shocks associated with geo-political risks (Wafa, 2014). The study of Rosmy, 
and Mohammad confirmed that GCC countries have smoother demand shocks after 
pegging to the dollar (AlKholifey and Alreshan, 2010). The pegging has also provided 
certainty about future exchange rates, as money and capital markets show confidence 
in the dollar peg. More importantly, the various oil exporting nations to which the 
GCC nations belong are familiar with dollars and therefore have confidence in trading 
in currencies that are pegged to another currency; an instance is that 18 out of the 26 
oil exporting countries have mutually pegged currencies (Khan, et al., 2008).  
B) Managed Floating: It has been argued that a managed floating exchange 
rate has the potential of accelerating the economic diversification of the private non-
oil sector of the GCC economies because it elicits confidence and endorsement of the 
private non-oil sector. It also allows for a unified currency float against other 
currencies thereby making monetary policy very effective in stabilizing the inflation 
as well as boosting the none-oil national production outputs. The managed floating 
exchange rate has a major disadvantage in the GCC because the current economic 
structure of the member countries has many difficulties to achieve internal and 
external stability. By adopting a currency float against other currencies, GCC 
countries face sudden uncertainties in its international trade relations with other 
countries, which further complicates budgetary accounting and business in member 
15 
 
countries. It is also too risky for undeveloped financial markets in the GCC to hedge 
against exchange rate risk (Khan, et al., 2008; Wafa, 2014). 
C) Basket pegging: This tactic could help the GCC countries achieve an 
exchange rate with better flexibility, where a basket peg such as the SDR would result 
in lesser volatility oil export receipts than those pegged to the dollar. By 
implementing the basket peg, the exchange rate will become gradually flexible, thus it 
will give the participants in the private market the opportunity not only to adapt the 
living with foreign exchange risk but to manage it as well. The major drawback of 
basket pegging is that dealers have to bear the exchange rate risk. Also basket pegging 
is less transparent; it is operationally difficult to comprehend by the public because 
the process of managing the weights assigned to the basket of pegged currencies are 
difficult; and finally basket peg often could lead to speculative behavior as evident in 
the case of Kuwait, the only country in GCC that adopted basket peg.   Reference 
needed 
D) Pegging to the Export Price of Oil: This approach implies an exchange rate 
system where countries peg their national currencies to the Price of Export Product 
(PEP) especially minerals or agricultural products. The main advantage of this 
approach is that it integrates the benefits of pegging to the dollar and the floating 
exchange rates where it enhances the credibility of the dollar. The nominal anchor 
would automatically accommodate terms-of-trade shocks, thereby helping the real 
exchange rate of a country or countries using it to move in line with the real price of 
the exporter’s main commodity whether minerals or agricultural resources. This 
approach was suggested for countries that have small and open economies that rely 
mainly on the export of minerals and/or agricultural products. The basic difficulties 
with Pegging to the Export Price of Oil are: (a) The GCC countries is mega economy 
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when they integrated not a small economy hence it cannot be implemented; (b) Even 
though, oil plays a significant role in the global economy, but the approach of pegging 
to export price of oil cannot be considered as the oil cannot be considered exogenous 
or a replacement for a currency itself, when each country within the region export 
differently; (c) The pegging to export price of oil would lead to serious drawbacks in 
the GCC countries in their oil production capacity and extraction limits are  regulated 
by the OPEC quota system; (d) The exports in the GCC are dependent on inputs of 
hydrocarbon products, hence the exports of these countries are not 100% dependent 
on the oil sector alone; and (e) Pegging exchange rate to export price of oil would 
make prices of the imported products volatile and unpredictable with negative effect 
on other sectors of the economy if not managed transparently and with credibility by 
the policymakers (Khan, et al., 2008; Wafa, 2014). 
2.4. Environmental and Political Undercurrents in GCC 
In the second half of the twentieth century, economic integration, regional 
cooperation and political integration are critical issues that occupy the centre stage of 
politics and academic discourse. The issues are often discussed in economics, 
international relations and political science literature (Al-Saud, 1997; Raimi and 
Mobolaji, 2008; Patrick, 2011). Economic integration in particular, which is the focus 
of this research, shifted attention of different regions of the world towards enhanced 
cultural, economic and political blocs (Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008). The prominent 
continental blocs include North American free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), European 
Union (EU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African 
Union (AU) and host of others (Poldermans and Philippe, 2008; Raimi and Mobolaji, 
2008). From historical perspective, Pinfari (2009) argues that two critical political 
reasons led to the formation of GCC bloc. The first reason was the threat raised by 
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Iraq and Iran competition as regional powers in the gulf area; and the second political 
reason was the fear of the spreading of Iran’s Islamic revolution within the region as 
mentioned in section (2.7).  
From the above discussion, it can be argued that the economic integration may 
emerge naturally for mutual benefits and may also emerge as a response to the 
economic and the political threats from other blocs or nations. In the case of GCC 
bloc, the literature has established two undercurrent reasons: a genuine need for 
economic integration and the need for self-preservation from powerful nations (Iran 
and Iraq) (Aljadani, Mear and Raimi, 2014). Al-Saud (1997) argued that GCC 
represents purely an economic relationship among member states built and nurtured 
on the three principles, namely, coordination, integration and interdependence. 
Having discussed the principals of formation of the GCC bloc, it is important 
to examine the GCC charter for better understanding of the objectives behind 
economic integration among GCC countries. For the avoidance of doubt, Article 4 of 
the Charter states the aims and objectives of the GCC as follow: 
1) “To effect co-ordination, integration and inter-connection between 
member states in all fields in order to achieve unity between them. 
2) To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of cooperation now 
prevailing between their peoples in various fields. 
3) To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following: 
a) Economic and financial affairs. 
b) Commerce, customs and communications. 
c) Education and culture. 
d) Social and health affairs. 
e) Information and tourism. 
f) Legislative and administrative affairs. 
4) To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, 
mining, agriculture, water and animal resources: to establish scientific 
18 
 
research: to establish joint ventures and encourage cooperation by the 
private sector for the good of their peoples” (GCC, 2016, online). 
Furthermore, it was formed to establish joint ventures and encourage 
cooperation within the private sector for the good of their citizens (Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 2012). Al-Saud in 1997 explained that the 
aims and objectives of the GCC charter is built on the need for an effective 
coordination of the administrative system within the GCC bloc; promotion of 
cooperation in different fields for sustainable unity in economic, social, cultural, 
commercial, legislative, custom and financial markets. It can be seen from the aims 
and objectives of GCC, that they were related to the economic integration not the 
political. The members have already well developed their national identities and the 
loyalties of their own citizens to their governments. For a political integration, the 
leaders of these six states backed by their citizens to sacrifice some of their internal 
political structures and institutions for the sake of the formation of a new powerful 
nation (Haokip, 2011).  
2.5. Benefits and Costs of Economic Integration/Adoption of OCA 
The term OCA emerged and provided a useful explanation for adoption of a 
single currency by several countries co-existing in the same region. In economics, 
there are benefits and costs in all policy issues and development models. The benefits 
are the economic advantages/merits accruable from financial and non-financial 
decisions, while the costs are the negative effects/demerits arising from the decisions. 
With regard to the adoption of OCA, scholars and analysts have identified several 
benefits. 
First and foremost, OCA encourages competition among the member states of 
a single currency region (like the GCC bloc) by creating collaborative mechanisms for 
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enhancing the potentials of these member states and their capacities to improve the 
wellbeing of their citizens and to cut down the indebtedness. At present, the GCC 
countries states have not established strong economic system yet. Official report in 
2001 indicated that crude oil dominates exports from the GCC bloc, accounting for 
almost 88% of the total exports in 2000, while the region depends heavily on the 
import of basic machinery and transport equipment (39.5%), manufactured 
commodities (17%), food and livestock (15%) and industrial chemicals (9%) (The 
Secretariat General – Economic Affairs Division, 2001). Another report in 2002 
indicated that the oil sector provides one-third of the area’s GDP and three-fourths of 
its government revenues and export earnings (Fasano and Iqbal, 2002).  By adopting 
more openness in the GCC countries, through centralised monetary and trade policy, 
they will be able to access international markets more efficiently for exporting oil and 
oil-related industries, in which they have a comparative advantage over the rest of the 
world. Openness would further enhance the private sector competitiveness and 
improve its productivity and efficiency through better access to state-of-the-art 
technology and to other capital goods that would allow for the production of quality 
products for international markets (The World Bank, 2003).  
Secondly, economic integration through OCA provides the benefits of 
openness and wider trade relations among member states and their citizens. This 
openness often covers travelling visas, transportation and other immigration-related 
issues (Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 2012). Openness also 
encourages capital inflow through foreign direct investment (FDI), a phenomenon that 
has been identified as a catalyst for economic development, when combined with 
sound monetary policy measures, expertise, quality training and the availability of 
advanced technology for enabling markets (Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998). 
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On the strength of the above, OCA would also allow for massive capital inflows 
through regional investments from capital-abundant countries in the GCC into the 
capital-deficient countries. This stands in contrast to the present arrangement, in 
which massive oil wealth of the GCC countries is invested abroad. Several years ago, 
Henry and Springborg (2001) noted that GCC countries had over $500 billion in 
foreign assets in developed countries. Inter-regional restriction of capital inflows 
accounts for this situation, which needs to be changed in favour of regional 
development within the GCC bloc.  
Thirdly, the free movement of factors of production – and, especially, labour 
and capital – has numerous benefits, as it would allow for mutual beneficial 
relationships among GCC countries. It has been recorded that migrant workers 
moving in and out of the GCC bloc contribute over 72% of the total manpower 
requirements (labour force) and account for 95% of employment in the private sector 
(Al-Najar, 2001 cited in Al-Yousif, 2004). To aid the process of actualising stages 
four and five of the economic integration process in the GCC, there is an urgent need 
for a joint immigration policy. 
Fourthly, economic integration engenders unity in monetary and financial 
policies across member states. The use of a single currency requires a single central 
bank above all the national central banks in the region and for the implementation of 
uniform monetary policy measures, which would be formulated by the central bank 
within the currency area (as in the EU model). A single currency area needs a single 
control authority for monetary policy. 
The GCC Document (2013) states that the gains of single currency and 
monetary union are many and diverse as it will deepen economic integration and 
promote custom union while leading the GCC bloc to a common market. These gains 
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will impact positively on regional trade, tourism, institutional investment, capital 
market, financial market and other economic sectors thereby accelerating economic 
growth and development in the GCC countries. 
Despite the benefits of OCA, there are some costs associated with its 
implementation. The major cost of OCA is the loss of independence by the monetary 
authorities of member states and the associated powers of monetary policies, 
exchange rate policy, trade policies and fiscal issues (McKinnon, 2004).  
Similarly, Laabas and Limam (2002) noted that the fundamental costs of 
adopting a single currency include the loss of autonomy to a regional body and the 
acceptance of monetary policy measures developed by the union. However, Horvath 
and Komarek (2002) identified five costs that countries must contend with under an 
OCA.  
The loss of autonomy over the issuance and control of a national money 
supply is the first of the costs to be borne by country seeking membership in an 
economic monetary union (EMU) under a single currency. This loss is compounded 
by the reality of heeding to one monetary policy directive, since member countries 
lose the ability to use exchange rates for the stabilisation of their economies. 
Consequently, member countries under a single currency achieve an effective trade-
off, or policy mix, of unemployment and inflation.  
Secondly, individual member countries have to bear the impact of independent 
fiscal policy measures left under the control of each country, which may conflict with 
the centralised monetary policy measures in each country’s quest to control economic 
shocks.  
Thirdly, embracing economic integration under an OCA implies a loss of 
seigniorage, which is the “revenue the government obtains by financing its budget 
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deficit through printing money rather than selling debt” (Horvath and Komarek, 2002, 
p14). 
The fourth is that the fixed exchange rate regime that exists under an OCA 
implies costs for investment will be reduced because the transaction costs arising from 
multiple currencies are removed (Ricci, 2008). However, uncertainties and risks may 
drive up the costs on investment, thereby reducing the returns on investment.  
The fifth cost relates to the socio-economic hardships that member country 
suffers after the complying with the policy environment of a single currency, one 
central bank and a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Further arguments regarding costs indicate that the adoption of an OCA would 
heighten the possible risk of a crisis within the GCC bloc, such as the one, which was 
experienced by the European Union. Therefore, rather than fostering economic 
prosperity, an OCA can become an economic trap, leaving the GCC bloc as a 
collection of squabbling nations (Krugman, 2013). In practical terms, the adoption of 
the Euro as a single currency by member countries and the implementation of uniform 
monetary policy measures by the European Central Bank were at huge costs. This 
caused serious inconvenience for member nations because their respective monetary 
authorities/government could not formulate and implement national fiscal and 
structural policies to resolve the economic shocks that threaten financial stability in 
EU. A single currency area therefore implies loss of national monetary policy 
measures for central monetary policy measures (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013). 
The second classic example of a loss of autonomy over currency and monetary 
policy as happened in the Central Africa, in which six nations (Cameroon, Gabon, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic and Chad), under the 
Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), agreed to a 
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single currency called the Franc CFA with a fixed exchange rate of FCFA 656: 1 Euro 
(Mutasa, 2003).  
From the foregoing arguments, it is clearly essential for aspiring countries 
seeking EMU to weigh the benefits, costs and risks before rushing into a single-
currency zone. These considerations might be the reasons, which made the GCC 
countries to drag their feet from full economic integration with a single currency.  
2.6. Issues Around Common Fiscal Policy With A Monetary Union 
Ideally, a fiscal policy within a common monetary union is expected to control 
business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock. There are three forms of fiscal 
shock bring about the changes in fiscal policy measures of deficit-spending, deficit-
financed tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion (Mountford and Uhlig, 
2009). Fiscal policy is the use of government spending and taxation, which reflect a 
nation’s economy. Discussion of fiscal policy focuses on the impact of changes in the 
government budget on the overall economy. Fiscal policy is said to be tight or 
contractionary when revenue is higher than spending, that is, the government budget 
is in surplus and loose or expansionary when spending is higher than revenue, that is, 
the budget is in deficit (Minarik, 2008). Fiscal policy within the GCC is a front-burner 
issue that would strengthen or weaken the actualisation of the objective of the 
regional block. Hanna (2006) reported that GCC Ministers of Finance, and the 
Committee of Monetary Agencies and Central Bank Governors met under that 
platform of the GCC Committee for Financial and Economic Cooperation to discuss 
the issues around common fiscal policy under a monetary union as well as agreeing 
on a set of convergence criteria for monetary union. The criteria were intended to be 
used as a barometer for measuring the readiness of member states for monetary union. 
At the end of the meeting, the GCC Secretariat asserted that the Eurozone's entry 
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criteria, or what is popularly called the Maastricht criteria represented that basis for 
deliberations among the GCC member countries. 
The GCC member countries met in 2007 and agreed to five convergence 
criteria. The basic elements of the new convergence criteria are as follows: (a) 
Inflation rate shall not exceed the weighted average inflation rate of the member 
countries (weighted by GDP) by more than 2%; (b) Interest rate shall not exceed the 
average of the lowest three rates (3-month interbank rates) by more than 2%; (c) 
Foreign reserves shall be sufficient to cover at least 4 months of imports; (d) Public 
budget deficit–GDP ratio shall not exceed 3% as long as the average oil price is equal 
to or above US$25, 12 5; and (e) Public debt–GDP ratio shall not exceed 60% for the 
general government and 70% for the central government (Khan, 2009). Comparing 
the five convergence criteria above with the EU’s Maastricht criteria discussed above, 
it would be observed that they look alike, except for an additional criteria called 
foreign reserve adequacy. 
With regards to the fifth criterion on inflation was more problematic, as there 
was little evidence of inflationary convergence over the last decade. While for the 
fiscal policy harmonisation, the first two Maastricht criteria on fiscal sustainability 
assumed that the debts of the various GCC governments should stabilise at 60% of 
GDP. This was necessary, as it would serve a transparent process of avoiding 
interference with the monetary union’s macroeconomic stability in the region thereby 
avoiding negative spillover effects to other member countries. Furthermore, the GCC 
member countries set their respective budgets on a conservative oil price assumption 
that would generate surpluses for these six countries that will provide bailout in the 
periods of low oil prices. The implication of exclusive reliance on oil revenue for 
budget purposes is that, when oil reserves dwindle the GCC countries would be 
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seriously affected. Therefore in the long run, the six GCC governments must develop 
robust alternative sources for revenue. The projected depletion dates for oil reserves 
in the six countries is as listed: 2011 Bahrain, 2022 Oman, 2049 Qatar, 2077 Saudi 
Arabia, 2110 UAE, and 2121 Kuwait, while for the Gas reserves reduction in reserve 
is projected as follow: 2012 Bahrain, 2060 Oman, 2112 Saudi Arabia, 2139 UAE, 
2191 Kuwait, and 2840 Qatar (Hanna, 2006; Hebous, 2006). For both oil and gas 
reserves, the Kingdom of Bahrain and Oman are at disadvantaged compared to others. 
Therefore, there is need for urgent economic diversification.  
The GCC countries have also established public investment authorities with 
task of managing a proportion of proceeds for surplus thereby meeting needs of future 
generations. Within a stable fiscal policy environment when the exports and external 
financial assets of the GCC converge, the GCC countries face no problem. But, when 
the GCC exports and external financial assets become more diversified, a more 
flexible exchange policy would be required for competitiveness and stability. Pegging 
the prospective common GCC currency to a dollar-euro basket obviously would give 
a conservative transitional strategy toward a more flexible exchange rate policy 
(Abed, Erbas and Guerami, 2003). Therefore, the above addressed issues should be 
carefully investigated and clear plane should in place in the case of any economic 
shocks. 
2.7. Literature Review on OCA in the GCC 
The literature gives credit for developing the OCA theoretical construct to the 
Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Mundell (Coy, 1999) for his remarkable work on 
OCA in 1961. He proposed the idea in the 1960s for nations that coexist within the 
same geographical area to unite and enhance the economic potentials adopting a 
single currency, rather than proliferation of currencies. Other researchers argued that 
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the credit for conceptualisation, development and articulation of OCA is to be shared 
by three Economists namely: Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997; Dellas and Tavlas, 2009).  
Krugman in 1993 asserted that the OCA is highly beneficial and should serve 
as the basis for international monetary economics. On contrary, (Coy, 1999; Buiter, 
2000) argued that OCA is one of the defective theories that emerged in the field of 
monetary economics after the World War II; and that the OCA proponents placed 
significant emphasis on the supply-side of economics, which has had an effect on 
European Union.  
The GCC Document (2013) states that a single currency in the region has 
several advantages, which include the benefits of Customs Union and GCC Common 
Market. The socio-economic impacts include Intra-GCC Trade, boosting of tourism 
and cross-country investments, enhanced financial services and expansion of the 
capital markets, which would increase economic growth and accelerated financial 
market development. The single currency eliminates the risks associated with 
exchange rates fluctuations; deepens the common market, contributes to the 
integration of capital markets (securities market) thereby improving the stock market 
fundamentals. In trying to provide answers to readiness of the GCC countries for a 
single currency area several studies have been undertaken with useful findings and 
recommendations. The literature review is divided into three subsections the first one 
considers the historical studies on OCA in the GCC bloc. The second subsection 
focuses on the empirical studies on OCA before and after the 2008 financial crises. In 
the third subsection the previous studies that have been investigated the political 
factor in the context of OCA in GCC bloc are reviewed. 
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2.7.1. Previous Studies on the Historical Factor  
There are many studies that have investigated the history of the gulf area in 
terms of the development of the Islamic currencies. However, none of these studies 
considered the link between the history of the single currency in this particular area 
and the OCA theory. In this section, most of these related studies are critically 
reviewed. When gold was discovered at some point in human history, it became a 
precious metal, which coveted and hoarded by kings, emperors and affluent 
merchants in the medieval period (Mundell, 1997). At this period, the gold is co-
existed with silver and both of them globally reckoned as precious metals used as 
means of exchange for business transaction in different parts of the world including 
the Muslim nations. This phenomenon is known as bimetallism in the economic 
literature (Chapra, 1996). When the monetary system advanced, the bimetallic 
currency system was abandoned and replaced by mono-metallic currency, which is an 
exclusive use of gold for financial exchange (Chown, 1994). The exclusive use of 
gold as a currency system, a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of 
value was failed at some point in human history. With a sustained growth in human 
knowledge and technology, people developed different commodities for currencies to 
facilitate exchange, which were backed by gold (a phenomenon latter known as the 
gold standard). 
From monetary and fiscal policy viewpoints, the adoption of Dinar and 
Dirham as the official currencies systems during the time the Prophet Muhammad was 
based on the fact that gold and silver currencies are assets money (i.e. not 
representative money). These currencies were adopted as a medium of exchange and 
they have guaranteed stability by the influence of the law of demand and supply 
(Lewis, 2007). Also, gold currency is free from the phenomenon of rise in the general 
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price level of inflation, or speculation leading to usury, doubt gambling and other 
speculative practices common in the conventional monetary system (Yaacob, Ahmad 
and Zabaria, 2011). It is very clear that GCC countries have a significant link to the 
Islamic culture and history. The monetary system in GCC countriesvis credit-based, 
which means the central bank practically has unlimited ability to expand the money 
supply in order to prevent a deflation in the economy. The central bank prevents 
deflationary situation by always inflating the money supply, in such a manner way 
that would not trigger and/or aggravate inflationary problem (Saville, 2008). 
Historically, the GCC, a regional trade bloc among Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, announced in 2005 its commitment to create a single 
common currency by 2010. The need for a single current union is economically 
desirable for larger companies within an economic bloc with barriers/impediments to 
free trade. To boost and encourage increased integration in the region, the GCC 
announced its intention to embrace a common currency to facilitate trade among 
member countries in the region. In the same period, the Gulf Arab central bankers in 
the region agreed to pursue monetary union similar to the European Union. The Gulf 
central bank is designed to be independent from the governments of member countries 
(AME Info, 2005). As the process of common and monetary union progress, the 
global financial crisis impose new problems for the GCC initiative, as pressure the 
member countries were forced to drop their currency pegs as inflation accelerated 
above 10% in five out of the six countries. Consequently, all the member countries 
except Kuwait peg their currencies to the dollar follow the interest rate set by US 
Federal Reserve (Agencies, 2009). A monetary union is believed would be successful 
in the region because the member countries have uniting factors and it has been 
argued that GCC’s monetary is the most homogenous across the globe (Khan, 2009). 
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Previous studies have not investigated this kind of link and the fact that the Caliphate, 
which included the area that includes the GCC countries had a single currency. The 
single currency project in GCC is therefore linked to the culture and the history of the 
region. This motivated the researcher to investigate this relation in the context of 
OCA in GCC single currency project. 
There were several historic events, which extremely affect the move from 
single currency to many different currencies in the Islamic Stat. One of these historic 
moments is Armenian genocide, which considered to be an important part of Muslim 
history that effected the change to many currencies. It is recorded that Armenians in 
the Ottoman Empire suffered in the World War I, as the Ottoman strategically 
massacred the Armenians in what historian called Armenian genocide  (Melson, 
1992).  In 1914, the Turks entered World War I on the side of Germany and the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Because of the activities of the Armenians, Turkey viewed 
as it against the interest of this Muslim-dominated nation. The Ottoman religious 
authorities declared holy war, against the Christian Armenians as they organized 
volunteer battalions to help the Russian army to fight against the Turks in the 
Caucasus region. In 1915, the Turkish government expelled and massacred 
Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. Though reports vary, most sources agreed 
that there were about 2 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire at the time of the 
massacre. By the early 1920s, when the massacres ended, some 1.5 million of 
Turkey’s Armenians were reported dead. Today, most historians call this event a 
genocide premeditated to exterminate an entire people. However, the Turkish 
government does not acknowledge these events (Akçam, 2006). Although the 
Armenian genocide has not been given the same consideration and attention as the 
Jewish Holocaust, yet this dark side of human history still haunts the Western world 
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in the light of other genocidal killing such as those in Bosnia and Darfur (Dadrian, 
2003).  
After the World War I, the Allies defeated Turkey. It was made to sign two 
peace treaties – Treaty of Sèvres and Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Sèvres, 
signed by the victorious European powers and the Ottoman state on 10 August 1920, 
prescribed the creation of an autonomous and independent Kurdish state as contained 
in Articles 62, 63, and 64 of Section II of the treaty (Ataman, 2002). The Treaty 
of Lausanne explicitly provides for renunciation by Turkey of all rights and title 
whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in 
the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is 
recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled 
or to be settled by the parties concerned. The renunciation by Turkey of all rights and 
titles over Egypt and over the Soudan will take effect as from 5th November; 
1914.Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British 
Government on the 5th November 1914. Without prejudice to the general stipulations 
of Article 27, Turkey hereby recognises the definite abolition of all rights and 
privileges whatsoever which she enjoyed in Libya under the Treaty of Lausanne of 
the 18th October, 1912, and the instruments connected therewith and the complete 
abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey (Treaties of Peace, 1023; Oran, 2007). 
Arab revolt is a political agitation for regime change fuelled by frustration, 
poverty and hopelessness suffered by segments of the society, a phenomenon 
described as Arab Spring. The Arab Spring started in Tunisia on 18th December 2010 
following Mohammed Bouazizi's self-burning due to molestation, dehumanisation 
and ill treatment from the nation’s security agency (Raimi, 2013a).  The revolt in 
Tunisia systematically brought down the regime of President Zine el Abidine Bin Ali 
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(Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). The unprecedented success achieved in Tunisia 
encouraged and motivated similar protests in the Middle-East and Arab Gulf countries 
such as Libya, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen (Raimi, Patel, Adelopo and 
Ajewole, 2013). Related revolt was the six-week bloody political standoff between 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the armed forces of Egypt sequel to coup that ousted 
President Mohammed Morsi (Taylor, 2013). The Arab revolt has sent a signal to the 
GCC countries in particular and Arab world in general to accelerate economic and 
social development in their respective countries in order to avert recurrence of revolt. 
2.7.2. Previous Studies Before/After the 2008 Financial Crises 
Laabas and Limam (2002) found that the GCC countries do not have the 
essential pre-conditions in place for sound embedment of a currency union (CU). 
Firstly, the two things that appeared to have favoured a common currency area are the 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate and political will to embrace economic 
integration. However, the rest fundamental pre-requisites had not been met yet. The 
production structure across the GCC countries is similar as oil wealth is the mainstay 
of all of them. Secondly, there is a very little intra-regional trade as they all produce 
the same commodities. Thirdly, there was some degree of convergence of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals of the GCC countries. For an enduring single currency 
area or currency union, they recommended immediate lifting of all restrictions to 
allow for free movement of goods and other factors, thereby promoting more intra-
regional trade. For convergence of macroeconomic fundamentals, there was a need to 
create a GCC central bank and a related financial institution (supranational institution) 
that would formulate and implement fiscal and monetary policy measures for the 




Sturm and Siegfried (2005) assessed the single currency when it was planned 
for 2010 and the level of preparedness for a single currency, and found three key 
macroeconomic and institutional issues that required the urgent attention from the 
GCC countries. These included;  
1) Need for a supranational GCC monetary institution to coordinate a single 
monetary and exchange rate policy within the monetary union towards the 
actualization of economic, monetary and financial stability in the region;  
2) Need for fiscal convergence – a phenomenon where the fiscal policies of 
member countries are harmonised. This complement the gains of monetary 
convergence; and  
3) Need for sound policy to promote structural diversification in GCC 
economies as members at present have high structural convergence in terms of 
products and services.  The implication of the development is that countries with 
similar economic structures and tradable goods/patterns are unlikely to cope with 
asymmetric shocks, which is one of the key benefits of adopting a single currency 
area in the first place.  
An earlier study by Badr-El-Din (2005) investigated the cost/benefits of a 
monetary union in GCC bloc by testing the degree of convergence. The study used 
five tests, which are Convergence test, Flexibility test, investment test, financial 
services test and Growth, stability and employment test using the guides of the United 
Kingdom’s policy decision on the European Monetary Union. These five tests were 
selected because of its aligns with the GCC’s policy objectives in a monetary union. 
The paper found elements and types of convergence, but for the future the GCC 
countries need to diversify and specialise on the basis of their endowment factor to 
wipe out the current convergence. Besides, the absence of fiscal policy flexibility, 
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there is limited labour market flexibility and FDI, but the financial market is most 
likely to benefit from the monetary union agenda.  
Similarly, a study carried out by Hebous (2006) examined the main 
characteristics of GCC countries in readiness for the introduction of a single currency 
in 2010. Different aspects of the structures for readiness were examined ranging from 
pattern of trade, the monetary issues, and the fiscal arrangement. The study found that 
there are large similarities among the GCC countries, a situation that would help 
reduce the costs of introducing a single currency. Secondly, small trade relations take 
place among member countries possibly because of similarity in the production 
structure, which has a negative impact as low intraregional trade reduces the 
economic benefits of a single currency.  
However, Buitre’s (2006) studied questions the desirability of monetary union 
among the six members of the GCC. From the lenses of economics and political 
economy, the paper found that there are several benefits ranging from unrestricted 
movement of goods, services, financial capital, and human beings as labour. Apart 
from mobility, monetary union would forge political integration. The political 
argument of integration requires supranational political institutions including a central 
bank to coordinate the activities of the GCC countries. Political integration requires 
surrendering of national sovereignty, which at the moment is elusive in the GCC 
countries. The empirical study by Pattanaik (2007) investigated the closeness of the 
GCC countries to the process of full economic integration of a single currency in 
2010.  The paper found that it is important that the GCC countries collaborate and 
have a single currency rather than proliferation of national currencies even though the 
pre-condition still has not been met yet.  
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In view of the debates on the viability of GCC countries embracing a single 
currency area in 2010, Pattanaik (2007) assessed the degree to which the GCC has 
met the requirements of an optimum currency area. The study found that firstly, GCC 
countries have similar economic structures due to a high degree of oil dependence and 
somewhat convergent business cycles. Secondly, they show a high degree of 
openness, which is an indication that there is a strong case for a single currency, 
centralised monetary policy and a common exchange rate. However, monetary 
convergence criteria showed that there are differences observed yearly in inflation 
rates across GCC countries, but the inflation differentials converge over time.  The 
conclusion, there is a strong case for adopting a common currency in the GCC bloc. 
The benefits include a larger common market, intense competition, and enhancement 
of monetary and financial stability in the region, which will create a business 
environment that is favourable to trade and investment promotion.  
Similar, a study by Alturki (2007) examined the feasibility of GCC bloc to 
form a single currency area according to the framework of nine OCA perquisites. The 
study found that the GCC bloc has satisfactorily met a six out of the nine criteria, 
these include: openness, similarity of production structures, similarity of inflation 
rates, financial market integration, fiscal policy coordination, political power. 
However, the three yet to be met are mobility, diversification of production and price 
wage flexibility. 
Reviewing the activities of the GCC countries, Kamar and Ben Naceur (2007) 
noted that GCC countries have progressed substantially within the framework of 
economic integration by achieving a free trade zone in 1981; the introduction of a 
custom union in 2005 and official commencement of a single currency had been fixed 
for 2010. On the strength of this progress, they used the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
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estimator to examine the impact of money supply, budget deficit, government 
consumption and degree of openness in each country on Real Exchange Rate (RER). 
The result confirmed that all the factors have a similar impact. However, a test of 
equilibrium exchange to assess the degree of exchange rate misalignment in each 
country from 1991 to 2005 reveals that misalignment converges overtime in all the 
countries; an indication of substantial coordination by the present institutional 
framework and exchange policies, but needed to be harmonised and improved.  
Similar to the previous empirical studies discussed above, Naser (2008) 
investigated the effectiveness of GCC economic integration. Using descriptive and 
comparative analyses, the paper measured the progression toward monetary union by 
using indicators/integrators such as trends of trade, FDI inflows, joint venture project 
activities and technology. The paper found that the progression of the GCC countries 
towards economic integration is progressive and encouraging, but leaves gaps for 
substantial improvement.  
A situational assessment of the gains of GCC by Khan (2009) revealed that 
formation of a monetary union had always been the main goal since 1981. At present, 
substantial progress has been made based on unrestricted intraregional mobility of all 
factors of production (labour and capital included), ongoing harmonisation of 
financial regulation and the establishment of a common market in 2008. The study 
noted that all the convergence criteria required for sound monetary integration have 
been met except the exchange rate regime for a single currency. Khan cautioned 
against adoption of US dollars because of the spillover effect of inflation and negative 
business cycles in the US in recent times. The benefit of shielding the regional bloc 
from economic shocks or contagion prevention is a key reason why countries try to 
form economic unions. To investigate the impact of such shock or contagion in the 
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GCC bloc, Suliman (2011) examined contagion and crisis spillovers in the GCC 
countries from 1960 to 2002.  The study found that contagion from the US stock 
market crash and the Thai devaluation affected Saudi Arabia and later triggered a 
spillover to smaller GCC countries. 
In a similar study, Kim, Hammoudeh, and Aleisa (2012) examined the impacts 
of external shocks from the US, EU, Japan, the international oil market and regional 
shocks to the GCC countries. Using a quantitative technique, specifically structural 
vector auto regression (SVAR), the study found that the US dollar and the euro 
currencies are more impactful on external shocks in the GCC bloc and should be used 
in the common basket of currencies in the region. Further empirical studies by Kandil 
and Trabelsi (2012) tested the desirability and feasibility of the GCC forming a 
monetary union with a single currency for the region. Applying the multivariate 
structural Vector Autoregression Model (VAR) from 1980-2006, the study found that 
the GCC countries are yet to meet the pre-condition for a successful currency union. 
However, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar show greater potential for setting up a 
common currency zone. The authors also found that the degree of labour mobility, 
trade openness and intra-regional mobility are still below expectation, there is a need 
for improving the labor mobility, the openness, and the intra-regional mobility for a 
sustainable currency union.  
Further study by Louis, Balli, and Osman (2012) assessed the costs of forming 
a monetary union among the GCC countries and leveraging on the economic 
potentials of other countries like the US and major European countries such as France, 
Germany and Italy. Using a quantitative approach, the study used econometric 
analysis variables such as oil output, non-oil output, total output, nominal/real price of 
oil and overall price level. Their findings indicated that aggregate demand shocks are 
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symmetrical across the GCC countries with US. However, there was no symmetry 
with other European countries. Secondly, the non-oil aggregate supply shocks are 
asymmetric, but oil aggregate supply shocks are mostly symmetrical when the real 
price of oil is included. The implication of the study was that it aligns the presumption 
of some researchers that GCC countries have common oil shocks, which may make it 
easy for them to form a monetary union with single currency.  
Recently, Aloui, Hkiri, Nguyen, and Hamida (2014) investigated if the GCC 
countries have fulfilled the basic requirements for creating a monetary union by 
examining the synchronization of real growth in the GCC countries with other non-
member nations in the GCC bloc. The paper found that the real growth rates in the 
majority of the GCC countries co-move with one another over the short and medium 
terms. Besides, two major countries in the GCC bloc, Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
manifest similar growth cycles compared with other countries. Considering the 
controversy surrounding the over-delayed single currency of the GCC countries, 
Basher (2015) critiqued past efforts in terms of benefits and costs. The paper viewed 
the single currency is a viable option following the current systematic adoption of 
exchange rate regimes (pegged currencies). Although many studies investigated the 
economic factors, which effect the adoption of single currency in GCC bloc, most of 
these studies focused on only some factors and mostly are out of date, hence there is a 
need to investigate all factors that have a significant effect on the single currency with 
more updated data.  
2.7.3. Previous Studies on the Political Factor  
From a political economy perspective, Patrick (2011) appraised the current 
political situation is playing a big role against the formation of a monetary union and 
the adoption of a single currency by GCC countries. Ideally, the economic 
38 
 
consideration is the first process that is complemented by the political consideration. 
In the case of GCC bloc, the political consideration took a centre stage, which was out 
of their control. Patrick’s analysis underscored the fact that although GCC countries 
agreed to have an economic alliance to counter the increasing security threats arising 
from Iraq and Iran. The study showed that specifically Saudi Arabia needed this 
alliance to curb the other Arab Gulf states from forging an alliance with Iran and Iraq. 
Secondly, although the alliance is political, the leaders emphasised the economic 
cooperation using coordination, integration and interdependence. Thirdly, the GCC 
countries have fear of surrendering their national sovereignty to a loose regional 
political cooperation. Finally, Patrick found that the process of monetary union 
formation in the GCC bloc was founded by ruling families, which lacks democratic 
tradition on devolution of power and authority with the implication that it became 
very difficult for them to surrender their national interests to supra-national 
institutions. Cooper (2003) made similar conclusions, that full economic integration in 
GCC was delayed because of its political formation, which was premised on the 
intention to limit the potential pressure from Iran and the Soviet Union in the Gulf 
region. From the previous discussion, it can be clearly seen that the political factor has 
not been integrated with the economic pressures by most of the researchers. 
2.8. Evidences on Feasibility of a Single Currency Agenda 
From the above discussion in section 2.6, the previous works on a single 
currency agenda confirmed the importance of adopting the single currency in the 
GCC bloc, but the six countries have not fulfilled all the pre-conditions in the open 
currency area (OCA) criteria. In clear terms, the literature review described the 
fulfilment of OCA criteria by the GCC bloc was varied depending on each member 
and ranges from poor fulfilment of OCA criteria up to satisfactory fulfilment.  
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At present many of the GCC countries have made modest attempts to fulfill 
the pre-conditions. Politically, the willingness to have a single currency is 
demonstrated in rhetoric, inter-ministerial meetings and regular release of 
communiques re-stating commitments to the agenda. However, the literature review 
showed that there is mutual suspicion, fear of domination by stronger member 
countries (these two points were supported by the research discussed in chapter 7) and 
more importantly, the royal families ruling the GCC countries lack democratic 
tradition and find it very challengeable for them to surrender to supra-national 
institutions.  
The political factors outweigh the economic factors with regards to delay in 
adopting a single currency. It can be argued that a single currency agenda has several 
benefits and of course a number of associated costs. For example, the adoption of the 
Euro as a single currency and implementation of a uniform monetary policy measures 
by the European Central Bank had huge costs, which “create disincentives for 
individual governments to properly tackle fiscal and structural policies as well as to 
safeguard financial stability” (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013, p2).  
2.9. Political Discourse on Formation of GCC 
The regional blocs and other international organization usually are formed for 
the economic and/or political cooperation. However, Karns and Karen in 2004 argued 
that regional blocs formed by statutes, charters and treaties by more than three nations 
is a global governance and a conscious attempt to take politics beyond the national 
political contestation. The proposed adoption and the delay in the GCC are deeply due 
to a political issue rooted in the regional and the global events that defines the history 
of the GCC countries. The need to maintain regional security and sustain the military 
capability in the Gulf region influenced the formation of GCC in 1981. The six 
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member states intended to pursue unified economic, military, cultural and social 
policies in the Gulf region. Therefore, the GCC’s economic objectives are intertwined 
with political exigencies. The above assertion is not only related to the history of the 
Gulf region but also continues with current geo-political tensions in the region.  
According to Abdulla (2010) the historical turning points of the GCC countries 
passed through series of events. The first event commenced with the oil discovery of 
the 1950s. The second phase is the formation of new Arab states such as UAE in 
1971. The third event is the emergence of oil boom of 1973. The fourth event is the 
turbulent years of the 1980s (the war between Iraq and Iran). The fifth phase is the 
establishment of the GCC in 1981 to promote political, financial and monetary 
integration in the region. The sixth event is Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and its 
attendant consequences. The seventh event is the era of globalization in the 1990s. 
The eighth phase is the tragic events of 11 September 2001 (the hit of the twin trade 
towers), which exposed GCC countries to severe global scrutiny.  
Therefore, discussing the desire to seek socio-economic change in the region 
without political factor is misleading and insufficient. In spite of the efforts and 
resources committed to the commencement of a single currency union, the idea has 
not been materialised, because the prevailing socio-political realities in the region still 
point towards the intent for continuity and preservation of the old tribal and 
conservative society even though there is willingness for change (Abdulla, 2010). 
Political unrest in the Middle East, which hit directly and indirectly GCC countries 
and tensions in Libya, Syria, and Yemen are still contributing to the delay of the 
starting the single currency. 
Taking into account the above described status, the GCC bloc is the main bloc 
in the Gulf region, which has determination to achieve incrementally full economic 
41 
 
and monetary integration due to noticeable political stability, incredible engine of 
prosperity, moderate national ideology (O'Sullivan, Rassel and Berner, 2008). These 
events are reshaping the region’s geo-economics, geo-politics and setting off the 
process of the Gulfanisation in the Arab world (Abdulla, 2010). 
Another hidden political factor, which is underplayed by the policymakers who 
are in charge of GCC bloc is to maintain military and security capabilities. Prior to the 
formation of GCC bloc, Britain as a dominant super-power with sophisticated military 
capabilities used to provide the required security support and also served as the sole 
arbiter of boundaries in the Gulf region. Therefore, Britain’s exit and the removal of 
its direct military presence in the Gulf in 1968 created a vulnerable power vacuum 
and left the GCC countries politically fragmented. The immediate task confronting the 
vulnerable oil rich GCC countries is to fill the gap left by Britain; they consequently 
formed the GCC to protect their socio-economic and political interests and deal with 
the political, social and economic intricacies with the world (Wilkinson, 1994; 
Crystal, 1995; Abdulla, 2010). 
Pinfari (2009) stated that two political threats that necessitated the establishment 
of the GCC bloc. The first was the fear of the regional ambitions of Iran under Shah 
rule and Iraq after their dispute on the Shatt-el-Arab. The second threat was the spread 
of Iran’s Islamic revolution to the region. To counter these political threats, the GCC 
integration charter was swiftly drafted and ratified by the GCC countries. With 
regards to Iran’s ambition in the region, Iran occupied three UAE’s Island of Abu 
Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Despite diplomatic negotiation, the 
policymakers in Tehran consistently refused to relinquish the control over the three 
islands. UAE within the GCC explored the opportunity to restrain Iranian expansion 
in the southern Gulf through an integrated militarily effort with Iraq lured into the 
42 
 
Gulf military strategy for a balance of power as the UAE's and GCC military forces 
cannot counter the security threat of Iran (Foley, 1999)  
With regards to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Abdulla (2010) 
explained that the incident confirmed the vulnerability of the Gulf region and the need 
for more cooperation. The invasion raised concerns about the territorial integrity and 
political viability of the GCC bloc, exposing its vulnerability and the need for 
proactivity to stop Iraq’s ambition in the region. Therefore, the formation of GCC was 
politically motivated to counter the military adventurism of both Iran and Iraq in the 
region, but the economic consideration was much more obvious (Patrick, 2011). 
The phenomenon of Arab spring, which started in Tunisia in December 2010 
triggered a series of unprecedented demonstrations in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. 
The political impacts of Arab spring have shaken the foundations of a variety of 
Middle East regimes especially the monarchies in the GCC states (Berger et al 2012).  
To conclude it is the hidden political factor that inhibits the actualisation of a 
unified common currency in the GCC bloc and the associated monetary and financial 
integration. This hidden factor needs to be taken into account when discussing why 
the uptake of the single currency agenda in the GCC has been prolonged. The political 
factor seeks to improve the military and security capabilities in the Gulf region and 
the entire Middle East. The events of the Arab Spring confirmed this reality as the 
GCC countries and non-member Arab states cooperated and collaborated to supress  
the Arab spring in their determination for durability of their authoritarian regimes 
(Bellin, 2012).  
The citizens’ lives within GCC countries have been unevenly transformed, 
with some of these countries developing faster than others in strategic areas such as 
education, health, gender balance, population, agriculture, manufacturing, private 
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sector employment, and exports. The capitals and cities in the GCC countries have 
also seen improved infrastructural developments and advancement of small and 
medium enterprises and large multinational companies, which needed to be 
strengthened for the region to compete effectively at the level of international trade 
(Al-Rawashdeh, Al-Nawafleh and Al-Shboul, 2013).  
Furthermore, the Gulf region faces political, economic, social and 
environmental challenges and these have raised a pertinent question on the 
desirability of OCA as well as its capability to redressing the above challenges. The 
World Economic Forum (2008) reports that Gulf countries were spending in excess of 
US $1 billion a year in costs and charges to support the direct trade amongst them. 
The same report also mentioned that some Gulf countries are lagging behind in terms 
of economic development because of lack of price transparency and mutual 
suspicions. Therefore, the use of a common currency is expected to mitigate the 
highlighted challenges and facilitate more developments amongst GCC countries and 
assist to develop the vital role of prominent Arab financial and economic 
development.  
A common currency is further expected to promote cooperation and 
development, especially of small and medium sized enterprises. The need for OCA 
becomes inevitable as the trade and the international investment policies are the main 
policy problems facing governments in the contemporary times (Willett and 
Auerbach, 2009). This could be better resolved by strategically uniting countries 
under a single currency and the centralisation of monetary policy among countries 
within the same region because the issue of “monetary policy is central for overall 
economic strategy in an economic and monetary union because of its control over the 
money stock” (Jovanović, 2005, p89). 
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2.10. Summary  
This chapter reviewed the previous studies that have been carried out on the 
economic and the political factors, which affect the adoption of single currency 
agenda. The GCC countries located in a shallow basin and hold two thirds of the 
proven oil, which makes them have a growing international importance and relevance. 
This importance could make the GCC countries move forward toward economic 
integration process. There was a phenomenon of forming economic blocs around the 
world such as (NAFTA), (EU), (ECOWAS) and (AU). These kinds of unions inspired 
the Arab gulf countries to form the GCC bloc.  
The GCC was formed aiming to achieve the economic integration, which 
make the countries come together for the mutual economic benefits and to protect 
their economic and political interests from incursion by other regions or blocs. In 
order to achieve the economic integration there are five stages should be 
implemented. Some of these stages are custom union, free trade area. The economic 
integration made the GCC counties to plan for a single currency through OCA. In the 
context of GCC bloc, the OCA allows the usage of a single currency for all GCC 
countries with maximum economic efficiency and minimum costs. Although the OCA 
has some impact cost on the interest of individuals in the bloc but the economic 
benefits of OCA overweigh the cost such as economic integration engenders unity in 
monetary and financial policies across member states. Furthermore, the four 
alternative exchange rate systems were examined, namely: (a) Pegging to the Dollar, 
(b) Managed Floating, (c) Basket peg and (d) Pegging to the Export Price of Oil. 
In this chapter, also the empirical studies on OCA were critically reviewed 
before and after the 2008 financial crisis. The review revealed that some studies 
suggested that the before forming a single currency union there are some 
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preconditions should be met first. The main preconditions are political agreement and 
economic integration. Based on the critical review of previous studies there were clear 
evidences, which support the significant benefits from forming the single currency 
agenda. One of these evidences stated by The GCC Document (2013) states that a 
single currency in the region has several advantages, which include the benefits of 
Customs Union and GCC Common Market. The socio-economic impacts include 
Intra-GCC Trade, boosting of tourism and cross-country investments, enhanced 
financial services and expansion of the capital markets, which would increase 
economic growth and accelerated financial market development. The single currency 
eliminates the risks associated with exchange rates fluctuations; deepens the common 
market, contributes to the integration of capital markets (securities market) thereby 
improving the stock market fundamentals and another evidence stated by Hebous 
(2006) The study found that there are large similarities exist among the GCC 
countries, a situation that would help reduce the costs of introducing a single 
currency. Secondly, small trade relations take place among member countries possibly 
because of similarity in the production structure, which has a negative impact as low 
intraregional trade reduces the economic benefits of a single currency.  
To sum up it is very clear from the critical review of the previous studies that 
there is clear evidence that OCA will benefit all the GCC countries economically. 
Hence GCC countries should carefully plan how to move forward toward the single 
currency union with maximum benefit if the political factors can be resolved. In next 
few chapters the OCA will be investigated and evaluated through quantitative and 




Chapter Three  
History of a Single Currency in the Gulf States 
3.0. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the literature review from two perspectives, 
namely, the empirical studies on OCA before and after the 2008 financial crises and 
political factor in the context of OCA in GCC bloc with a brief review on the 
historical factor. This chapter continues to explore the history of a single currency in 
the Gulf countries in more details. There is a widely held presumption that the 
national currencies of the GCC countries are strongly connected to Islamic cultural 
norms and values back to Prophet Muhammed era. This motivated us to explore 
further OCA theory and expand it to include a new factor, which is the history of the 
region with regard to single currency. This chapter provides critical historical study 
that supports or refutes this concept and clearly shows how the historical factor has 
been added to the OCA theory and its effect on the single currency project of GCC. 
Also the evidence that proves the single currency in the GCC countries is the normal, 
case whereas the multi currency is exceptional case is clearly presented.  
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the effect of the historical factors on 
achieving a single currency in GCC bloc. In section 3.1 the overall historical aspects 
of the single currency starting from early days of the first Islamic state up to the 
present days were addressed. The Gold Currency System, the Dinar Currency System 
in Period of the first Islamic State are discussed in section 5.2 while the history of 
Dinar during the Period of the four Caliphs (Khaliph’s) and Kings is explored in 
section 3.3. The recent calls for adopting the Gold Dinar as monetary system was 
reviewed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 is about the OCA theory with Historical factor. 
Finally, section 3.6 concludes the main findings that have been reached regarding the 
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single currency agenda in the Islamic history. This places the historical and cultural 
context that is region specific and is missing from earlier studies as discussed in 
section (2.7.1).  
3.1. The History of Single Currency  
In the Muslim world, the use of an independent currency by each province or 
state is relatively new. The prevalent currencies in the first Islamic State (which was 
founded by prophet Muhammed in Madinah) were Dinar (gold) and Dirham (silver). 
Dinar is a gold coin used as official currency during the period of Islamic civilisation, 
whereas the Dirham is silver coin, which substitutes and complements the Dinar 
(Samad and Hassan, 1999; Siegfried, 2001; Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008). Since the first 
Islamic state in Madinah until the end of Ottoman Empire (during 1920s) the Dinar 
currency alongside with the Dirham were used. The Dinar that was in circulation 
during that period and it was a metallic round 24 carats gold coin, weighing 4.25 
grams (Yaacob et al 2012). 
After the balkanisation of Ottoman empires into smaller Muslim states during 
1960s; these countries independently adopted different currencies, but some of them 
still making use of the Dinar and the Dirham as a currency name for their monetary 
due to religious, cultural and emotional imperatives effects. Some examples of 
Muslim countries that retained Dinar and Dirham for monetary imperative include: 
Kuwait (Kuwaiti Dinar), United Arab Emirates (UAE Dirham), Bahrain (Bahraini 
Dinar), Libya (Libyan Dinar), Morocco (Moroccan Dirham), Iraq (Iraqi Dinar), 
Algeria (Algerian Dinar) and Tunisia (Tunisian Dinar).  
However, all independent Muslim countries tried to maintain their Islamic 
heritage in economic, religious, cultural and emotional relationships through the 
formation of different blocs such as the League of Arab States (Arab League), the 
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GCC, Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MFTA), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 
and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) (Al-Saud, 1997; Lawson, 2012).  
In the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), the Muslim countries faced a 
poor economic performance traceable to low quality of administration in the public 
sector and a very low public credibility. These poor performance dimensions 
compelled the MENA to rethink the need for more openness of its political and 
economic institutions (The World Bank, 2003). To forge better integration, the 
MENA and GCC opted for economic and political integration. 
Gold has played a central role in Western and Islamic currency systems 
because of the Theory of Superpower Influence (TSI). According to Mundell (1997), 
whichever country adopted the TSI, the currency of such country will influence the 
international monetary system. Huntington (1999) further explained that the 
emergence of a superpower as a powerful nation unilaterally dominates the mandate 
of resolutions for important international maters, while less powerful states have to 
comply with these resolutions even if it was against their interests.  
TSI therefore explains a connection between the currency and the international 
power (super power influence), although the relationships between the two constructs 
is not clear, but the deducible fact is that a currency will not be valued and used 
internationally, if the issuing state/nation does not have a significant measure of 
economic and political influence in the world (Cohen, 2010).  
The theory unveiled the rationale behind the influence that the United States’ 
dollars has on other world currencies. At present in the global international economy, 
the foremost superpower is the United States of America. It has a great influence on 
the other powerful nations due to the strength of dollars at the level of international 
trade relations and politics (Mundell, 1997). When the TSI is applied to the single 
49 
 
currency agenda in the Gulf region, it could be argued that the agreement to have a 
single currency across the GCC countries is based on the strong belief that with a 
single currency in the region (as opposed to several national currencies), the region 
would be in a better position to assert its influence economically, diplomatically and 
politically among the community of nations at the level of international trade 
relations.  
With specific reference to the GCC bloc, which is the focus of this study, the 
six founding members that shared social, cultural and religious similarities and agreed 
to form the Gulf Cooperation Council in Abu Dhabi. The GCC was based on three 
tenets, namely: 1) coordination, 2) integration and 3) interdependence. The three 
tenets of the charter are applicable to economic and financial affairs, commerce, 
customs and communications, education and culture among member states (Al-Saud, 
1997; Patrick, 2011; Aljadani, Mear and Raimi, 2015b). Another important 
motivation for the formation of the GCC was the need to forestall the threat of the 
dispute on the Shatt-el-Arab between Iran and Iraq and also the fear of the spread of 
Iran’s Islamic revolution in the region (Pinfari, 2009). In view of the overarching 
issues raised above, their existence in the historical connection between the Dinar 
currency system and the single currency agenda in the Gulf States.  
3.2. Dinar Currency System in Period of the First Islamic State: 
During the formation of the first Islamic state (Madinah and Makkah 
combined) under the leadership of Prophet Muhammad, the two currency systems 
were the Dinar and Dirham. These two currencies belonged to the Roman Empire and 
the Persia Empire, respectively (Heidemann, 1998; Yaacob et al 2012). Affirming the 
preceding fact, Siegfried (2001, p320) stated “at the time of the Prophet, Muslims 
used raw metal or Byzantine coins as money. And that gold (Dinar), silver (Dirham), 
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and copper (fals) were the three sorts of metal used for economic transactions”. 
Furthermore, the leadership of first Islamic state was less concerned in developing its 
own currency system because the state was in the process of nation-building, faith 
consolidation and development of Islamic jurisprudence on socio-economic and 
political issues. Hence there was no need to change the inherited currency system and 
the state recognised the Roman Dinar and Persian Dirham as the official currencies 
(Salam, 2005; Yaacob et al 2012). The prevalent currency system allowed gold and 
silver coins to circulate simultaneously unhindered. Exclusive use of gold alone as a 
currency system is a short-lived idea. Therefor the Dinar was converted to Dirham 
based on rate 1:10, which remained stable throughout the period of the first four 
Caliphs of the Prophet (Chapra, 1996). In other words, the convertibility ratio of 
Dinar and Dirham for the payment of tithe (Zakat) was 20 Dinars to 200 Dirham 
(Raimi et al., 2013). 
The first Islamic leadership made far-reaching currency reform and guidelines 
to strengthen the exchange rate and the convertibility of these two currencies in 
Makkah and Madinah. This reform was necessary because both communities under 
the control of Islamic leadership had different exchange rate systems. Makkah was 
using the weighing system and Madinah was using the counting system, which 
created some confusion for traders and the public (Samad and Hassan, 1999). 
Consequently, to ensure free flow of trade and exchange, the Prophet directed that the 
citizens of Makkah should conform to the weighing system whereas citizen of 
Madinah should conform to the counting tradition system (Anwar, 2002; Yaacob et al 
2012). In other words, the Prophet did not mean to mint a new currency but only 
ensured the stability and harmonisation of conflicting exchange rate systems between 
Makkah and Madinah (Yaacob et al 2012).  It is worth mentioning that the two 
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conflicting exchange rate came due to two reasons. Firstly, the old Persian Dirham 
and Byzantine Dinar coins have very rough shapes, hence the users weigh them 
instead of counting as expected of any medium of exchange. Secondly, the people 
prefer weighting not counting because these coins were commodity money made from 
precious metals, which undergo wear and tear. Thus losing weight over time as a 
result of continuous usage for commercial transactions (Siegfried, 2001).  
The GCC countries considered having a single currency union is smooth 
achievable aim due to the historical link to Islam culture. The prevalent currencies 
inherited and retained were Dinar and Dirham. The Dinar is a gold coin in use during 
the period of Islamic civilisation as the official currency, while the Dirham is a silver 
coin, which substitutes and complements the Dinar (Siegfried, 2001; Raimi and 
Mobolaji, 2008).  
3.3. Dinar in the Four Caliphs (Khaliph’s) Era and Afterwards 
The four Caliphs (Khaliph's) (Abu Bakr Al Siddiq, Umar Ibn Khattab, Uthman 
Ibn Affan and Ali Ibn Abi Talib) who came after Prophet Muhammad continued with 
the use of Dinar as the medium of exchange. However, In the year 639AD (18AH) 
when Persia was conquered by Muslim, Khaliph Umar Ibn Khattab minted a new 
currency for Islamic state using the mold of the Persian bearing the quote of ‘al-
Hamdulillah/ Muhammad Rasulullah/ La ila ha illallahuwahdah’ and the picture of 
the emperor of the Persian and the image of place on the coins were kept (Yaacob, 
2012). Khaliph Umar Ibn Khattab initiated a reform on exchange rate between Dinar 
and Dirham by declaring 10 Dirhams are equivalent to 7 Dinars, and a Dinar weigh 
4.25 grams of pure gold value, while single Dirhams weigh 3 grams of pure silver. It 
was also documented that Umar’s name was engraved on some Persian Dirhams 
(Samad and Hassan, 1999). 
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However, Yaacob et al (2012) noted that a study by Al-Maqrizi argued that, 
Khalid ibn al-Walid the one who initiated the first change in Muslim’s currency by 
issuing a new one in 635AD (15AH) with his name engraved on it. Al-Maqrizi noted 
that Khalid ibn al-Walid retained the Greek emperor’s picture and the cross symbol 
on the currency and added his own name 'Khalid written in Greek as 'XAVED' on the 
new currency. Several Khaliphs of the Umayyad Caliphate and the Abbasid Caliphate 
continued the use of Dinar as a single currency, which represents “a symbol of 
strength and a Muslim’s identity during the time of the caliphates until the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1924” (Yaacob et al 2012, p348). 
 
Further historical sings revealed that during the period of stabilisation, the 
Roman Dinar and Persian Dirham were kept but the symbols were replaced to be 
Islamic-compliant. The first minted Islamic Dinar and Dirham in Islamic history 
occurred in 696AD (74H) and 697AD (75H), respectively. Khalifah Abdul Malik ibn 
Marwan minted the first Islamic Dirham currency as a replacement for the widely 
used Persian Dirham. Islamic Dirham was weighed 6 grams and on one side of the 
coin, the inscription of the verse of Qur’an called al-Ikhlas was written, while the 
other side bore the inscription of the word Tawhid. In order to distinguish Islamic 
Dirham from the Persian version the Islamic version was named Al-Dirham Al-Islami 
(Anwar, 2002).  
Other historical evidence showed that the currency reform of minting gold for 
Islamic state was traced back to the leadership of Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan 661AD-
682AD (41-60H) and Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwan in 696AD (74H) or 697AD (75H) 
even though the prevalent Byzantine coins were still being in use for commercial 
transactions (Siegfried, 2001).  In this era, the Islamic state had Dinar (gold coin) and 
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Dirham (silver coin) with known values and convertible exchange rates (Yaacob et al 
2012).  Figure 5.1.A below shows a picture (taken from British Museum, 2016) of the 
first gold Dinar used during the period of Abdul Malik Ibn Marwan (696/74AD). 
Figure 5.1.B depicts the last gold Dinar used by the Ottoman Empire before 
collapsing in 1924.  
 
A: First Gold Coin in Islamic State B: Last Gold Coin in Islamic State 
  
Source: (The British Museum, 2016)  Source:  (Yaacob et al., 2012). 
Figure 3.1: Coins used During Islamic History 
 
3.4. Revival of Gold Dinar as a Monetary System 
The use of Dinar as a single currency in Islamic world ended in 1924 sequel to 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Yaacob, 2009). Thereafter, several attempts were 
made for the reintroduction for Dinar without any success. The call for the adoption 
of the Dinar as an official currency was renewed by Abd al-Qadiral-Murabit, the 
leader of the Islamic Association of Murabitun (the Murabitun World Movement) in 
1992 (Yaacob et al 2012). The second coordinated attempt was traced back to Tun Dr 
Mahathir Mohammad, a former Prime Minister of Malaysia who proposed the gold 
Dinar system to be adopted in Malaysia.  At this period, Malaysia was heavily hit by 
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the 1997/98 Asian currency crisis; therefor the policymakers contemplated returning 
to the era of using Dinar (often called gold-based monetary system). It was viewed as 
more stable and reliable to encounter the economic shock compared with the 
conventional non-gold-based monetary system. This proposal attracted heated debates 
in the policy plans in Malaysia and outside. Undoubtedly, the Dinar was the first 
currency of the Muslims across the Islamic world and all related economic activities 
(Yaacob et al 2012). Later in 2003, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohammad recommended the 
adoption of Dinar currency system for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 
arguing that the Dinar has historically proved its relative stability, but the members of 
OIC had mixed reactions to the proposal (Yaacob et al 2012).  
From the previous discussion on Dinar currency system, it can be concluded 
that the move of the GCC bloc for a single currency agenda in the modern times is 
based on cultural, religious and stability imperatives. The implication of the above 
discussion is that the modern calls to form an economic and political bloc in the Gulf 
region have religious and cultural connections with the Dinar currency system that 
collapsed in 1924. This new call was not a call for the adoption of a gold standard 
system but it was a call for a single currency in the Gulf region, which driven by the 
theory of OCA. Although, the proposal is a very complicated, which requires a lot of 
preconditions and imperatives but the historical factor can be considered as one of the 
keys to ease achieving this goal. 
3.5. OCA Theory with Historical Factor in GCC bloc 
OCA theory was developed and introduced in the 1960s by Mundell, 
McKinnon and Kenen (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997; Dellas and Tavlas, 2009). 
Since the pronouncement and development of OCA theory, it has been applied in 
many economic blocs such as European Union and Central Africa to investigate their 
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suitability for a single currency. In order to assess the suitability of OCA for a given 
region, the scholars from Europe, America, Africa and GCC have granted serious 
consideration to the economic and political factors (Poldermans and Philippe, 2008; 
Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008). However, the historical factor has not previously been 
included in the OCA theory to investigate the suitability for a single currency in any 
economic bloc. Whilst in many regions it is a coming together of countries with 
different histories and traditions while the case of GCC is the opposite, which easing 
many of the problems of a single currency. However, in the case of GCC bloc the 
historical factor has a significant effect on the readiness of GCC to form a single 
currency. Furthermore, the historical factor is very important for the GCC countries as 
it shows the share of other Arab countries with languages, cultural and religious 
compatibility with the local populations.  
The historical factor binds the GCC countries together firmly and was evident 
even during the colonisation period. The historical national identity that has been 
symbolic in driving the GCC nationalists and leaders is based on the four foundations, 
land, people, time, and will to live together (Al-Khouri, 2010). This research fills the 
observed gap by adding the historical factor as a new dimension to OCA, which can 
be applied in evaluating the readiness of GCC bloc to form the single currency. 
Specifically, the research investigated the historical factor to understand the cultural, 
language, religious and customs that historically bind the GCC countries together and 
makes to potential adoption of a single currency smoother than any other economic 
bloc. This common dimension of historical factor can help the GCC bloc accelerate 
the adoption of a single currency. These findings confirmed the Proposition 1 as 
stated the Islamic culture and the history of GCC countries have a significant impact 
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in supporting the idea of achieving the single currency project. The main conclusion 
from this study is that the historical factor is a new context  added to the OCA. 
3.6. Summary  
Chapter three provided deep insight into the historical evidence that support 
the assertion for a single currency has cultural and religious link in the history of the 
Islamic State.  For not less than 800 years a single currency called Dinar served as the 
unifying medium of exchange across Muslim world. Colonisation and balkanisation 
of the Muslim world into small independent states made these nations adopt different 
national currencies within the last 90 years. The historical evidence discussed in this 
chapter shows clearly that Muslim world naturally had a single currency usage. 
Therefore, one of the GCC’s agenda was to adopt the idea of introducing the single 
currency project. From the historical analysis to two main findings were deducted. 
GCC countries have strong connections with Islamic culture and religion, this 
connection provide them with natural motivation toward a single currency project 
similar to what has been used in the past for Muslim world.  
The study revealed that the adoption of Dinar as formal currency was used 
during the first Islamic state the Dinar was minted from gold and the Dirham, which 
also minted from silver and these currencies are considered to be real asset money. 
Further historical studies revealed that during the golden age of Islamic Khalifa, the 
prevalent Byzantine/Roman Dinar and Persian Dirham were replaced with 
Islamically-compliant Dinar. In the study, an authentic evidence was obtained, which 
confirms that Khalifah Abdul Malik Bn Marwan established the first minted Dinar 
and Dirham in Islamic history. From the historical study and in my point view that it 
is very obvious the single currency had very deep roots back to Prophet Muhammad 
era. This kind of feeling and the sympathy with the Islamic culture results in several 
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calls were made for the reintroduction of Dinar without much success. Finally, the 
project of having a single currency was initiated by the GCC countries. This 
significant project faces economic and political challenges and issues that needs an 
effective attention by the GCC countries, which will be examined and investigated in 
chapters six and seven.  
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Chapter Four  
Theoretical Framework 
4.0. Introduction 
The theoretical framework provides a structure that logically supports the 
adopted theory in the research. The discussion of theoretical framework presents 
economic and political theories that are relevant to integration process and a single 
currency agenda in the GCC countries. The chapter focuses on the theoretical 
framework for OCA based on the works of (Mundell, 1961), (McKinnon, 1963) and 
(Kenen, 1969) and the prerequisite factors for applicability of OCA are introduced. 
The research framework was designed according to these prerequisite factors. 
Furthermore, this chapter presents some criticisms of OCA and also the main 
empirical studies on the OCA theory in other blocs in the world were examined. 
Section 4.1 explains the conceptual issues: Economic integration and OCA. Section 
4.2 looks at the adopted theory of this research the OCA theory and its factors. 
Section 4.3 the OCA modelling is introduced followed by section 4.4, which looks 
into the political theory. Finally, this chapter is summarised in section 4.5.   
4.1. Conceptual Issues: Economic Integration and Optimum Currency Area 
In this section, the definition of economic integration and optimum currency 
area are explained and discussed.  
4.1.1. Economic Integration 
The term economic integration has many definitions and applications; hence, 
there is a need for the clarity. Economic integration is broadly defined as the 
deliberate removal of all obstacles and discriminatory barriers for free trade and the 
free movement of economic factors within the countries that inhabit the same region 
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under an agreement of cooperation and coordination (Mutasa, 2003; El-Agraa, 2011). 
Another definition of economic integration is the removal of all trade impediments 
among the participating nations and the establishment of cooperation and coordination 
between them (Patrick, 2011). According to Mutasa (2003), economic integration 
refers to a form of unification between the states in the same region with the ultimate 
goal of promoting free movement of labour, goods and services and financial 
resources (capital) guided by harmonised trade, customs, fiscal and monetary policies. 
Furthermore, Raimi and Mobolaji (2008) defined the economic integration as putting 
the countries together for mutual benefits and to defend the economic and political 
interests of their region from incursion by other regions or blocs. From the previous 
conceptual definitions, the definition adopted for this research is the one provided by 
Raimi and Mobolaji (2008). The reason behind selecting this definition was; the 
definition clearly defines the basis of uniting the nations within the region and the 
basis of economic and political interests. The GCC bloc ratified economic integration 
treaty to consolidate the region’s economic interests, but the integration process was 
delayed because of divergent political interests of member states. Mutasa (2003) 
identified five stages, or taxonomies, of economic integration, namely, trade zone, 
custom union, common market, economic union and political union.  
The free trade zone is often the first and most common stage of economic 
integration; it entails allowing unhindered trade and the free movement of goods and 
services among members by removing trade barriers such as taxes and levies. The 
second stage is the custom union, which allows free trade among members and 
maintains common external tariffs and other trade measures against non-member 
states outside the union. The third stage is the common market, in which all members 
allow the smooth movement of the capital inflow and human resource inflow, while 
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each member retains its own power over its monetary and fiscal policies. The fourth 
stage of economic integration is the economic union, which is the main demand of the 
members. The economic union encompasses all other stages, in addition to a common 
monetary policy, a single currency, budgetary and fiscal policies and socio-cultural 
policies, which can boost the move towards the regional integration. At present, the 
GCC bloc is still struggling with the economic integration, which is the stage four. 
The fifth stage of economic integration that most nations escape away from is 
the political union, which required the total unification of political institutions, 
governmental organisations and institutions under a common central body and 
provides directions to all members on all matters.  For meaningful economic 
integration process, the political interest is very important and should not be ignored. 
Political integration is distinct from economic integration. According to Haas (1958), 
political integration is a process where states agree to pursue collective political 
interests with bearing in mind that all nations concerned downplay their individual 
national interests, expectations and loyalties for the central authority with far more 
superior powers, institutions and jurisdiction connotes over the states. Furthermore, 
Haokip (2011) defines political integration as the deliberate process of unification of 
heterogeneous groups and states with diverse culture and political interest under a 
single territory for the purpose of creation a national identity of a nation.  
From the foregoing conceptual discourse, one of the main benefits of 
economic integration in theory and practice is the creation of a collaborative 
mechanism to improve the quality of life of their citizens and to tackle poverty and 
indebtedness. Moreover, economic integration fosters accelerated development 
among member states based on mutual cooperation and coordination. Integration 
allows for common regulations of economic, industrial and financial matters, which 
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would strengthen the economic activities of all member states. More importantly, 
economic integration encompasses a major political issue in the form of informal 
cooperation on matters of internal security, defense and peacekeeping and the 
presentation of common voice on global issues at the General Assembly of United 
Nations, the UN Security Council and similar international organisations.  From the 
above, it can be surmised that the economic integration is likely to be precipitated by 
economic and political exigencies, as well as interests. 
4.1.2. Optimum Currency Area 
The term optimum currency area (OCA) has many similar definitions as 
presented in many published researches. It has been well established that the 
theoretical discourse on OCA was articulated by Mundell’s (1961) and seminal work 
by (Adams, 2005). The term OCA was simply defined by Mundell (1968) as a region 
or domain within which exchange rates are fixed based on exigency of monetary 
union.  
However, Mongelli (2008, p2) defined an OCA “as the optimal geographical 
area for a single currency, or for several currencies, whose exchange rates are 
irrevocably pegged. The single currency, or the pegged currencies, fluctuate jointly 
vis-à-vis other currencies.” Another viewpoint on OCA is that it is a region that 
allows the usage of a single currency for maximum economic efficiency and for 
political leverage over other regions outside the OCA (Coy, 1999).  
Similarly, Frankel and Rose (1996, p14) define OCA as “a region for which it 
is optimal to have its own currency and its own monetary policy.” While Laabas and 
Limam (2002), agreeing with previous definitions and add that OCA refers to area or 
region that agrees to form a common monetary and currency union for mutual benefit, 
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with several implications for the governance and economic structures of the member 
states. The various definitions above are aligned with the view of Mundell (1968).  
4.2. Theoretical Framework  
Theory provides the grounding that shapes the direction of academic enquiry 
and the basis for testing tentative propositions. The theories that provide the 
foundation for this research are two; namely:  
1) Theory of optimum currency area (OCA) and  
2) Theory of political integration. It is worth to mention that the optimum 
currency area provides the theoretical foundation for the quantitative aspect of the 
research, while the theory of political integration strongly supports the qualitative 
aspect.  
4.2.1. Theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
Historically, it has been mentioned that Milton Friedman’s work in the early 
1950s articulated the significance of monetary integration, a view that predates the 
OCA theory as defined today (Dellas and Tavlas, 2009). The theory of OCA could 
simply be summarised as an academic debate over the superiority of fixed exchange 
rate and floating exchange rate within a region with many countries (Ishiyama, 1975). 
Mongelli in 2008 defines OCA as distinct geographical area where a single currency 
is being used, or a region where several currencies are being used but the exchange 
rates are pegged. Consequently, the pegged currencies and the single currency 
fluctuate jointly relative to other currencies outside the region. Even though, all the 
GCC countries pegged their currencies to US dollar except Kuwait it does not 
automatically mean that this area is suitable for single currency.  Another definition of 
OCA is a region or continental area, which allows usage of a single currency for 
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maximum economic efficiency and political leverage above other regions outside the 
OCA (Mundell, 1961; Coy, 1999). Quite similarly Frankel and Rose in 1996 defined 
OCA as a region where the economic and social structures dictate that the approach to 
have a single currency with a centralised monetary policy.  
Horvath and Komarek (2002) stated that OCA theory attempts to provide 
answer to the raging question: what is the optimal number of currencies ideal for a 
region with similar social and economic structures?  It could also be viewed as 
framework designed to lead a region to monetary integration. Even though Laabas 
and Limam in 2002 agreed with previous definitions, but they added that OCA refers 
to an area or region that agree to form a common monetary and currency union for 
mutual benefits with several implications on governance and economic structures of 
member states. These implications include: 
1) Monetary integration, which presupposes one single currency and a 
coordinating central bank with power of monetary policy measures on 
liquidity, inflation, foreign exchange reserves and interest rates; 
2) Fixed exchange rates (currency pegging), meaning convertibility of member 
states' currencies with non-members; and 
3) A financial market integration, which entails openness and the free inflow of 
capital transactions and centralized financial regulations.  
According to Coy (1999), Mundell’s OCA can be adopted only for regions or 
areas with similar economies, which allow for an embodiment of a single monetary 
policy. Within the OCA framework, two types of currency areas could be identified: 
(a) A currency area with several countries with their own national currencies 
(Model A); and  
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(b) A currency area with many countries with a single currency (Model B) 
(Mundell, 1961). Mundell justified the preference for the former (that is, Model A) on 
the grounds that: For a currency area with several countries and their different 
currencies, there could be a form on cooperation if the countries with surplus rate of 
employment are willing to cooperate with deficit countries to absorb the excess 
workforce from the surplus countries. This is the mutually beneficial relation, which 
provides the formation of optimum currency area for cooperating nations. The choice 
of an optimum currency area depends largely on the size of the regional disturbances, 
the causal relationship among these disturbances, the costs of transactions across 
currencies, factor mobility in the region and the interrelationships between demands 
for different goods. On the strength of the observation of Mundell for Model A, it is 
evident that OCA raises the welfare across countries within the union, while it lowers 
welfare across countries outside OCA (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994). 
However, for a currency area with many countries and a single currency, the 
rate of inflation is better controlled based on the willingness of central authorities to 
allow unemployment in deficit countries (Mundell, 1961). However, these two 
Mundell models have not been applied in this research as it is out of the scope. 
An OCA has some economic costs and benefits associated with it during the 
implementation. The OCA essentially enhances the benefits of economic integration. 
On the cost of OCA, Laabas and Limam in 2002 noted that the main demerit is the 
loss of autonomy on monetary policy and regional currency. The first example is the 
European Union member nations that adopted Euro as a single currency and 
implemented monetary policy measures of the European Central Bank. This became a 
cost as the arrangements created burdens for individual government within the Union 
to take charge of their fiscal and structural policies individually to maintain financial 
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stability in their respective countries (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013). The second 
classic example of loss of autonomy over currency and monetary policy is the case of 
Central Africa, where six nations Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, the 
Central African Republic and Chad under the Communaute Economique et Monetaire 
de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) agreed to a single currency called Franc CFA 
(Mutasa, 2003). 
Furthermore, on the cost of OCA, McKinnon (2004) contended that OCA has 
several benefits, but the fundamental cost associated with the single currency agenda 
is abandonment and loss of power over monetary policy measures. By joining a single 
currency area, a nation maintains same currency controlled by a central monetary 
authority in the region, which consequently means automatic surrender of controlling 
its own monetary policy. When such economy is subject to an external shock, it has 
no choice but to follow the central monetary policy of the monetary union. Countries 
with similar economic structures can respond to a common economic shock with a 
common monetary policy, and the costs of giving up an independent monetary policy 
are relatively low. In contrast, countries with heterogeneous economic structures 
require different policy responses to common shocks, and the costs of sharing a 
common monetary policy are relatively high, which results in such kind of economies 
are not suitable for OCA.  
In spite of the ideas contained in OCA, McKinnon (2004) criticised the theory 
on the grounds that the lead proponent Mundell was inconsistent and self-
contradictory on two of his works.  For tackling economic shocks, he proposed 
smaller and homogeneous currency area, which allows for exchange rate flexibility in 
his 1961 treatise. However, in his later work in 1973, he proposed larger and the 
heterogeneous currency area, which allows for upholding asset holding for 
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international risk sharing.  The adoption of the OCA by European Union was 
described as the bane of its economic crisis, which rather than fostering economic 
prosperity became an economic trap leaving Europe with squabbling nations. 
Brackemyre (2014) explained that with regards to the OCA theory, there are 
two perspectives, namely: the traditional approach of OCA theory, which was 
proposed by Robert Mundell, Ronald McKinnon and Peter Kenen during 1960s and 
the alternative modern approach by several scholars in 1970s. More importantly, the 
traditional approach argued in favour of singling out specific, determining economic 
variables and uses those criteria to decide where the borders of OCA should be set. 
This traditional approach is hinged largely on economic framework, as the bedrock of 
OCA theory.  
Whereas, the alternative approach adopted by countries within a region of the 
currency union is a fundamental decision that has political and economic implications. 
Therefore, decision by countries to be in the same currency union requires a more 
holistic strategy that does not start and end with few economic criteria. The alternative 
approach advocates defining OCA as the point where the marginal costs and benefits 
of joining such a union intersect (with underlining mutually beneficial terms and 
conditions in place). These costs and benefits are not limited to a few economic 
criteria and instead extends to a wide range of social, political, and economic 
determinants. Despite the criticisms launched against the two versions of OCA, the 
conclusion is that economic integration through the adoption monetary union is 
reparable as it makes possible opportunity to rectify or repair the problem of 
isolationism that national governance is often operationally faced with. Monetary 
union is a multi-governance system with many benefits that outweigh the few 
inconvenient costs (Mongelli, 2008).  
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However for the GCC bloc, the GCC Document (2013) states that a single 
currency in the region has several advantages, which include the benefits of Customs 
Union and GCC Common Market. The socio-economic impacts include Intra-GCC 
Trade, boosting of tourism and cross-country investments, enhanced financial services 
and expansion of the capital markets, which would increase economic growth and 
accelerated financial market development. The single currency eliminates the risks 
associated with exchange rates fluctuations; enriching the common market, 
contributes to the integration of capital markets (securities market) thereby improving 
the stock market fundamentals.   
4.2.2. Criticism of OCA Theory and its Prerequisites 
Since the conceptualisation of OCA theory and its popularisation in academic 
circles, it has contributed to the theory of monetary integration and exchange rate 
adjustment under economic disequilibrium especially in the formation of the 
European Union and its Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It also provides a 
standard point of departure in discussions of dollarization and the creation of new 
monetary unions (Horvath, 2003). Even though the significance of the theory, but it 
faces several criticisms from researchers. The first criticism against OCA is that, the 
concept of integration conceptualised is vague as it was not clear whether it is a 
geographical or a political integration. The concept of mobility of factor production, 
especially labour can only be applied to a small region and not a large region of the 
contemporary. Labour mobility of the contemporary requires that labour be viewed as 
homogeneous in order to allow for perfect inter-country labour mobility and 
occupational mobility (Kenen, 1969). If there were a perfect labour mobility, then 
OCA would be applicable to the region (Horvath, 2003). 
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Furthermore, Mundell’s definition of region under the OCA theory received 
criticism. Mundell (1961) described the region as geographical areas, which allow 
mobility, factor on one hand (among member countries within a single currency area), 
and which equally allow immobility (among non-member countries outside the single 
currency area) on the other hand. Looking at the vagueness of the definition, Grubel 
(1970) described it as inappropriate, misleading and possesses little practical 
relevance in the contemporary times.   
Thirdly, the arguments that capital mobility with a common currency area can 
help mitigate and aid adjustment to asymmetrical shocks are faulty and unacceptable.  
According to Salant and Krause (1973) capital mobility may be feasible only in the 
short-run, but in the long-run capital mobility cannot resolve the adjustment to shocks 
for two countries within a common currency area for two reasons. Firstly, no sensible 
nation would embark on endless borrowing of capital from other countries to sustain 
the economic shock it is facing. Secondly, borrowing increases a nation’s 
indebtedness to other nations; therefore making a nation less credit-worthy among 
other nations, affecting interest rates and sustainability. 
Another fundamental criticism of OCA theory is that the theory is rooted more 
in political factors than the often advanced economic criteria/prerequisites. In other 
words, some OCA literature argues that OCA is more about long-term political 
commitment than economic criteria (Horvath, 2003). Ingram (1962) noted that within 
the OCA construct the economic consideration is less important or at least passive 
when nations decide on exchange rate arrangements. Therefore, economic definitions 
of optimal currency area and characteristics are dependent on the government’s 
commitment to a single currency agenda. 
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In conclusion, Mongelli (2002) summarized the inadequacies of OCA theory 
and its prerequisites as inability to rank the OCA properties in order of importance.  In 
spite of the constraints, price and wage flexibility and mobility of factors of 
production have been widely identified and acknowledged as the commonest in the 
OCA debates. Financial market integration at present only complements the process 
of fine-tuning the adjustment process in the monetary integration process. Inflation 
has had very modest status until the emergence of oil shocks. Economic openness and 
the diversification have indirect effects observable only through product and labour 
markets. The political will factor is very important and broad such that its effect 
encompasses the economic policy variables (especially fiscal and monetary policies). 
Political will means the will to reform economic and financial structures for economic 
integration, but the term has taken different meanings within different national and 
international context. Political will presupposes that, the GCC countries need to know 
that transition to a single currency union requires that governments of member nations 
to surrender to supra-national economic and political institutions including a central 
bank (that needs to be established independent to nations) to coordinate all regional 
activities in order to increase the intensity of political will, it is necessary for member 
countries to play the special role for its realisation through a unified economic, 
political and foreign policy measures; while at the same time avoiding suspicion and 
rivalry among member countries. 
4.2.3. Criteria/Prerequisite Factors for OCA 
The viability of the formation of a monetary union and the application of an 
OCA is based on critical conditions, or prerequisites, criteria or characteristics. In the 
literature on exchange rate regimes the prerequisites are eight in all as stated below 
(Mongelli, 2008). The eight prerequisites of an OCA were identified by Laabas and 
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Limam (2002) and Mongelli (2008) as: 1) degree of economic openness, 2) mobility, 
3) degree of commodity and diversification, 4) similarity of the structure of 
production, 5) price and wage flexibility, 6) similarity of inflation rates, 7) degree of 
policy integration and 8) political factors. For the purpose of this study the 
prerequisites have been categorized into six quantitative and two qualitative 
prerequisites.  
However, other researchers have simply noted that the adoption of an OCA 
within a monetary union is predicated on some prerequisite factors that help to 
mitigate the fallout from asymmetric shocks. These factors are: 1) flexibility of prices 
and wages, 2) intra-regional factor mobility, 3) openness to trade, 4) product 
diversification, 5) fiscal integration, 6) strong political will and 7) public support 
(Masson and Taylor, 1993). The relationships among the eight prerequisites of the 
OCA prerequisite factors are discussed below. 
1) Degree of Economic Openness: This factor explains the degree to which an 
economy is open to international trade. A better off country has a greater 
potential to survive international trade and exchange rate instability than 
another economic country. Therefore it is more desirable for smaller countries 
to join a monetary union, which can allow them to enjoy openness while still 
being protected against trade fluctuations and shocks (Ishiyama, 1975; 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). 
2) Mobility: This factor presupposes that a country that allows free movement of 
productions within and outside its economy will do better in an OCA than a 
rigid counterpart. Mobility allows for self-adjustment among nations within a 
monetary union; thus, a nation with labour abundance offsets another nation 
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with labour deficiency, and the same holds true for capital inflow and outflow 
(Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008). 
3) Degree of Commodity and Diversification: The more diversified the 
economies within a region, the more effective to establish a monetary union, 
since the union would protect the economies from external shocks. 
Consequently, the adjustment of exchange rates to cope with shocks would be 
unnecessary (Mongelli, 2008). In other words, diversified countries are well 
suited to monetary and currency union (Laabas and Limam, 2002). 
4) Similarity of Structure of Production: In OCA, when faced with external 
shocks from international trade, economies with homogeneous or similar 
production structures are more likely to share the same experiences (that is, 
they are symmetric). This presupposes that these countries are less likely to 
adjust their exchange rates to mitigate the shocks. Economies with these 
characteristics are qualified for monetary unions and single currencies (Laabas 
and Limam, 2002; Mongelli, 2008). 
5) Price and Wage Flexibility: Countries willing for an OCA require flexible 
nominal prices and wages within the currency union and among countries. 
This condition enhances the union’s response to the market shocks, which 
could cause unemployment and inflation in some members. Therefore, the 
union does not need to use the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism 
(Laabas and Limam, 2002; Mongelli, 2008). 
6) Similarity of Inflation Rates: With a symmetric production structure, 
countries with similar inflation trends or rates are more likely to utilise similar 
monetary and fiscal measures to correct their inflationary challenges. 
Moreover, the lower or higher inflation rates in these countries could stabilise 
72 
 
the terms of trade fairly overtime. Thus, it is in the best interests of such 
economies to embrace a monetary union with a single currency and centralised 
economic policies (Fleming, 1971; Laabas and Limam, 2002). 
7) Degree of Policy Integration: The willingness of members and their positive 
attitudes towards harmonised fiscal policies and other commercial policies is a 
precondition for a currency union (Laabas and Limam, 2002). This 
precondition allows for better risk-sharing among members states in a 
monetary union when shocks occur (Mongelli, 2008). 
8) Political Factors: In both the political and the economic literature on 
integration, an important precondition for its adoption and effectiveness is 
political will. For a monetary union adopting a single currency and economic 
policies, the willingness of political actors is crucial (Mintz, 1970; Laabas and 
Limam, 2002). The political factor cannot be downplayed as politics fosters 
compliance, commitments, and enhances cooperation on economic policies for 
the interest of members, as well as encourages integration of financial and 
non-financial institutions in the bloc (Mongelli, 2008). 
4.3. Modelling the OCA Criteria 
The empirical work of Frankel and Rose (1997) support OCA on the ground 
that an increased economic integration in its entire forms free trade zone, customs and 
monetary union, free movement of factors, especially labour. Also increases 
convergence between nations within the same region, thereby cutting drastically the 
costs of monetary union viewed in terms of loss of exchange rate control. Opposing 
the submission of Frankel and Rose (1997), Krugman (1993) argued on the basis of 
empirical evidences from North America that tendency towards economic integration 
is not a guarantee for convergence and could certainly result in divergence, thereby 
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increasing the costs of monetary union.  Two further empirical studies of Krugman 
(1993) established that the higher the trade integration, the higher the correlation of 
business cycles among participating countries in a single currency area. The 
conclusion was that business cycles and trade integration are intertwined and are 
internal factors (endogenous variables) required for entering or forming a currency 
union. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) in their study found that there was a 
cointegration in the movements of real exchange rates among the three East African 
nations. Based on this finding, the author concluded that the three East African 
nations accommodate an optimal currency area based on G-PPP cointegration 
analysis.   
The empirical work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) investigated the 
applicability of OCA in various economic situations, and highlighted its failures in the 
presence of rational economic agents who maintain and adjust their expectations for 
the future. When ‘rational expectations’ exist, a policy rule can result in an improved 
social outcome over the use of OCA as embodied in discretionary policy. Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) argued that OCA is only applicable where decisions are based on 
past and present information. In dynamic economic situations this is not the case since 
rational economic agents form, and act upon, expectations of future policy changes. 
Therefore, the current policy leads to a “game” between policy makers and agents, 
which can be either divergent or convergent in relation to a stable policy-outcome 
mix.  
Apart from empirical studies, official report of GCC affirms progress on 
economic integration on the grounds that the Supreme Council observed satisfactory 
progress in the areas of Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union, and 
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infrastructure integration projects in the GCC states especially electricity grid project 
and the railways project (Final Communiqué of the 30th Session, 2009). Although the 
integration process among the GCC countries has increased since its formation, but 
the realisation of OCA in the GCC bloc is becoming a challengeable task as 
evidenced by the continued postponement of the commencement date and emerging 
political crisis among member countries. A single currency initially proposed to take-
effect in 1999, but was extended for political reasons due to precautions and 
disagreements (Lawson, 2012). However, the common currency project of the GCC 
bloc has become elusive and delayed, the barriers and challenges could be broadly 
explained under micro-level and macro-level challenges. More importantly, the GCC 
official statement on the level of policy integration reads:  
 “The Ministerial Council perused the report of the Ministerial 
Committee concerned with the follow-up on the decisions 
pertaining to the joint process, and expressed satisfaction at the 
progress made with regard to implementing the decisions of the 
joint process, and looked forward to the implementation of the 
remaining decisions in this connection… 
 
The Supreme Council examined the progress report in the area of 
the Customs Union, the GCC Common Market, the Monetary 
Union, and the infrastructure integration projects in the GCC 
States, the most important among them being the electricity grid 
project, and the feasibility study for the GCC railways. The 
Supreme Council expressed satisfaction at the achievements made 
and issued directives pertaining to them” (Final Communiqué of 
the 30th Session, 2009, online) 
 
The finding on political factors like the degree of policy integration is largely 
a political issue that cannot be measured quantitatively when linked to the theory 
OCA. Lack of political will largely explains the prolonged delay in starting the single 
currency project despite over 15 years of debate on the issue. There is mutual 
suspicion and fear of domination by some member countries, especially Saudi Arabia 
in the GCC (Lohade, 2013). The suspicion could be resolved if a necessary legal 
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framework and institutional building for a single currency in the region could be 
quickly put in place to strengthen commitment by member nations to the project of a 
single currency (Final Communiqué of the 30th Session, 2009). 
To determine the fitness and suitability of countries within a particular region, 
there are several models and techniques for testing OCA criteria. Adams (2005) 
identified seven models and techniques of OCA criteria, namely: 1) Generalised-
Purchasing Power Parity Analysis [mode], 2) the OCA Index [model], 3) Structural 
Vector Autoregression Regression (SVAR) [techniques], 4) Correlation and Cluster 
Analysis [technique], 5) the Gravity Trade [technique], 6) Macroeconomic Modelling 
[technique], and 7) the Cointegration Test. From these seven measurements, the 
research adopted the macroeconomic modelling the Cointegration method as the 
technique for modelling the six factors of the OCA criteria.   
4.4. Theory of Political Integration 
The theory of political integration places emphasis on the political structures, 
factors and processes, which affect policy relations among states, as it is a foundation 
for a multi-level governance approach. Multi-level governance conceptualises 
integration process as an extension of authority across jurisdictions at diverse scales 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2009).  
The term political integration in a political sense could be better viewed as a 
sector-based concept with the underlying meaning of uniting, unifying and organizing 
a group of two or more dispersed units for the actualisation of a political community 
with mutually beneficial interests (Hoppe, 2007). The duty of national governance 
and its institutions are to provide an efficient, equitable and responsible functioning of 
a market economy, a sound financial system, prevention of anti-competitive 
behaviour, socially responsible corporate governance and a embedment of system for 
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property rights and contracts necessitated the development of concept of multi-level 
governance (Bekemans, 2008). The phenomenon of multi-level governance is 
strongly linked to the emergence of the European integration process, liberalization 
and decentralization in the nineties especially the Treaty of Maastricht and its 
subsidiarity principle and the concept of decentralization (Bekemans, 2008). In the 
field of political science, the multi-level governance is exemplified as decentralization 
- the shift of power from the central state toward multi governance levels. Hooghe and 
Marks (2003) identified two types of multi-level governance, namely: (a) Type I and 
(b) Type II systems. Type 1 or a multipurpose sub-central jurisdiction is multi-
governance approach that allows overlapping memberships operating within the sub-
central jurisdictions. It is governance with fixed number of levels of sub-central 
jurisdictions functioning as one uniform design for the whole system. Type II systems 
or task-specific jurisdictions are multi-governance approach with overlapping 
memberships operating within unlimited number of jurisdictional levels with flexible 
design. 
On the theories of regional institution building. There are several strands, 
which are emerged from several different intellectual traditions. Neoclassical trade 
theory and growth theory provide the conceptual basis for understanding whether the 
regional economies will converge or diverge over time. For mutually beneficial 
relationships, the nations within a given region collaborate in building institutions and 
structures that would be beneficial to all (Dawkins, 2003).  
A relevant theory of regional building is the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which 
explains how free trade and/or factor mobility equalizes prices of factors of 
production among regions in international trade relations. The model assumes that if 
region 1 specializes in the production of A (labour-intensive good), while region 2 
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specializes in the production of B (capital-intensive good). Regional institution 
building allows for excess factor of production in one nation to be absorbed by 
another nation that has shortage. With sustained trade relations between any two 
nations, the nation that has enhanced specialisation in production, the relative price of 
its labour in the labour-abundant tends to rise due to relative increases in the demand 
for labour from the other nation with shortage.  
Conversely, the relative price of capital tends to rise in the capital-abundant 
nation due to relative increases in the demand for capital in the other nation with 
shortage. Even if capital and labour are immobile, the aggregate effect of these market 
forces is to equalize relative factor prices across regions (Dawkins, 2003; Raimi and 
Mobolaji, 2008).   
Moreover, Ilievski (2015) added that political integration when viewed as the 
process of uniting and centralization of interest groups, the four pre-determined 
conditions and elements have always been the need to establish a unified legal 
framework; to create common institutions; to develop decision-making centre; and to 
promote and project the identity of the unifying units. From the above-stated pre-
determined conditions and elements of political integration, it is has been argued there 
are strands of political integration theories, namely: social contract theory (Ilievski, 
2015), theories of regional institution building (Katada, 2009) and theory of multi-
level governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). These three strands of political 
integration theory emphasise the importance of political cooperation, common 
institution and political structures for the benefits of all parties involved a regional 
integration. However, the social contract theory is the adopted political integration 
theory for explaining the delay and apathy to adopt a single currency union in GCC 
countries. The choice of social contract theory as opposed to other is premised on the 
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fact that failure of national governance and its institutions to provide an efficient, 
equitable and responsible functioning of a market economy, a sound financial system, 
prevention of anti-competitive behaviour, socially responsible corporate governance 
and a embedment of system for property rights and contracts necessitated the agenda 
of a single currency union through the formation of the GCC and leveraging multi-
level governance systems and institutions. 
The origin of social contract theory has been well discussed by philosophers 
such as Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689) and Jean Jacques Rousseau 
(1762) as a self-preservation concept. Before the development of social contract 
theory, the state of affairs in the society as well as social relations among people were 
characterised by lack of political authorities, lawlessness and anarchy leading to 
unending war among communities. The pragmatic political solution brokered to 
redress the unpleasant social and political relations in Europe at that auspicious period 
was the invention of the state in its purest sense. The invention of the state created a 
platform for political integration as individuals readily surrendered their personal 
liberty and freedom for preservation of human life, collective liberty and property to 
the political leadership (Ilievski, 2015). The move by the GCC countries to form an 
economic bloc is therefore a form of social contract. On the imperative of political 
integration through state formation, Thomas Hobbes (1651) asserted: 
“When men live without other security than what their own strength 
and invention shall furnish them, ...the only way to erect such a 
common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of 
foreigners and the injuries of one another... is to confer all their 
power and strength upon one man... or an assembly of men that may 
reduce their wills... unto one will” (Baum, 2004, p56). 
 
 Reinforcing the viewpoint above on political integration in a conflict-prone 
world, Herbert Spencer (1892) stated: 
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 “We see the wandering group dispersing, dividing, held together 
by no bonds; the tribe with parts made more coherent by 
subordination to a dominant man; the cluster of tribes united in a 
political plexus under a chief with subchiefs; and so on up to the 
civilized nation, consolidated enough to hold together for a thousand 
years or more... Thus in all respects is fulfilled the formula of 
evolution. There is progress toward greater size, coherence, 
multiformity, and definiteness” (Baum, 2004, p56). 
 
Social contract theory has been applied with variations to a number of 
contemporary discourses on political integration, sustainable development and 
welfare economics (Benabou, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 2009; De Jasay, 2012). 
Benabou (2000) used the social contract theory to explain how countries with similar 
economic and political "fundamentals" can sustain such different systems of social 
insurance, fiscal redistribution, and education finance picking from two models: the 
United States and Western Europe models. The commitment to a social contract by 
parties to the contract could be either revocable or irrevocable.  Social contract 
becomes revocable, if the parties (individuals, groups and nations) to the contract 
preserve their respective pre-contract identity and autonomy. The revocation is 
allowed with some costs payable by the party breeching the social contract. On the 
other hand, a social contract becomes irrevocable, when the parties that go into the 
contractual agreement lose their respective pre-contract identity and autonomy 
indefinitely because all the identities belonging all the identities have been merged 
into a new entity by extension all autonomies have also been surrendered (De Jasay, 
2012). In the case of GCC, the extent to which member’s identities/sovereignty 
should be surrendered (and hence whether it is revocable) will be governed by the 
GCC agreements. An example of a revocable agreement is article 50 of the Lisbon 




Social contract theory when applied to the ongoing single currency agenda in 
the GCC bloc presupposes the intention for a political environment that reflects the 
existence of political cohesion, a strong political institution and a formidable image 
among comity of nations. The GCC bloc is believed to be better off, if the GCC 
countries promote a political integration through inclusive economic, social, religious 
and cultural policies that bring about economic convergence and equitable 
development to the region, while reducing economic inequality and poverty. Patrick 
(2011) noted that operational objectives of the GCC are clearly embedded in the three 
tenets of the body, namely: 1) coordination, 2) integration and 3) interdependence. 
Part of the coordination, integration and interdependence is for member nations to 
allow for effective utilisation of surpluses and deficits.  
A labour-abundant nation would explore free movement for the transfer of its 
excess labour to a labour-deficient nation, and the same principle applies to capital-
abundant situations (Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008). In other words, a worthwhile 
political integration is the integration model that joins labour and capital frontiers of 
the GCC countries. Despite the simplification of integration process, the GCC has not 
fully attained a single currency area owing to these political factors. This is not 
surprising because GCC countries reserve their national identities and autonomies 
despite adoption of the final stage of economic integration and political integration. 
Katada (2009) argued constructively that from the experiences of the Asian region 
that governments are sceptical compromising their sovereignties and political 
autonomies for full political integration unless three political elements are well 
articulated. These include: clarity on regional cooperation, creation of mechanisms for 
compensating parties to the agreement styled “losers” and the “weak” and clear 
definition of beneficiaries form the integration mechanisms. Similarly, Hooghe and 
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Marks (2009, p2) explained that political integration process as a multi-level 
governance mechanism is often delayed or compromised because “the functional need 
for human co-operation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community. 
Communities demand self-rule, and the preference for self-rule is almost always 
inconsistent with the functional demand for regional community”. 
4.5. Summary  
This chapter discussed the theoretical framework of OCA according to the 
works of (Mundell, 1961), (McKinnon, 1963) and (Kenen, 1969) and also highlighted 
the required prerequisite factors for the implementation of OCA.  The aim of the 
theoretical framework in this thesis was to demonstrate the application of both 
economic and political theories, which are the main building blocks for the integration 
process and a single currency agenda within the GCC countries. The two theories that 
made the foundation for this research are optimum currency area (OCA) and theory of 
political integration. The theory of OCA provides a solution in finding the optimal 
currency for a region with similar social and economic structure. The framework also 
designed to make the region achieve monetary integration for mutual benefits and 
some degree of costs regarding the governance and the economic structures of each 
member. One of the main implications, which results in the adaptation of single 
currency is the central bank with power of monetary policy measures on all finance 
aspects. Another implications also should be considered are the fixed exchange rate 
and the centralised financial regulations. In order to implement OCA there are eight 
factors should be taken into consideration, namely 1) degree of economic openness, 2) 
mobility, 3) degree of commodity and diversification, 4) similarity of structure of 
production, 5) price and wage flexibility, 6) similarity of inflation rates, 7) degree of 
policy integration and 8) political factors.  
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In this chapter, two currency areas were identified the first one is a currency 
area with several countries with their own national currencies and the second is a 
currency area with many countries with a single currency. However, Mundell justified 
the preference for the first one on the grounds that: For a currency area with several 
countries and their different currencies, there could be a form of cooperation if the 
countries with surplus rate of employment are willing to cooperate with deficit 
countries. The framework also argued that OCA could only be applied when decisions 
are made on both past and present information. This is not the case for dynamic 
economic situations since rational economic agents form, and act upon, expectations 
of future policy changes. This leads to the current policy plays a “game” between 
policy makers and agents.  
        This chapter discussed the theory of political integration to emphasis the 
political structures, factors and processes, which affect the policy relations among 
states. This is due to the political integration makes the foundation for a multi-level 
governance approach. The concept of political integration when viewed as a process 
of uniting and centralizing of interest groups, the four pre-determined conditions and 
elements have always been required to establish a unified legal framework; create 
common institutions; develop decision-making centre and promote the identity of the 
unifying units. The three strands of political integration theory emphasise the 
importance political cooperation, common institution and political structures for the 
benefits of all parties to the formation of a regional integration. All in all the argument 
in this chapter is that there is a lack of political will of GCC nations in forming the 
OCA, which explains the reason for the delay in the implementation of this important 




Chapter Five  
Research Methodology 
5.0. Introduction 
Methodology entails collecting the relevant data for making informed 
academic research. This chapter provides an overview on the methodology employed 
in current research. A comprehensive discussion on the adopted methodology with 
appropriate justifications is presented. The methodology used in this research is the 
mixed method (quantitative and qualitative). First part includes the first part of the 
discussion, which focuses on the ontological discourse on the position of the 
researcher regarding the reality. The second part of the chapter discusses the 
philosophical domain and epistemological foundation of the research. This was 
followed by discussion of three dominant paradigms in academic research, namely: 
Positivism, Interpretivism and Pragmatism. The chapter provided the research 
process justifications for the adoption of mixed paradigms using Johannes’s 
cointegration method. 
5.1. Ontology 
Ontology as a philosophical position in research asks a critical question: what 
is the nature of social, economic, environmental and political reality that a researcher 
attempts to investigate? Wrong ontological standpoint leads to wrong epistemology, 
wrong theoretical perspective, wrong methodology and wrong data sources (Crotty, 
1998; Hay, 2002; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). According to Hay (2002), 
the term ontology means the phenomenon out there to be learnt or investigated. 
Besides, ontology refers to assumptions that humans made about the nature of 
social reality in terms of claims about what really exists, what the reality looks like, 
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what units make up the social reality and how these units of reality interact with each 
other. In other words, ontology is concerned with what researchers believe to 
constitute social reality. Ontology embeds epistemology, which also guides the 
choice of theoretical perspective of a good research (Crotty, 1998). Since ontology is 
a personal mind-set of a researcher, it is seen as the basis for which the research 
should be assessed. From multidisciplinary application, ontology is conceived as a 
means of sharing and reusing knowledge. The practice of adopting more than one 
ontology is gaining prominence. The process of comparing and combining several 
ontologies to form a more extensive one is termed as ontology merging (Hitzler et al 
2005). 
The practical aim of this thesis is to develop the concept of OCA as a 
beneficial framework for uniting the GCC countries under a single currency. The term 
OCA is a scientific framework that has wide application in empirical studies across 
Europe, Asia and Africa. Economic integration issue is matter of convergence or 
divergence, which is an ontological issue of a single social reality. Based on the 
strength of foregoing explanations, the ontological position of this thesis is based on 
philosophy merging. This position arose from the mixed research methods. For the 
qualitative approach, the ontology is multiple realities as the viewpoints sought 
through interviews allow for subjective and multiple perceptions. For the quantitative 
approach, the ontology is a single reality as the viewpoints elicited through available 
data (from secondary sources) allow for objective and tele-guided viewpoints; it is 
either the GCC countries fulfill the prerequisite for OCA or not. Philosophy merging, 
which used in this thesis provides comprehensive and detailed explanations for a 
better understanding of the issues causing the delay in adopting common currency in 




Closely tied to the ontological question (What is out there to know?) is 
epistemology, which Hay (2002, p64) simply defines as “What and how can we 
know about it?” However, Blaikie (2000, p8) defines epistemology as “all the 
possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is understood to be. 
In short, claims about what is assumed to be exist can be known.” Furthermore, 
epistemology is defined as “the theory of knowledge that defines what kind of 
knowledge is possible and legitimate” (Feast and Melles, 2010, p1). Upholding an 
epistemological position in research, involves making an option from three 
standpoints, namely: objectivism, constructionism and subjectivism (Crotty, 1998; 
Feast and Melles, 2010).  
With regards to the meanings of these three standpoints, Crotty (1998) further 
explained that objectivism is premised on the belief that where knowledge and 
absolute reality exists within the social context where humans live, but could be 
unveiled through systematic investigation of causes, effects and explanations. 
Objectivism, while examining cause-effect relationships, employs the use of 
prediction, theory testing and hypotheses development/validation on the basis of 
which explanations are given. Subjectivism presumes that human behaviour or social 
reality could exclusively be understood through experience sharing with those 
involved, that is, reality could be reconstructed through self-understanding by 
researchers with the actors.  
However, constructivism is an epistemological viewpoint that that social 
phenomena develop within distinct social contexts. To understand social reality 
therefore, researcher must involve relevant individuals and groups in the creation/re-
creation of social reality where this reality is changeable. These changes evolve 
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overtime as social interactions continue in human society. The epistemological 
position of this thesis is a combination of objectivism and subjectivism. The issue of 
economic integration among the GCC countries and the associated social reality, 
which obstructs the establishment of a common currency since its formation can 
effectively be understood by adopting an objective epistemological posture. 
However, the political factor is a qualitative issue, which cannot be objectively 
verified, hence this research employed subjectivism. This research combined the 
examination of the economical and the political aspects and their relationships. This 
approach required an adoption of a mixed method approach. The positivist analysis 
is used to analyse the economics of an OCA whereas the interpretivist approach is 
used in the political analysis of the GCC. This approach will provide a more nuanced 
and comprehensive explanation of the process. 
5.3. Research Paradigm 
Research paradigm is simply a discussion backed by justifications when 
making a selection between positivism and interpretivism philosophical positions. 
The two common paradigms in contemporary research are: positivism and 
interpretivism (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). This section will provide a 
concise critique on positivism and interpretivism. At the end, the advantages/merits 
and disadvantages/demerits of both paradigms are discussed. 
Hergenhahn and Henley (2013) established that positivism finds relevance in 
social sciences, as the social issues cannot be observed directly without following a 
scientific approach. Furthermore, positivism avoids arbitrariness in reaching 
conclusions for the good of the society. This is the concept of neutrality and 
objectivity (Babbie, 2008; Al-Habil, 2011; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). 
Adopting both positivism and interpretivism are justified by the concept of 
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methodological pluralism. Lee (1991, p342) stated that “the positivist and interpretive 
approaches are opposed and irreconcilable”. In fact they are reconcilable; a researcher 
can be a positivist and enhance his/her research with input from interpretivism and 
vice versa. The philosophical position of this research is mixed paradigms. The 
positivist paradigm is upheld for understanding the Economic issues in the OCA in 
the GCC. The interpretivist paradigm is upheld to elicit information on the political 
factors from interviewee in the GCC countries. 
5.3.1. Positivism 
Positivism is defined as a research philosophy that based on the principles of 
which researchers should conduct their investigations objectively, free of valued 
judgement and independently in the social environment (Al-Habil, 2011). Positivism 
also has been defined as a belief that the empirical process of science is the only 
authentic way of attaining reality because “empirical methods, make extensive use of 
quantitative analysis, or develop logical calculi to build formal explanatory theory” 
for finding answers to scientific inquiry (Shafritz, Krane and Wright, 1998, p1718).   
Furthermore, Al-Habil (2011, p949) noted “positivism could be seen as the 
belief in the existence of objective reality, which could be explained and controlled 
through causal relations and testing hypotheses that establish statistical inferences”. 
According to the definitions above, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) explained 
that positivist ensures objectivity is maintained and sustained when the social 
environment is being observed, and that process of collection of data/facts, analysis, 
presentation and inferences is also objective.  Put differently, Shafritz, Krane and 
Wright (1998) noted that positivism is constructed on the notion that reality within 
the social context in which humans live could be objectively understood and 
investigated based on scientific methods of establishing facts.  
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Based on the discussion above, positivism is the norm in the natural sciences 
and is employed as tool for explaining, predicting and analysing the behaviour of 
natural phenomena. The adoption of positivism in the social sciences presupposes 
that social issues and phenomena would be explained and predicted using scientific 
analytical process of cause-effect relationship (Al-Habil, 2011). This suggests that in 
both the natural sciences (where the positivism paradigm historically emerged) and 
the social sciences (where it is borrowed and adopted), the most important element is 
the methodological uniformity in conducting research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Al-
Habil, 2011; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012).  
When positivism is used in natural sciences, it is viewed as scientific method 
of research, whereas if applied to social sciences it becomes a science policy for 
solving socio-economic and other challenges facing the society (Al-Habil, 2011). 
The positivism is contemporary empirical research (in both natural and social 
sciences) that is not connected to its theory-building potential, which entails “the 
development of a collection of related and testable law-like statements that express 
causal relationships among relevant variables” (White, 2001, p44).  
Positivist argument sounds strong in theory and practice; however, it received 
a number of criticisms. Firstly, it was found to be inappropriate in the fields of social 
and management sciences as it is not people-focused (Hummel, 1991). Al-Habil 
(2011, p950) explained further that rejection of positivism by Ralph Hammel’s was 
based on the argument that research in social sciences “should pay more attention to 
the stories managers tell [interpretations], which is a valid approach to produce 
knowledge, instead of maintaining the objectivity of science (for the critics including 
Hammel) the use of scientific standards, which the positivist approach asserts, is not 
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an appropriate research tool for studying this type of administrative practice” as 
people-focused problem can only be solved by interacting with the people involved. 
Secondly, Wang (2016) argued that the outcomes of positivist investigation 
are often based on rational proof from science, which has no connection with social 
issue; the positivist approach take a position on issues after rigorous scientific inquiry 
and the outcome of the process is applied to other things and areas.  
5.3.2. Interpretivism 
Interpretivism is a reactionary paradigm, which queries the philosophical 
limitations of positivism as inadequate for social sciences (Al-Habil, 2011). The 
concept of interpretivism emerged in the 19th century and the credit for its intellectual 
conceptualisation and development was acknowledged to a German scholar, Wilheme 
Dilthey (Spencer et al 2003; Al-Habil, 2011). Conceptually, the term interpretivism in 
the literature is a research paradigm, which is built on presumptions/principles related 
to the social environment of humans. It is basically based on subjective and personal 
experiences of humans as researchers or observers of events in the social world. The 
bottom-line of interpretivism is that social phenomena being investigated could be 
better understood if the researcher/investigator looks into the totality of events and 
how people provide meaning and interpretation to events in the social world (Brown, 
2006; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). Similarly, Ritchie and Lewis (2003) 
described interpretivism as a paradigm that presumes reality could be best 
investigated and understood by studying the personal experiences of human beings as 
actors within historical and social contexts in which they live.  
Furthermore, Henn, Weinstein, and Foard (2009) described interpretivism as a 
paradigm that seeks to gain meaning and deep understanding about human behaviour 
from a people-focused approach involved, rather than a causal relationships approach. 
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In other words, people provide meanings to realities within defined social and cultural 
contexts. Whereas, White (2001, p47) perceived interpretivism as a “philosophical 
traditions of the analytical philosophy of language, hermeneutics, and 
phenomenology”; he believes that when conducting a research, the language used by 
humans within a social context enhances better understanding to the social problems 
being investigated. According to Butin (2010), the focus of interpretivism is not to 
seek after a positivist’s single reality or authoritative truth, rather an insight into 
people’s perspective within the social and cultural contexts to enable researcher 
understand realities.   
The first criticism of interpretivism is due to its subjective nature, where 
results are constrained by “validity, reliability and generalisability” tests; hence is not 
replicable and repeatable by another person (Kelliher, 2011, p123). Another criticism 
of interpretive research that is a paradigm abandons the scientific procedures of 
systematic verification/investigation and therefore results cannot be generalised or 
extended to other situations. This limitation makes scientists/positivists query the 
overall validity and the inherent benefit of interpretivist research (Mack, 2010). 
5.4. Rationale for Adopting OCA Theory  
Most of studies in the field of single currency area used the framework of 
OCA theory. For example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) applied OCA theory for 
investigating the relationship between OCA characteristics and the observed 
behaviour of exchange rates. They made the OCA theory functional and 
implementable by formulating an OCA for the investigated European countries.  
OCA has gained popularity as a model for measuring asymmetric shocks, 
labour mobility and the transactions value of a single currency exchange rate in 
countries with a monetary union (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997). 
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OCA has a broader view perspective of shocks in single currency area; it looks 
at several factors ranging from asymmetric shocks, price fluctuation/inflation, labour 
mobility and exchange rate, whereas other like a Generalized-Purchasing Power 
Parity (G-PPP) involves the use of consumer price index focuses on exchange rate 
variability as the offshoot of the real exchange rate variability criterion introduced by 
Roland Vaubel in 1977 (Enders and Hum, 1994; Sarno and Taylor, 1998).  In other 
words, if the Real Exchange Rates (RERs) in countries with the single currency union 
are non-stationary, but other macroeconomic factors that influence exchange rate are 
related across member countries, then a linear combination of all the non-stationary 
RERs will lead to shared stationary trends in the long-run across member countries 
(Mishra and Sharma, 2010).  
On the contrary, (G-PPP) is simply a model for testing for non-stationary of 
the bilateral real exchange rate (Sarno and Taylor, 1998; Laabas and Limam, 2002; 
Chiemeke, 2010). G-PPP is useful for predicting nonlinear adjustment in single 
currency region with real exchange rates volatility especially where the countries 
within the single currency area have very high inflation rates (Sarno, 2000). The key 
argument of G-PPP is that inflation rate in a country and its bilateral nominal 
exchange rate with another country are strongly influenced by other countries within 
the single currency area (Enders and Hum, 1994).  
OCA is more comprehensive in the sense that it presumes the countries with 
similarity in their business cycles and prices/exchange rate shocks are more likely to 
adopt a single currency area. By coming together they are able to counter the shocks 
with a single monetary policy thereby avoiding the excessive cost of counter-cyclical 
monetary policy (Darvas and Szapáry, 2004). The comprehensiveness of OCA made 
its appropriate and relevant for studying single currency issue in GCC countries. 
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5.5. Research Process 
 The research problem as stated in chapter one is to provide explanation for 
how OCA could strategically build long-term unity and development of single 
currency in the GCC bloc. Beyond the logistics of time, space and resources, the issue 
of research process (that is, the progressive stages of research) to be adopted is critical 
if a research is really designed to “understand individuals’ perceptions of the world” 
(Bell, 2014, p7). The methodology in the literature is full of different views on 
research process. Johanson (1994) proposes eleven research process steps for 
meaningful research. Crotty (1998) identified four sequential research process steps, 
namely: epistemology, the theoretical perspective, methodology, and methods. Cohen, 
Manion, and Morrison (2013) identify eight sequential stages of the research process. 
Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2006) proposed five stages (design, sampling, data 
collection, data analysis and presentation). In this research, Johnson’s (1994) eleven-
stage process was partially followed and is explained in the following sub-sections. 
5.5.1. Selected Research Method  
Selecting a suitable research method from the several methods available is 
indeed a crucial task in the research process (Johnson, 1994). Blaxter, Hughes and 
Tight (2006) explained that the research method refers to how the researcher intends 
to carry out the research, use for data collection, processing and analysis.  Selecting a 
research method entails to make a choice from the three methods qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed research methods (Johnson, 1994; Babbie, 2008; Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). Before making this choice, it is useful to explain each of 
the three methods. The qualitative research method refers to a research method where 
non-numerical soft data were collected through interview technique, data are 
transcribed from voice to word using content, thematic and discursive analyses 
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(CTDS), on the basis of which conclusions are drawn (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2012).  
Moreover, the qualitative research method employs an inductive reasoning 
approach. Data collection in qualitative research is often carried out using techniques 
like survey interview, focus groups and ethnography. Limitations of qualitative 
research and its techniques include data overload, labour intensity, time waste, poor 
response rate, a generalisation of findings, subjectivity or researcher’s bias and non-
representativeness for example, an inadequacy of sampling, due to having only a few 
cases (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 2006; Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2012). Johnson (1994) notes that qualitative methods are slow. Thus, 
the qualitative research method is often used for small-scale research that seeks 
merely insight, rather than absolute truth or facts on social, economic and political 
phenomena. Adoption of a qualitative research method is based on the nature of the 
research and the skills and ability of the investigator to do justice to this method 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012).  
Quantitative research collects quantifiable information, secondary data and 
numerical data from people and institutions, which allows for statistical analysis. 
Quantitative research based on survey questionnaires and documented secondary 
sources, and its collected data are analysed and interpreted using descriptive and 
inferential statistics, on the basis of which conclusions are drawn (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2012). Compared to the qualitative research method, the quantitative 
research method has a high response rate as it allows for anonymity and 
confidentiality in the process of data gathering (Denscombe, 2009). For this research, 




For the qualitative research, on the other hand, the interview technique was 
used. In view of the scope of this research, thirteen interviewees from seven financial 
institutions were carefully selected for their seniority in decision making, economic 
analysis, and banking industry. They were chosen to reflect the objectives of 
identifying economic, political and cultural factors issues that causing the delay of 
implementing the single currency in GCC. An interview is an important element in 
the qualitative research strategy; it involves generating useful answers through 
conversations with the target audience on topic of their interest to the researcher.  In 
terms of their managerial status, all the interviewees are top-level professionals, 
bankers and policymakers who are familiar with the work of the GCC and its single 
currency agenda. 
The quantitative research method finds grounding in deductive reasoning to 
establish a cause-effect relationship on the basis of theories (Babbie, 2008). 
Quantitative research is often used for large-scale studies that seek authoritative 
information on social, economic and political phenomena. The major limitations of 
quantitative research are that it is a monolith; hence, it can be ineffective because it 
seeks one absolute reality using a scientific approach. In contrast, business and 
management research allows for multiple realities and a variety of explanations 
because it is people-focused and people-centred, and these people interpret issues 
differently. In other words, quantitative research creates a static view of life 
(Jankowicz, 2005; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012; Bryman and Bell, 2015). 
The mixed methods emerged as a ‘third paradigm in social research. It is 
unique a research paradigm that is accommodative and consistent with the pragmatist 
perspective of research. It also accommodates some degrees of diversity and provides 
researchers with methodological choices of triangulating between two paradigms 
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(Denscombe, 2008). The defining characteristics of the Mixed Methods approach 
involve its use of quantitative (QUAN) and qualitative (QUAL) methods within the 
same research work. It aligns with a research design that allows QUAN and QUAL 
elements of data collection and analysis.  
Furthermore, the mixed research defines the manner in which the QUAN and 
QUAL aspects of the research relate to each other especially how triangulation is 
used. Finally, mixed research connects with pragmatism as the philosophical 
underpinning for the research (Bryman, 2004; Bryman, 2007; Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2007; Denscombe, 2008). It has been argued that, the philosophical premises of 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies are incompatible; therefore, the use of both 
methods is encouraged to leverage both strengths (Denscombe, 2008; Morse, 2003). 
 A number of scholars argued that that researchers make use of mixed methods 
to improve the accuracy of their data, to produce a more complete picture by 
combining information from complementary kinds of data or sources; it is deployed 
as a means of avoiding biases associated with a single-method approaches; it is used 
to analyse and build upon initial findings using contrasting kinds of data or methods; 
and it aid sampling when questionnaires are being used to screen potential participants 
for inclusion in an interview programme (Bryman, 2007; Collins, Onwuegbuzie and 
Sutton, 2006). The drawback of the mixed methods research is the difficulty faced by 
researchers is how to integrate the findings from the QUANT and QUAL aspects of 
mixed research.  
Bryman (2007) noted that the cogent reasons for the difficulty in integrating 
quantitative and qualitative research is connected with the nature and strategies of 
both research methods. In view of the significance of triangulation, it is necessary to 
discuss triangulation in mixed research methods. What is triangulation? Triangulation 
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is often defined the deliberate desire by the researcher to use more than one particular 
approach when conducting research for the purpose of obtaining richer, expansive 
data and comparison results of research (Raimi, 2015; Wilson, 2014). It is an 
approach that has gain acceptance in social science research (Bryman, 2004).  
Four types of triangulation have been identified by Flick (2002). These are 
data, investigator, theory and methodological triangulations. Data triangulation 
involves using data from several sources, different times, difference places and 
different people in a research. Investigator of triangulation entails using different 
methods in the data gathering and analysis of data. Theory triangulation is the practice 
of embedding data within multiple theories for the purpose of extending research 
frontier or for the possibilities of producing new knowledge. In other words, 
methodological triangulation is the use of more than one method to gather data for a 
research (Flick, 2002; Raimi, 2015).  
5.5.2. Research Methodology 
The mixed method approach is used in this thesis to link political and 
economic factors that affect the GCC’s single currency. Using this kind of method 
will enable the research to have deep insights and enriched findings. Previous studies 
in the GCC’s single currency have adopted a single research method. Adopting mixed 
research approach is a significant advantage, which could contribute to the body of 
existing knowledge in this field of research. In order to have a deep look and clear 
picture of the research, the quantitative and the qualitative research methods are 
combined together. For the quantitative research, the documented secondary data on 
socio-economic indicators and financial transactions were officially obtained from the 
GCC secretariat and the missing data were obtained from the UNCTAD and World 
Bank. The secondary data (quantitative) were used to analyse six out of eight pre-
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requisites of OCA, namely: 1) openness; 2) factor mobility; 3) degree of commodity 
diversification; 4) similarity of structure of production; 5) price and wage flexibility 
and 6) similarity of inflation rates. The analysis was carried out using Cointegration 
Test. In order to investigate the quantitative OCA factors, the Johansen method of 
cointegration was used. 
The Johansen method of cointegration is usually used for testing the presence 
of cointegration between variables. The cointegration can be defined as if linear 
combinations of two or more non-stationary time series data generate a stationary 
error term, then the two series are cointegrated. The Johansen method is used in this 
study to analysis the prerequisites of OCA theory for the GCC countries. Based on 
this analysis, the cointegration relationships between the GCC countries can assessed 
in light of achieving single currency union. In order to carry out the Johansen 
analysis, the following steps should followed; Convert the raw data values to 
logarithmic values, Check the original time series for unit root test by Augmented 
Dickey Fuller, Check the first differenced series for unit root and final Run the 
cointegration test.  
In the case of unit root, macroeconomic time-series data are usually 
considered to be non-stationary (Nelson and Plosser, 1982) and therefore conducive to 
spurious regression. The test for stationarity of a time series at the outset of 
cointegration analysis should be performed. In order to empirically test for 
cointegration between the variables under consideration, series should be investigated 
if they are stationary or not using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF) (Dickey and 
Fuller, 1979). Most of time series data are usually non-stationary, therefore unit root 
tests are necessary to make sure that all model variables are stationary.  If a variable is 
stationary in its level is considered to be integrated of order zero 𝐼(0) . When a 
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variable is not stationary in its level form but stationary in its first difference form, it 
is considered to be integrated of order one or 𝐼(1). Enders (2010) mentioned that 
multivariate generalization of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or Schwarz 
criterion (SC) is used to select the lag length. The unit root test is based on estimating 
the following regression equation 6.1. 
∆𝑋𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝑡 +  𝑎2𝑋𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝐶𝑖 ∆𝑋𝑡−𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝜌
𝑖=1                 (6.1) 
Where 𝑋𝑡 is the series being tested, 𝑎0 is a constant, 𝑎1 is the coefficient of 
time trend, 𝜌  is the number of lagged differences included to capture any 
autocorrelation, and ∆ is the first difference operator. The null hypothesis for unit root 
is 𝐻0: 𝑎2 = 0    
In the case of cointegration test, the econometric framework used for the 
analysis is the Johansen (1998). The idea of cointegration, which was first introduced 
into the research by Granger (1981), is applied in economics to determine the long run 
or 'equilibrium' relationships.  Cointegration is the statistical technique used for 
testing the existence of a long-run relationship between economic variables (Thomas, 
1993). Johansen test is used to identify cointegrating relationship between the 
variables. Johansen Cointegration test was selected as an econometric technique used 
for testing the hypotheses, and the cointegration economic relationships contained in a 
model involving non-stationary stochastic variables. Johansen Cointegration test is an 
effective for ascertaining the relationships among multiple economic variables; it is 
valuable for testing and estimation macroeconomic model where long-run 
relationships among variables affect present/future observed values.  
The Johansen Conintegration is used to analyse all the six quantitative 
prerequisites factors of OCA using an updated (up to 2015) statistical data obtained 
from UNCTAD and the World Bank. Cheung and Lai (1993) note that, trace tests are 
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more reliable and robust than the maximum eigenvalue tests for testing the 
cointegration. The Johansen trace test used to determine the number of cointegrating 
vectors between the variables, the null hypothesis says that there are at most 𝑟 
cointegrating vectors (𝑟 = 0) is tested against the alternative that (𝑟 = 1) where r 
equals the number of cointegrating vectors. For existence of cointegration there 
should be at least one cointegrating vector. If series are integrated with the same 
order, 1(𝑑), cointegration test is required to investigate the existence of a stable long-
run relationship between the variables. It is worth mentioning that when series are 
integrated at the same order, for instance, as 1(0), they are naturally cointegrated and 
the estimated model is considered to be relevant. However, when they are all 
integrated at 1(1) , the series itself is not stationary, but its first difference is 
stationary. When series are not integrated at the same order, then cointegration could 
not be exist among them over the long-run period. 
The Johansen procedure is based on likelihood ratio (LR) test to determine the 
number of cointegration relationships among the variable. Johansen method is used to 
test for the presence of non-unique cointegrations as shown in equation 6.2. 
Δ𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶 +  ∑ Γ𝑖 ∆𝑌𝑡−1 + Π𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝜂𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1                 (6.2) 
Where, 𝑌𝑡  is a vector of non-stationary variables, Γand Π are the coefficient 
matrices, 𝑘  denotes the lag length and 𝐶  is a constant. The information in the 
coefficient matrix between the levels of the Π is decomposed as Π = 𝛼𝛽 where the 
relevant elements 𝛼  matrix is adjustment coefficients and the 𝛽  matrix contains 
cointegrating vectors. 
Two statistics tests are advised to select the number of cointegrating relations 
based on LR test. In this analysis the cointegration relationships among the 
prerequisites of OCA theory were determined using EViews9 software. The OCA 
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factors of Saudi Arabia are considered to be independent variables because it is the 
largest economy in the GCC region. The economic decisions of Saudi Arabia have 
significant impact in whole region. Thus, the economic cointegration relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and other GCC has the plausibility of reducing the potential 
cost of common monetary policy, whereas the factors of the other GCC countries are 
considered to be dependent variables. Both trace statistic and maximal eigenvalue 
statistic are obtained. Since the Trace test is more robust than the eigenvalue test, so 
the analysis relied only on the Trace test to make a decision whether the variables are 
cointegrated or not (see Duttat and Ahmed, 1999 and Odhiambo, 2005). The Null 
Hypothesis is rejected if there is at least one cointegration with 5% level of 
significance. The trace test (𝜆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒) maximum eigenvalues and are defined in equation 
6.3 and 6.4, respectively. 
𝜆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 = −𝑇 ∑ log (1 − ?̂?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑟+1 )                (6.3) 
Where T is the number of unusable observations, and λ is the estimated values 
of the eigenvalues and n is the number of separate series to be analysed. The null 
hypothesis is that the number of Cointegration vectors is ≤ r  where 𝑟 = 0, 1 𝑜𝑟 2 
against the alternative hypothesis that the number of Cointegration vectors = 𝑟. 
λmax = −T log(1 − λr+1)                (6.4) 
Which test the null hypothesis that the number of Cointegrating vectors = 𝑟 
against the alternative that there are 𝑟 + 1 cointegrating vectors, the null hypothesis, r 
= 0 is tested against the alternative that 𝑟 = 1 , and 𝑟 = 0  is tested against the 
alternative 𝑟 = 2. The λmax test has the sharper alternative hypothesis. It is usually 
preferred for trying to get the number of cointegrating vectors (Enders, 2010). 
The qualitative research method was used to investigate the other two from the 
eight pre-requisites of OCA, namely: 7) degree of policy integration and 8) political 
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factors. The researcher conducted interviews with experts in economic integration in 
the GCC countries. The total number of the interviewee was thirteen who have a deep 
knowledge and expertise in GCC’s single currency. A brief description of their 
professionals and expertise is provided in section 7.1. The study was carried out over 
period of three months in Saudi Arabia. The interviews were conducted in Arabic 
because the Arabic language is the official language in all of the countries concerned 
and is the native language of the researcher. 
5.5.3. Data Collection 
In order to carry out the empirical verification, this study used secondary and 
primary data. For the quantitative research method, all the secondary data are from the 
UNCTAD, World Bank Indicators. The data period is from 1980 to 2015 section 6.1 
explains the data in more details, which can lead to a more robust analysis as the 
progress towards a single currency has been accelerated recently.   
In order to achieve the reliability and validity of the interview questions, a 
pilot study was carried out as explained in section 7.2.1. For the final interview 
questions version, it was modified according to the feedback obtained from the pilot 
study (see Appendix C). The interviews were designed to gather information that 
could not be obtained by the secondary data. The major OCA factors that secondary 
data could not capture are political factor and degree of policy integration. The 
quantitative research tool was a semi-structured interview with eleven questions was 
constructed. The questions were formulated based on the issues arising from the 
reviewed theoretical and empirical studies. The interview questions were very specific 
questions designed to obtain the required viewpoints from the interviewee. On other 
words this part elicits the viewpoints of the interviewees on the pros and cons of a 
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common currency area, policy issues and associated challenges in the GCC (About 
Issues on GCC/Monetary and Political Policies).   
5.5.4. Data Process 
This represents the process of collating and streamlining the numerical data 
(for the quantitative research aspect) and collating and transcribing the voice data into 
text data (for the qualitative research aspect). This stage of the research process is 
described as a stage of readiness as it entails accountability in reporting what has been 
gathered in the field of enquiry. The secondary data for the quantitative research 
aspect were collated, tabulated chronologically and imported into EViews9 to preform 
Johansen cointegration test. The qualitative data gathered form the conducted 
interview were analysed using content and thematic analysis.  
5.5.5. Data Analysis 
In this research, there are two sets of data: the non-numerical qualitative data 
collected from the interviews and the numerical quantitative data. Both data involve 
different data analyses. For the quantitative research, the numerical data generated on 
the socio-economic indicators and financial transactions of the GCC were analysed 
using the Johansen cointegration test. It is used to test the existence of a long-run 
relationship between economic variables among the six quantitative OCA factors. For 
the qualitative research, the non-numerical data collected were transcribed and 
analysed using content analysis (CA) and thematic analysis (TA), following 
conventional methodologies for analysing qualitative research (Babbie, 2008; 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012).   
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5.5.6. Enabling Dissemination 
Research outcomes become useless if they are not disseminated to the end 
users. It is the researcher’s responsibility to promote research findings through 
presentations of findings before presenting them to the panels, academic staff, 
colleagues and the business community (Johnson, 1994). For this study the findings 
will be presented to the GCC Secretariat for consideration and implementation. The 
benefit of internal and external dissemination is the sharing of valuable findings, 
results and field experiences with a wider audience (Johnson, 1994).  
5.6. Ethical Considerations  
This research ensures the confidentiality and privacy of all human and 
institutional participants. To render the study ethical, rights regarding anonymity, 
confidentiality an informed consent was issued, as recommended by the ethical code 
of the university. This code prescribes the principles of confidentiality, security of 
data collected, no harm, prior consent, intrusion on privacy and anonymity [De 
Montfort Code of Research Ethics (4.2.2.)]. This research was guided by the terms 
and conditions of Ethical Approval of Faculty of Business Administration and Law 
(BAL). Due to the seniority of the respondents’ it is not possible to show their 
positions without identifying the person. 
5.7. Summary  
 This chapter provided a brief discussion on the adopted methodology applied 
in this research with appropriate justifications. Some important philosophical issues 
such as ontology, epistemology and paradigms were presented. Methodology concept 
can be understood as the process of collecting relevant data for making informed 
research decisions. The first part of the discussion focuses on the ontological 
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discourse on what is reality and what is the position of the researcher on reality. This 
was followed by discussion of some dominant paradigms in academic research, 
namely: Positivism and Interpretivism. This was followed by a discussion on research 
paradigm, which is simply a discussion backed by justifications for making a choice 
between positivism and interpretivism philosophical positions.  
 The philosophical position of this research is mixed paradigms. The positivist 
paradigm is upheld for understanding the economic issues in the OCA in the GCC. 
The interpretivist paradigm is upheld to elicit information from human in the GCC 
countries regarding the political factors, which cannot be investigated using 
positivism. The positivist paradigm is upheld to process secondary data on the GCC 
countries that found in the institutional documents. From the foregoing explanation, 
the two paradigms have been applied for problem-identification and problem solving 
by two different methods. Therefore, the choice of research paradigm could be based 
on the nature of research and researcher’s orientation. The research process was also 
explicated in this chapter.  
 The chapter provided justifications for the adoption of mixed paradigms, OCA 
and Johansen Cointegration test. Johansen Cointegration test is an effective tool used 
for ascertaining the relationships among multiple economic variables; it is valuable 
for testing and estimation macroeconomic model where long-run relationships among 
variables affect present/future observed values. The chapter was concluded with 
discussion of the ethical considerations/ issues in research especially issues of 
confidentiality and privacy of all human and institutional participants.  
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Chapter Six  
Economic Data Analysis I Quantitative Analysis 
6.0. Introduction  
The GCC countries have made a significant progress toward the integration of 
economic and financial systems. A quantitative analysis based on OCA theory is 
essential to identify the similarities and/or the differences of the economic structures 
of the GCC countries. Theoretically, the OCA theory emphasises a number of criteria, 
which have to be satisfied for a successful CU. These criteria are essentials to 
minimise the cost of implementing the CU. Based on the OCA quantitative 
prerequisites 1) degree of economic openness, 2) mobility, 3) degree of commodity of 
diversification, 4) similarity of structure of production, 5) price and wage flexibility, 
6) similarity of inflation rates, the magnitude of the costs of establishing the CU can 
be predicted.  
In order to analyse the convergence criteria of the GCC countries, the 
cointegration analysis of OCA theory prerequisite is performed. The Johansen (1994) 
method of cointegration is used to implement the analysis. A successful monetary 
union depends on the presence of cointegration relationships between OCA factors in 
GCC countries, which can be used as evidence that support the formation of this kind 
of CU. Indeed as the number of cointegration relations increased means more 
common trends among the OCA factors, which may indicate the robustness of the 
effective economic coordination between GCC countries.  In this chapter a 
quantitative study of OCA factors are carried out to be used as indicative tool to 
assess the suitability of GCC countries for forming a currency union. This study 
provides an updated analysis based on the previous studies discussed in section (2.5.2) 
such as Laabas and Limam (2002), Hebous (2006), Alturki (2007), Kim, 
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Hammoudeh, and Aleisa (2012) and Aloui, Hkiri, Nguyen, and Hamida (2014) that 
investigated the OCA factors within GCC countries. The main aim of this chapter is 
to evaluate the appropriateness of the economic integration of GCC to form the OCA. 
The following sections of the chapter assess the suitability of GCC countries to 
implement the single currency through the OCA theory. Thus, the Hypothesis of this 
chapter suggested that the GCC countries are cointegrated and converged for forming 
a single currency in terms of economic principals. 
6.1. Data Explanation of the Quantitative Prerequisites Factors of OCA 
 This section presents the description of the data of the six quantitative 
prerequisites factors of OCA, it is important to note that the factors five and six are 
merged together. 
6.1.1. Openness 
Openness as explained in section (4.2.3) can be defined as how open is a 
country to the international trade. It can be measured by the average of exports and 
imports (goods and services) as a percentage of GDP. In order to measure the 
openness, the trade openness indicators were employed. The trade openness indicators 
are calculated for trade in goods, trade in services and total trade in goods and 
services. Note that the average of imports and exports, which indicates roughly the 
size of international trade, is the sum of imports and exports divided by two. The raw 
data for GCC countries, apart from Qatar as it was not available, were collected from 
UNCAT between 1980 and 2013 annually, (refer to Appendix A).   
6.1.2. Mobility  
Mobility as explained in section (4.2.3) can be defined as the free movement 
of productions within and outside a country. UNCAT measures the mobility using the 
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current account net, expressed in millions of dollars and as percentages of GDP. This 
indicator represents the balance-of-payments current account data for all transactions 
between residents and non-residents of the GCC countries, including economic values 
of goods, services, income and current transfers. In order to measure the mobility, the 
Balance of payments, Current account net was employed. Usually the current account 
balance refers to the difference between current pay-in and payout for internationally 
traded goods, services and income payments. From a national perspective, the current 
account balance is equal the difference between national savings and domestic 
investment. The collected data was from UNCAT between 1980 and 2015 annually 
(refer to Appendix A). 
6.1.3. Degree of Commodity of Diversification 
Diversification for an economy is an index, which can be calculated by 
measuring the absolute deviation of the trade structure of a country from world 
structure. In other words the index is a measure of the degree of product 
diversification. The diversified economies are considered to be a very effective to 
establish a single currency union, which can protect them from external shocks. In 
order to measure the degree of commodity diversification, the merchandise: a 
diversification index of exports and imports by country was employed. The product 
diversification index represents whether the exports and imports of the GCC countries 
are concentrated on a few products or diverged in a more homogeneous manner 
among a series of products. The collected data was from UNCAT between 1995 and 
2015 annually (refer to Appendix A). 
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6.1.4. Similarity of Structure of Production 
Countries with similar production structure are more likely to face symmetric 
external shocks and to exhibit high covariation in economic activities. These countries 
are less likely to adjust their exchange rates as a tool to ease these kinds of shocks, 
which makes them better candidates for single currency as explained in section 
(3.2.3). In order to measure the similarity of structure of productions, indicator of 
similarity in merchandise trade structures, 1995-2015 was employed. The collected 
data was obtained from UNCAT between 1995 and 2015 annually (refer to Appendix 
A). 
6.1.5. Inflation Price and Wage Flexibility and the Consumer Price Index  
Similar inflation rate indicates similarity in the economic structure in the 
implementation of the economic policies. This could be appreciated for countries such 
as GCC, which are going to coordinate their plans to fulfil the requirements for the 
single currency. This factor can be measured using the Consumer Price Indices (CPI). 
The CPI is an inflationary indicator that can be calculated by the weighted average of 
prices of a basket of consumer goods and services, purchases by a consumer. In other 
words the CPI is calculated by taking the average of the price changes for each item in 
the predetermined basket of goods and services. Fluctuations in CPI are used to 
evaluate the changes in the price associated with the cost of living. The analysed data 
provides information on CPI, in addition, annual growth rate indicator. The collected 
data was between 1980 and 2015 annually for World Bank indicators except Oman 
and UAE (refer to Appendix A). 
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6.3. Empirical Result  
In this section, the empirical results of this study are discussed. Firstly the Unit 
Root Test Results are presented followed by the Cointegration results.  
6.3.1. Unit Root Test Result 
Table 6.1 summaries result of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Unit Root Test) 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979) regarding to MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values as the 
lag lengths were selected regarding to Akaike Info Criterion result (Akaike, 1974). 
The aim of the table is to present the stationarity test for the individual variable and to 
make sure it is integrated. The first column represents the GCC countries and the 
second column spilt into two cells, where the first cell refers to the level and the 
second refers to the first difference. The reset five columns refer to the five OCA 
quantitative factors of OCA namely; Openness, Mobility, Diversification, Production 
and Inflation. 
Table 6-1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF) Unit Root Tests 
 
          Variables 
 
GCC countries 
Openness Mobility Diversification Production Inflation 
Bahrain Level 0.518 -3.338 -0.397 -1.752 1.344 
1st difference -5.582 -7.111 -4.032 -4.380 -4.377 
Kuwait Level -0.583 -3.116 -0.806 -1.312 0.140 
1st difference -6.215 -6.511 -6.303 -5.121 -4.313 
Oman Level 0.667 -3.621 -1.771 -2.004 N/A 
1st difference -7.132 -7.651 -4.741 -4.593 N/A 
Qatar Level N/A -1.441 -1.056 -1.180 -0.098 
1st difference N/A -5.415 -3.210 -4.024 -3.399 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Level 0.120 -1.973 -1.175 -1.871 0.308 
1st difference -4.255 -5.300 -4.489 -3.979 -2.435 
UAE Level 1.474 -2.365 -0.481 -1.798 N/A 
1st difference -4.742 -6.137 -4.669 -4.835 N/A 
 
In order to perform the cointegration analysis, the unit roots in each variable 
should be determined. To this end Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) a stationary test 
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is applied on the five OCA factors of the GCC countries (openness, mobility, degree 
of commodity and diversification, similarity of structure of production, and the 
inflation)  
Table 6.1 reports the results of the ADF test for the level and for the first-
difference of the considered variables. The results show that unit root tests applied to 
the variables at levels satisfy the null hypothesis of non-stationary of all the variables 
used. In other words all the variables are non-stationary at levels. The hypothesis is 
accepted when the series are first-differenced, which means all variables are 
stationary. Table 6.1 shows that there is no unit root for the inflation factor for Saudi 
Arabia, so in this case the cointegration test cannot be performed. Also the raw data 
for UAE and Oman are not available, hence this factor is eliminated from this study. 
Based on MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values, the openness factor in Bahrain is 
non- stationary at level due to its value, which is (0.518) while is stationary at the first 
difference with value of (-5.582) All the series in this research results are integrated of 




6.3.2. Cointegration Test Result 
Tables 6.2 illustrates the result of the Trace Test of the five factors of OCA. 
The result of the table presents Johansen’s Cointegration test. The aim of the table is 
to confirm if every factor of OCA is cointegrated within GCC countries. The number 
of the cointegration for each factor was obtained regarding to Trace Test at the 0.05 
level.  In the first column shows the OCA factors and the second column refers to the 
Null Hypothesis 𝐻0 . The third column refers to the Alternative Hypothesis 𝐻1 while 
the fourth column represents the values of the Trace Test. The last two columns 
represent the P critical values. 











Openness  𝐻0: 𝑟 = 0 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 1  84.142  69.818  0.0024 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 1 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 2  47.635  47.856  0.0524 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 2 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 3  19.915  29.797  0.4286 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 3 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 4  6.0164  15.494  0.6936 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 4 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 5  0.1589  3.841  0.6901 
Mobility 𝐻0: 𝑟 = 0 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 1  148.738  95.753  0.0000 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 1 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 2  92.918  69.818  0.0003 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 2 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 3  59.358  47.856  0.0029 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 3 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 4  33.729  29.797  0.0167 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 4 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 5  15.473  15.494  0.0504 
𝐻𝑜: 𝑟 = 5 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 6  6.6654  3.8414  0.0098 
Diversification 𝐻0: 𝑟 = 0 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 1  229.032  95.753  0.0000 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 1 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 2  113.509  69.818  0.0000 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 2 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 3  47.700  47.856  0.0517 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 3 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 4  19.784  29.797  0.4375 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 4 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 5  4.302  15.494  0.8777 
𝐻𝑜: 𝑟 = 5 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 6  0.093  3.841  0.7600 
Production 𝐻0: 𝑟 = 0 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 1  198.327  95.753  0.0000 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 1 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 2  122.688  69.818  0.0000 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 2 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 3  76.464  47.856  0.0000 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 3 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 4  43.330  29.797  0.0008 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 4 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 5  16.574  15.494  0.0343 




The Johansen cointegration is applied on the four OCA factors of the GCC 
countries, which has unit roots (openness, mobility, degree of commodity and 
diversification and similarity of structure of production, inflation was excluded 
because it was not integrated in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test as it has no Unit 
Root. Tables 6.2 shows the results of the cointegration test based on Johansen’s trace 
tests for the four factors of the OCA. The results indicate that there is one 
cointegration between the independent variable (openness of Saudi Arabia) and the 
dependent variables (the openness of other GCC countries except Qatar). The results 
also confirm that there are four cointegrations between the independent variable and 
the dependent variables for the case of the mobility factor while there are two 
cointegrations among the variable for the degree of Commodity of Diversification in 
the case of Similarity of Structure of Production factor it can be seen from the table 
that there are six cointegration among the variable with regard to production. All the 
result of Johansen test are listed in appendix B. 
It is clear from the results that apart from the inflation all other quantitative 
prerequisites of OCA theory have at least one conintgration. These results provide 
strong evidence for the GCC to move forward toward a single currency union with 
minimum costs, which confirmed the Proposition 2 as stated - there is economic 
convergence (in the six quantitative prerequisites factors of an optimum currency 
area) in the GCC countries. Therefore, the Hypothesis of this chapter is confirmed. 
6.4. Summary  
In this chapter, the six quantitative prerequisites factors of OCA theory were 
analysed to examine whether the GCC countries could successfully form an Optimum 
Currency Area. The OCA theory in this context was used to predict the magnitude of 
the costs of using single currency within the GCC countries. The results of 
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cointegration test, when taking evaluated factors of Saudi Arabia as independent 
variables and the factors of other GCC countries as dependent variables, provided 
clear evidence that support the effectiveness of cointegration between the independent 
variables and the dependent variables. The obtained results showed that there was one 
or more cointegartions for each prerequisites of OCA theory among the GCC 
counties. The results indicated the production factor has 6 cointegrations, which mean 
that the GCC countries have a very similar production structures. However, for the 
openness factor the cointegration between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable was only 1, which means that the GCC countries should pay more attention 
to improve their openness, which is a political consideration as well as economic 
discussed in chapter 7 Questions 9 and 11. 
Finally, this study clearly indicated that the GCC countries are in a satisfactory 
position to form single currency with significant benefits and minimum costs. This 
assertion is backed by views in the literature and established theories.  Laabas and 
Limam (2002) a single currency area often defined as an area that agree to form a 
common monetary and currency union for mutual benefits with several implications 
on governance and economic structures of member states. Brackemyre (2014) 
explained that with regards to the OCA theory, there is preference for a single 
currency area, which brings huge benefits to the member countries. The OCA theory 
simply helps to define the point where the marginal costs and benefits of joining a 
union intersect (with underlining mutually beneficial terms and conditions in place). 
Horvath and Komarek (2002) stated that OCA theory attempts to provide answer to 
the raging question: what is the optimal number of currencies that ideal for a region 
with similar social and economic structures?   
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The OCA theory also explains the framework that leads a region to monetary 
integration with attendant beneficial implications. The first beneficial is the monetary 
integration, which presupposes one single currency and coordinating a central bank 
with power of monetary policy measures on liquidity, inflation, foreign exchange 
reserves and interest rates. The second is fixed exchange rates (currency pegging), 
that allows for convertibility of member states' currencies with non-members. The 
third beneficial implication is financial market integration, which entails openness and 
the free inflow of capital transactions and centralized financial regulations. It can be 
concluded from this empirical study that the main obstacle for the GCC countries to 
form single currency area is not the economic integration.   
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Chapter Seven  
Political Data Analysis I I: Qualitative Analysis 
7.0. Introduction 
The qualitative research interview refers to the description and the meanings 
of the studied themes in the subjects of the real world. The main role of the interview 
is to fully understand the meaning of what has been said by the interviewees. The 
interviews are significantly helpful for obtaining the information from the 
participants’ experiences. The researcher can seek deep information related to the 
studied topic. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the political factors, which 
effect the adoption of the OCA in GCC bloc through a qualitative study. This chapter 
investigates the transcription and analysis of the interviews that were conducted with 
professionals and economists across the GCC countries. It also provides a brief 
explanation of the content and thematic analysis, which used as a technique to 
interpret the gained information in section 7.1. In section 7.2 comprehensive and a 
critical discussion of all interview questions are presented. A brief of the findings 
from this study are presented in section 7.3 followed by the summary of this chapter 
in section 7.4. From the discussion in section (2.5.3), this study investigates the 
political factor. 
7.1. Analytical Approach used for the Interviews 
In this qualitative study, thirteen professionals with different career and 
discipline were interviewed and due to confidentiality constraint, the autobiography of 
these interviewees cannot be provided. The sample was chosen based on Self-
selection and Snowball sampling. Self-selection sampling is used when the 
individuals express their desire to participate in the research when they are contacted 
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by the researcher, while the Snowball sampling allows the researcher to contact one or 
two interviewees and then ask them to identify further interviewees. According to 
these motheds I started selecting my sample by contacted one professional at King 
Abdulaziz and then those interviewees recommended to further interviewees. There 
are three key points were learned from the pilot study. One, the pilot study made me 
to choose the right sampling techniques, which are explained above. Furthermore, 
clarify the ambiguity in the interview questions. The questions were reframed to be 
clear and specific. Two, the interviews used for the pilot were highly experienced, 
they provided more insight into economic, cultural and political dimensions that led to 
delay in adopting a single currency in the region. Thirdly, the interviewees assisted 
with contacts of experts on GCC in the Gulf region. The sample was selected 
according to following conventions: 
 Knowledge background (finance, economic and politic) to conduct 
comprehensive investigations; 
 From GCC countries; 
 Recommendation by third party; 
 Our own judgment and selection. 
From the contact list, the professionals were contacted through their email 
addresses. After a period of one month, 13 professionals signified interest to 
participate in the main interview. In order to have a clear understanding to the single 
currency project and to answer my research questions, three themes were identified, 
which includes economy, banking and political themes. Therefor, these 13 
professionals include economists, bankers and politics with extensive knowledge and 
expertise in GCC’s single currency agenda. These interviewees work in seven 
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different orgnaisations, which are interested in GCC economic integration and the 
single currency agenda in the Gulf. The seven institutions listed below: 
1) Islamic Economics Institute at King Abdulaziz University 
(http://iei.kau.edu.sa/Default.aspx?Site_ID=121&Lng=EN)   
2) Capital Market Authority (https://cma.org.sa/Pages/default.aspx)  
3) Business Economic Consulting Centre (http://www.becc.com.sa) 
4) Hafiz Financial Consulting (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)  
5) Bank Aljazira (http://www.baj.com.sa/ar/index.aspx) 
6) Khazaen Financial (http://www.khazaen.com/) 
7) Department of Political Science at King Abdulaziz University (http://political-
science.kau.edu.sa/Default.aspx?Site_ID=120006&lng=EN)  
The study was carried out over three months, from 15th October 2014 to 15th 
January 2015. The interviews were conducted in Arabic, which is the official 
language in Saudi Arabia. The interviews were then analysed based on Content 
analysis (CA) and Thematic Analysis (TA). These techniques are used to analyse non-
numerical data, voices and observations and will be explained in more details in the 
next two sub-sections. The interview responses were transcribed and translated from 
Arabic into English and sorted into common statements and themes using CA and TA 
techniques.   
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Table 7-1: The Research Sample Description 
SN Interviewee Job Title 
1 Dr. A Economist 
2 Professor B Economist/Consultant 
3 Dr C Economist/Consultant 
4 Dr D Economist 
5 Dr E Economist/Consultant 
6 Dr. F Banker 
7 Mr. G Banker 
8 Mr. H Banker 
9 Mr. I Banker 
10 Professor J Policymaker 
11 Dr. K Policymaker 
12 Dr. L Policymaker 
13 Dr. M Policymaker 
7.1.1. Content Analyses (CA)  
 The CA is an analytical technique used by interpretivists or researchers to 
carry out a qualitative study. This technique used for summarising, classifying, 
compressing and tabulating recorded voice data and several texts into meaningful 
concepts (Stemler, 2001; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012; Raimi, 
Akhuemonkhan and Ogunjirin, 2015). Harwood and Garry (2003) described the CA 
as a method for clearly explaining the content of a visual and verbal data. Collis and 
Hussey (2013) stated that, CA is popularly employed in analysing qualitative and 
quantitative data, although it is commonly used to manage qualitative data. Horn 
(2010) posited that CA is simply an analytical tool for providing meanings to open-
ended questions or interview responses. CA is used to determine the repetition and the 
frequency of certain words, concepts and themes from which logical inferences could 
be drawn on the subject of inquiry.  
Based on the above definitions, CA has both the descriptive and the 
interpretative levels of data analysis. The descriptive level of the CA is the verbatim 
quotation of the interview sessions without the personal interpretations of the 
researchers. On the other hand, the interpretative level of the CA is the researcher’s 
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explanation of what is meant by the statements and quotations, which is the inference 
drawn by the researcher form the interview responses (Denscombe, 2009; Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2012).  
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that CA looks for codes and themes 
to classify the collected data in meaningful and logical manners. To guide academic 
researchers, Harwood and Garry (2003) classified CA into six types namely: 
pragmatic analysis, semantic analysis, designation analysis, attribution analysis, 
assertions analysis and sign-vehicle analysis. Pragmatic content analysis explores 
cause-effect relationships among words, contents and ideas in terms of frequency and 
impact. Semantic analysis looks critically at meanings of words within textual and 
voice data and their frequency in the materials being analysed. Designation analysis 
examines the frequency of reference to a particular object, person, thing, theme, word 
in a piece of article. Attribution analysis explores the frequency of characterisations 
linked to certain attributes. Assertions analysis examines the frequency of 
characterisations linked to certain objects. Sign-vehicle analysis examines the 
frequency of certain utterances in a text or speech (Harwood and Garry, 2003; Raimi, 
Akhuemonkhan and Ogunjirin, 2015). The semantic analysis is the most appropriate 
technique that fulfils the requirements needed for analysing the data and makes 
meaningful and logical inferences from the text of the conducted interviews. 
7.1.2. Thematic Analysis (TA) 
The second qualitative analytical technique that provides a meaning out of 
interviews is the TA. According to (Braun and Clarke, 2006), TA is a qualitative data 
analysis employed by the interpretivists and realists for identifying, understanding and 
reporting themes, experiences and meanings from a social reality. However, Horn 
(2010) explains that thematic analysis is a form of template analysis to bring out 
120 
 
hidden themes and codes from qualitative enquiry. TA is a tool used for interpreting 
different themes/sub-themes that have been identified after transcription and coding of 
raw data from interviews (Boyatzis, 1998; Raimi, Akhuemonkhan and Ogunjirin, 
2015).  
There are five systematic steps that have to be followed when using the TA, 
namely: 1) Familiarisation with the data; 2) Generation of preliminary 
codes/categorisations; 3) Searching for common themes by reading, reviewing and 
fine-tuning the themes from the voice or text data; 4) Refinement of the themes; 5) 
Production of final report from the themes/codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006; 
Denscombe, 2009; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012).   
7.2. Presentation of Data 
In this section, the results of the pilot study are presented first followed by the 
main qualitative study on the policy of integration and the political factors. 
7.2.1. Pilot Study Outcome 
After constructing the first draft of the interview questions, a pilot study was 
carried out between the 6th and 30th June 2014. The pilot study informs the 
researcher about the reliability and validity of the interview questions. The interview 
questions are considered to be reliable when different researchers investigate the same 
research problem and come up with the same findings and outcomes (Easterbay-
Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2008; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). The 
reliability of the interview questions becomes necessary in qualitative research to 
ensure neutrality of the research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012). To conduct 
this pilot study a structured interview was constructed. In order to ensure that the 
interview questions reflect all research questions, these questions tested on four 
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volunteers with sufficient knowledge about the GCC bloc. The volunteers were given 
clear instructions, which make them provide a specific feedback on the interview 
questions in terms of adequacy, relevance, clarity and also to give feedback on the 
degree of the confidentiality as shown in Table 7.2. The interview questions were 
carefully reviewed and modified according to the volunteers’ feedback. The interview 
questions were instructed to cover the answer of the research questions. The interview 
questions 3, 4 and 5 were designed to cover the economic aspect of the current 
research, which in turn answer the third research question “Does the GCC meet the 
economic criteria for a single currency to be introduced?”. While questions 1 and 9 
were meant to answer the following research question “What are the political factors 
that affected the adoption of a single currency in the GCC?”. Finally, questions 2, 6, 
7, 8 and 10 were instructed to link these two research questions and how they 
influence each other. 
Table 7-2: Pilot Study Sample 






Relevance of Interview 
Questions 
Economist Fairly adequate Clear enough Relevant 
Banker Adequate Yes Indeed relevant 
Policy 
Analyst 
Adequate Yes Remove some repeated 
questions 
Lecturer Adequate Not too clear Relevant 
7.2.2. The Interview Study 
 This section presents the interview questions with the correspondence 
interviewees’ responses. The questions presented here in the same order as they were 
asked to the interviewees.  




Transcribed Responses of Question 1: 
All interviewees agreed that the GCC countries passionately believe in a 
single currency for the region. However, the passion of each GCC country about the 
single currency differs based on their attitudes, foreign policies and alliances in the 
Gulf region. For instance, interviewees A, K, L and M are in the favour of a single 
currency agenda in the GCC nations as this kind of union will bring huge benefits to 
the region. The interviewee C also mentioned that European countries took too long to 
reach the final stage. The delay is logistics and that is why the GCC countries are 
taking their time. The interview D and E is also believed that the GCC countries 
believe in the single currency union, but so many reasons behind the delay in the 
implementation.  
Interviewee F explained that religion and the language are a significant 
advantage for GCC countries to reach the single currency union. The delay in 
adopting the single currency could largely be linked to the internal issues of each 
member as well as structural differences in economics of the GCC countries. 
Although GCC countries are Arab countries, they have different priorities in their 
political commitments, national policy and foreign policy. Taking into consideration 
this type of picture, it will take some time for a single currency union to be achieved, 
Interviewee G mentioned. The GCC countries believe in the union in view of some 
level of cooperation on common business initiatives, military and open borders 
agreement, Interviewee H mentioned.  
Only one theme emerged from the thematic analysis of the interviewees’ 
responses as shown in Table 7.3. The thematic results in Table 7.3 shows that all 
interviewees agreed upon the necessity of achieving single currency union. The above 
qualitative findings confirmed the opinion of Laabas and Limam, who found that a 
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single currency agenda has been unnecessarily delayed because the structure of the 
GCC countries’ economies, is dominated by the oil sector (Laabas and Limam, 2002). 











believes in a 
currency Union 
13 A, B, C, D, E, 
F, G, H, I, J, 
K, L and M 




0 None 0 0 0 
 
Question 2: Why do you think it has taken too many years to actualise this agenda?  
Transcribed Responses of Question 2 
The intreviewees answers to this question indicate that there are two reasons 
behaind the delay of aculaising the single currency agenda, which are the political will 
and the difference in the economic and foreign policies. The interveiwee A said that 
the commence of the single currency has taken too long due to the difference in the 
interests of the representatives of these GCC nations such as ministers and the 
political leaders who make the final decions. The delay could be linked also to 
economic and foreign policy considerations, interveiwees A, B, C, D, E, F, G and L 
mentioned.  
Interviewee H belives that the lack of political will is main cause in delaying 
the take-off of a monetary unit among the GCC countries. Interviewee I identified that 
the political conflict, the difference in foreign policies and the foreign influence and 
other operational barriers are the main critical factors, which make the single currency 
agenda unattainable  during the recent years in the GCC. The GCC countries 
suspended their action on the single currency union due to the reginoal political 
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dispute, interviewee J mentioned.  Interviewee K pointed out that the delay could be 
linked to the differences in operational modal for the adoption of a single currency as 
each country has its own currency, exchange rate and financial challenges that have to 
be sorted before adopting a full currency union. K also mentioned that the reason for 
the delay could be linked to the willing of maintaining the independency under the 
monarchy system, where each country wants to maintain its own control on the 
external relations, the trade and the monetary policies. However, interviewee M noted 
that the actualisation of a single currency took so long due to the economic divergent 
and political interests among members. There are two themes resulted from the 
interviews, which explained the reasons that cause the delay in actualising the single 
currency agenda as shown in Table 7.4. 
It is clear from the interviews that the main reason behind the delay is the 
political will, which was also mentioned by the former head of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), who expressed concerns regarding the single currency agenda 
as there is need for greater political will by the GCC countries (Trenwith, 2014). All 
in all, it can be said that no matter how good a policy or programme is, without the 
political will, it will die naturally. 














8 A, B, C, D, 
E, F, G, L 
5 2 1 
Lack of 
Political Will 
5 H, I, J, K, 
M 




In view of the foregoing content and thematic analyses, 8 out of 13 
interviewees attributed the long years of delay in actualising the single currency 
agenda due to the conflicting economic and foreign policies among member countries. 
The other 5 interviewees attributed the long years of delay to the lack of political will 
among GCC countries. All economists thought the delay was due to economic and 
foreign policy differences whilst 3 of the 4 policy makers felt it was due to lack of 
political will. Given all thought in Q1 there was a significant potential to achieve a 
currency union and the perceived reasons will be analysed along with the economic 
analysis at the end of this chapter. 
Question 3: Do you think GCC countries have special roles to play in bringing a 
single currency to reality? If yes, what are these roles? If no why do you think they 
have no roles?  
Transcribed Responses of Question 3 
All the thirteen interviewees agreed that the GCC countries have special roles 
to play in the actualisation of a single currency judging by the experience of Europe 
and its single currency. Although they European countries were disunited during the 
first and second world war; later they agreed to come together when they weight the 
cost and benefits of monetary integration and cooperation. Therefore the socio-
economic and political reasons that led to the emergence of EU are quite different 
from those exist in the GCC bloc. The GCC countries have lots of roles to play to 
realise a single currency agenda interviewees C, D, F, G and L mentioned. The first 
role is the monetary cooperation in maintaining inter-regional monetary policy 
measures. The most important role to bring the establishment of a single currency is 
to weight the costs and the benefits of a single currecncy union. This task is for the 
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policymakers to carry out the cost –benefit analysis interviewees A, B and E 
mentioned.  
Interviewee H and I mentioned that the single currency can be actualised 
through better understanding, cooperation and avoidance of mutual suspicion, which 
political dispute has caused in the region. J, K and M pointed out that the key role to 
be played is a genuine cooperation backed by regular summits on the prospects, 
challenges and real practical steps to adopt the single currency union. They also 
mentioned that without cooperation and understanding the final aim would be just a 
long dream interviewee J, K and M.   
Four themes emerged from the TA of the transcribed interviews and are 
depicted in Table 7.5. In my opinion there is urgent need for the six founders to mend 
fences. Specifically, the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states - Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman need to improve their relationships. 
Table 7-5: Thematic Analysis of Question 3 











Political cooperation 5 C, D, F, G, 
and L 
2 2 1 
Weighing cost and 
benefits of single currency 
3 A, B and E 3 0 0 
Unified foreign policy and 
avoidance of suspicion 
2 H and I 0 2 0 
Regular summits and 
cooperation 
3 J, K and M 0 0 3 
 
In the thematic analyses, 5 interviewees noted that the special role for bringing 
a single currency into reality requires political will; 3 interviewees stated that the 
special role of members is to weighing cost and benefits of single currency; 2 
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interviewees explained that the special role of GCC is evolving into a unified foreign 
policy and avoidance of suspicion; and 3 interviewees opined that a single currency 
requires regular summits and cooperation. The policy makers emphasised the need for 
regular summits and cooperation, which indicates support for the proposition that 
fences need to be mended for building political trust will. 
Question 4: How important is the possible loss of sovereignty of monetary and fiscal 
policies be responsible for the delay in adopting a single currency?  
Transcribed Responses of Question 4 
The importance of sovereignty  was underscored by all the interviewees. They 
noted that partial loss on sovereignty is expected under a single currency arrangment. 
The cost of partial loss of sovereignty is negligable compared with the  enormous 
benefits that a single currency would bring to the GCC countries in the long-run. 
Interviewees A, B, C, F, L and M mentioned that a unified monetary and fiscal 
policies should not in any way lead to full loss of sovereingty when there is a 
comprehancive understanding of  what a single currency is all about. A single 
currency agenda requires serious sacrifices and concession among member countries. 
Losing monetary policy sovereignty is not a real problem since all the countries in the 
GCC bloc pegged their currencies with dollars for stability, interviewee A, G, H, I, J, 
L and M mentioned. 
However, B and C expressed their concerns about sovereignty by saying 
certainly, there will be some degree of loss of sovereignty and these nations would 
seek assistant from the central monetary body. The stronger nations within the GCC 
bloc should compensate and support weaker one like Oman on the principle of wealth 
redistribution and justice. This is what Germany does in Europe to sustain the single 
currency union, interviewee D and K mentioned. The fear of lossing the sovereignty 
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of monetary and fiscal policies increases  the procastination in adopting a single 
currency. E and F said that each member values his political power and sovereignty 
under the kingship system of governance. They feel loss of sovereignty would affect 
their country’s relations with trade partners/countries, which they are not prepared to 
abandon for a unified currency agenda in a region.  
The four themes rose from the TA that there is a possible link between loss of 
sovereignty and delay in adoption of a single currency as depicted in Table 7.6. This 
finding aligns with the finding of on the integration effort of ECOWAS. It is argued 
that the fear of loss of sovereignty by the West African Countries under the ECOWAS 
regional union experienced serious obstacle in the take-off of its monetary integration 
due to member countries loss their intra-regional tariffs. The fear is that with loss of 
revenue it would be difficult for member countries to meet their revenue requirements 
(Goshit, 2013). This is the same fear that makes the GCC countries think twice before 
going into a single currency union. 
Table 7-6: Thematic Analysis of Question 4 










Loss of sovereignty 
worsens procrastination 
7 A, G, H, I, 
J, L and M 
1 3 3 
Idea of central 
monetary and political 
sovereignties 
2 B and C 2 0 0 
Wealth redistribution 2 D and K 1 0 1 
Negative effect on 
trade relations 
2 E and F 1 1 0 
 
In view of the thematic analyses in Table 7.6, 7 interviewees noted that loss of 
sovereignty was responsible for the delay in adopting a single currency; 2 
interviewees stated that the delay is caused by the idea of central monetary and 
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political sovereignties; Another 2 interviewees linked the delay to wealth distribution 
and the remaining 2 interviewees said that negative effect on trade relations caused 
further delay in adopting a single currency area. This again highlights the loss of 
political independence as a key issue amongst policy makers. 
Question 5: How important is the fear of domination by Saudi Arabia be responsible 
for the delay in adopting a single currency? 
Transcribed Responses of Question 5 
The fear of other GCC countries from the domination of Saudi Arabia was 
clearly emphasised by all the interviewees. Some interviewees opined that this fear 
would be reduced if the GCC countries came together and move forward to create 
economic balance among member countries in an atmosphere of maturity, cooperation 
and mutual benefits as similar fears  existed in the European Union. Decision-making 
process should be based on evaluation of cost, benefits and the fairness rather than the 
domination; Interviewees B, C, F, H and K mentioned. These interviewees further 
mentioned that the fear of domination by Saudi Arabia is recently raised.  
The fear of domination is natural, interviewees B, C, F, H and K mentioned, as 
the same feeling happened in the EU when the nations feared the dominance of 
Germany. However, the reality of a single currency agenda in Europe means that all 
the member countries shared the positive and negative impact of economic dynamics. 
The EU fear experience should not be used as a justification for the fear in GCC bloc, 
interviewees A, D, E, G, J and I mentioned. Also the interviewee A mentioned that to 
be fair the fear of Saudi’s domination among the other countries of the GCC is reality 
as this feeling came due to that Saudi Arabia controls over 60% of economic activities 
in the region. Interviewees L and M also agreed that the fear is real because the 
headquarter of the GCC and the Gulf Central Bank are located in Saudi Arabia, and 
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the governor often appointed from the same country. The Gulf Central Bank does not 
currently mandate monetary policy, but should a currency union occur it would adopt 
these powers.  
The fear of domination by Saudi Arabia plays a big role in the delay of 
adopting a single currency as Saudi Arabia presented itself as a leader of the GCC 
bloc and this was the main concern of UAE and Oman.  Saudi Arabia is the only Arab 
country has the membership of G20, which may make the GCC bloc came up with a 
resolution to give Saudi Arabia advantage of hosting the regional central bank for the 
proposed monetary union. This resolution caused a confliction between UAE and 
Saudi Arabia and worsens the fear in UAE of dominance by Saudi Arabia, as the 
UAE wants the bank to be located in Abu Dhabi. This fear and the conflictions led the 
UAE to exit from the single currency project. The three themes that emerged from the 
link of fear of domination by Saudi Arabia and delay in adoption of a single currency 
are tabulated in Table 7.7 below. 






Interviewee  Interviewee by types 
 





5 B, C, F, H 
and K 
2 2 1 
Slow economic 
integration 
6 A, D, E, G, I 
and J 
3 2 1 
Loss of economic 
interests  




In view of the content and thematic analyses above, 5 interviewees noted the 
fear of domination by Saudi Arabia may lead to economic imbalance among member 
countries; 6 interviewees noted that the same fear could cause a slow economic 
integration, while 2 interviewees stated that fear of domination by Saudi Arabia may 
be responsible for the loss of economic interests. 
Question 6: Do you think UAE and Oman will join a single currency? What are the 
key factors for these e.g. economic or political reasons?  
Transcribed Responses of Question 6 
The joining of UAE and Oman to the single currency project is very important 
for regional integration.  However, if they decided not to do so, the integration agenda 
should go ahead as similar experience happened in European Union when Britain 
refrain from joining the euro zone, Interviewees A, D, L,  and M mentioned. Three 
other interveiwees B, C and E noted that every county has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. UAE has an open door policy for foreign investments, and sacrificed a 
lot to attract foreign investments.  
It seems to be UAE has no economic obstacles from joining the single 
currency but it has some political concerns. Oman on the other hand has a weak non-
competitive economy, which leads its policymakers to decide not to join the union as 
this may worsen their economy. The interviewees expressed the opinion that at the 
end there is no doubt that UAE and Oman will join the union, but at the moment they 
are watching and observing the progress of the integration process, interviewee E 
mentioned. Also interviewee E mentioned that joining or existing is a matter of 
national interest, freedom of choice and benefits. If Bahrain, Saudi, Kuwait and Qatar 
agreed to go ahead with the single currency agenda the impact in the Gulf would still 
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be noticeable in the region even without Oman and UAE, interviewees G, H and I 
mentioned.  
GCC as an entity is working hard to persuade UAE and Oman on the 
importance of interring the monetary union project as a precondition for launching a 
common currency in the region. While, urging UAE and Oman to return, the 
remaining four members are pushing ahead with the monetary union. A common 
market and/or central bank would also position the GCC as a single bloc with 
powerful structure for influencing the international financial system. In spite of the 
benefits, the monetary union would cause each member state to lose some of the 
flexibility associated currency autonomy. The four related themes that emerged as key 
factors, which preventing UAE and Oman  from  joining a single currency are 
tabulated in Table 7.8 below. 






Interviewee  Interviewee by types 
 
Economist Banker Policy 
maker 
Freedom of choice  4 A, D, L,  
and M 
2 0 2 
Investment interest  3 B, C and E 3 0 0 
Political consideration 2 F and K 0 1 1 
National interests  3 G, H and I 0 3 0 
 
In view of the content and thematic analyses above, 4 interviewees said the 
key factor that explain the opposition of UAE and Oman on a single currency is purly 
freedom of choice while 3 interviewees identified the investment interest is the key 
factor. 2 interviewees looked it as political consideration; while another 3 
interviewees attributed it to national interests. 
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Question 7: When do you think a single currency will be adopted? Why was it  not 
implemented in 2010? 
Transcribed Responses of Question 7 
The interviewees are optimistic in achieving the single currency as recently 
this project came up on the surface in the official media in the region. The delay 
caused by insufficient readiness of the Gulf countries, interviewees A, C, D and G 
mentioned. Some other interviewees argued from practical experience point view that 
the delay in the adoption of a single currency in 2010 was linked to some special 
circumstances in GCC bloc as well as poor planning for take-off. The commencing 
date of a single currency project is difficult to predict because the GCC countries have 
disputes in their foreign policies. For instance, Qatar has cordial relations with 
Turkey, which indicates that Qatar has different foreign policy compared with Saudi 
Arabia especially during the period of King Abdullah Interviewees B, E and F 
mentioned.  
Another interviewee reported that a single currency union was  not 
implemented in 2010 because of foreign pressures linked to delay in the 
implementation, interviewee J, K and L mentioned. Considering the announcement of 
take-off and then later cancelled, it would be extremely difficult to know exactly 
when the single currency project will be adopted in the GCC bloc.  
From the views of the interviwees and events unfolding in the region, the 
single currency agenda would be materialsed when the following measures are in 
place. First and foremost, there is need for a high fiscal coordination among GCC 
countries, which is an important process that goes beyond adopting criterion of 
European Union. Secondly, the GCC countries need to build up fiscal policy at 
national central banks to enhance successful launch, sustainability, stability and 
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continuity of the single currency when eventually adopted. Four themes emerged on 
the two-fold interview question are presented in Table 7.9. 






Interviewee Interviewee by types 
 
Economist Banker Policy 
maker 
Not sure, but 
soon/Poor readiness 








3 H, M and I 0 2 1 
Very difficult to 
predict/Middle-East 
Crisis 
3 J, K and L 0 0 3 
 
In view of the content and thematic analyses above, 4 interviewees said that 
they were not sure of when a single currency will be adopted; 3 interviewees said the 
timing is difficult to predict but the present time is clearly unsuitable; another 3 
interviewees stated that the timing for adoption is not soon because of regional 
conflicts; while 3 other interviewees opined that it is very difficult to predict the 
timing for adoption of a single currency because of the Middle-East crisis. The 
responses show that regional stability is a major factor affecting the speed of adoption 
of a single currency, on top of the current economic and political factors described in 
the thesis. All were agreed now is not the time to adopt a single currency. 






Transcribed Responses of Question 8 
The union will affect all member countries’ monetary, trade and custom 
structures. They would all be affected through interregional trade relationships and 
massive investment among member countries like UAE, Oman need investments and 
Saudi Arabia interviewees A, C, K, L and M mentioned. Another four interviewees 
responded that Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait would feel more of the positive effect 
that comes with adoption of a single currency interviewee B, D, E and F mentioned.  
Interviewees G, H, J and I replied that countries with the least level of 
development and weak currencies suffer because stronger currency expels the weak 
currency from the financial market. Therefore, Saudi Arabia because of its size and 
big economy would be more affected positively by the currency union than other 
smaller countries, which have high expectations from Saudi Arabia. However, when 
there is a negative development like the crisis in Europe, Saudi’s economy would bear 
the effect more especially providing support for the weaker countries in the GCC 
(Interviewee G, H, I and J).  
Saudi Arabia undoubtedly will benefit more than other countries considering 
the increasing domination of the leadership of Riyadh. Saudi Arabia possesses 30 % 
of global oil reserves, which positioned it as the political and economic force, which 
provides the needed motivation for integration in the region. Even militarily, Saudi 
Arabia under GCC overshadowed other members. This reality informed the apathy of 
some member countries. Following to the Arab Spring, in 2011 Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE sent troops to supress the uprising in Bahrain. Seeing this regional ambition, 
Kuwait, Oman and Qatar refused to intervene. To expand the economic and political 
benefits beyond the GCC bloc after the Arab Spring, attempts to influence the 
Middle-East region by expanding the GCC bloc. Morocco and Jordan applied to join 
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the GCC bloc in 2011 for the purpose of evolving a bloc based on joint value systems 
of autocratic monarchies. Yemen has also attempted to join the GCC. Three themes 
emerged on what countries will be more affected by currency union are presented in 
Table 7.10. 
Table 7-10: Thematic Analysis of Question 8 




Interviewee  Interviewee by types 
 
Economist Banker Policy 
maker 
All GCC member 
countries/Trade  
5 A, C, K, L 
and M 
2 0 3 
Three GCC 
countries/Investment 




4 G, H, J and 
I 
0 3 1 
 
In view of the content and thematic analyses above, 5 interviewees said all 
GCC countries will be more affected by a single currency area through improved 
trade; 4 interviewees said three GCC countries will be more affected by a single 
currency area through investment; and 4 weaker GCC countries will be more affected 
by a single currency area through weak economy. 
Question 9: How important is united currency in economic development to Gulf 
cooperation countries? 
Transcribed Responses of Question 9 
Three interviewees are in the favour of currency union in the Gulf as it is a key 
element for economic development and interregional trade relationships, interviewees 
A, K, and M mentioned. Another four interviewees stated that a currency union would 
make the GCC countries the hub of the Gulf region. It reliefs the deficit in budgets, 
encourages a stable economy, expanding balanced development, cultural/social and 
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political union, better international relations and unified foreign policy, interviewee B, 
C, D and E mentioned.  
Interviewees F, G and L are of the opinion that a united currency system 
would make the GCC bloc a powerful economic bloc similar to European Monetary 
Union. Interviewee H noted that a united currency system helps maintain significant 
foreign monetary reserves for all member countries. Interviewee I opined that a united 
currency has a number of benefits such a powerful influence, unified exchange rate 
system and massive regional investment in oil and gas. Finally, one interviewee 
explained that unified currency is important for maintaining similar convertible 
exchange rate. With unified funding there would be stability in funding 
developmental projects across the Gulf countries, interviewee J mentioned.  
A united currency is important for economic development in the GCC bloc for 
several reasons. Firstly, the GCC countries constitute less than 15 % of the population 
of entire Arab countries, but they produce 70% of total of the GDP of   Arab world. 
Secondly, these six countries have almost 90% of the stock market of the entire Arab 
countries. With a unified common currency, associated monetary and financial 
integration, the GCC bloc would have the opportunity to improve their socio-
economic policy, security and political structures in the Gulf region as well as the 
entire Middle East. GCC bloc is considered to be the most homogeneous economic 
bloc as they share a common history, language and culture. The currency union is 
therefore, an important agenda that needs to be supported and promoted by all the 
member countries. Six themes that emerged on the importance of currency union and 
are presented in Table 7.11 
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Interviewee Interviewee by types 
 
Economist Banker Policy 
maker 
Unified Currency 
creates a better trade 
relations 
3 A, K, and 
M 
1 0 2 
Unified Currency 
create a hub in the 
Gulf 
4 B, C, D and 
E 
4 0 0 
Unified Currency 
create a powerful 
economic bloc 
3 F, G and L, 0 2 1 
Unified Currency 
creates a significant 
foreign monetary 
reserves 
1 H 0 1 0 
Unified Currency 
create a powerful 
influence and unified 
exchange rate 
1 I 0 1 0 
Unified Currency 
creates a convertible 
exchange rate  
1 J 0 0 1 
 
In view of the content and thematic analyses above, 3 interviewees said 
unified currency creates better trade relations while 4 interviewees said unified 
currency create a hub in the Gulf. 3 interviewees said unified currency creates a 
powerful economic bloc and only 1 interviewee said unified currency create 
significant foreign monetary reserves. Also 1 interviewee said unified currency 
creates a powerful influence and unified exchange rate while 1 interviewee said 
unified currency creates a convertible exchange rate. 
Question 10: What can GCC region learn from EU in terms of the single currency? 
Transcribed Responses of Question 10 
The thirteen interviewees agreed that there are several useful lessens can be 
learnt from European Union experience such as unified monetary policy measures, 
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free movement of goods/services, trade relations and political/foreign policy 
cooperation. 4 interviewees explained that despite the divergence of EU members in 
terms of languages, traditions and ideologies, they united and created the Euro vision 
for bigger Europe (interviewee, A, C, F and M). Interviewees B, D and E explained 
that GCC countries should learn that attaining a goal requires persistent hard work. 
The EU’s single currency agenda took sixty years and the policymakers are still 
facing serious challenges and problems among member nations as some members are 
planning to leave the EU. This is a big lesson for policymakers in the Gulf region to 
be learnt, B, D and E mentioned.  
Two interviewees G and H said that the most important lessons to be learnt 
from EU’s experience is the need for constructive engagement by the members, the 
need to develop sound experience on integration and lastly the need for long term 
investment in a common currency agenda. There are many lessons to be learnt from 
EU with 28 members, which agreed to have a bigger impactful economy. This big 
economy gives European a powerful and effective foreign relations unlike the GCC, 
which is currently struggling to bring only six countries together. Each of these 
countries has fair inter-relations, but the current foreign relations are ineffective and 
needed more focusing and attention (interviewee 1, J and K).  
In veiw of the foregoing, the  GCC bloc can learn a number of lessons from 
EU’s single currency agenda. The first lesson is that EU understood the 
regional integration is a series of bargains among the cooperated nations in Europe, 
which are willing to cooperate in the areas of monetary and financial market 
integration for mutual benefits in long-terms economic development (Mattli, 1999). 
The second lesson is that in establishing a monetary union, the GCC countries need to 
learn the principles of managing an exchange rate regime from EU. An exchange rate 
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regime for nations with a single currency entails pegging the single currency against 
the US dollar as an external anchor for monetary policy. Four themes that emerged on 
what the GCC bloc can learn from EU’s single currency are presented in Table 7.12 






Interviewee  Interviewee by types 
 
Economist Banker Policy 
maker 
Unity by Euro vision 
& Bigger Europe  
4 A, C, F and 
M 
2 1 1 
Persistent hard work 4 B, D, E and 
L 
3 0 1 
Constructive 
engagement 
2 G and H 0 2 1 
Continues focus 3 I, J and K 0 1 2 
 
In view of the content and thematic analyses above, 4 interviewees noted that 
GCC bloc can learn from EU the unity and bigger Europe vision while 4 interviewees 
noted that GCC bloc can learn from EU is the persistent hard work in achieving the 
ultimate goals. 2 interviewees noted that GCC bloc can learn from EU constructive 
engagement by the members on single currency; 3 interviewees noted that GCC bloc 
can learn from EU is continues focus on single currency. 
Question 11: How can the existing economic framework of the GCC region enhance 
the move towards a single currency area? 
Transcribed Responses of Question 11 
The existence economic framework in terms of custom union, cultural and 
religious cooperation, interregional trade relations should sustain the strategic move 
of GCC toward   the adoption of the single currency union. Apart from the framework 
mentioned above, interviewees B, C and F suggested that the cultural and religious 
relations should be strengthened to help achieve the single currency union. Five 
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interviewees A, D, E, G and H said that the member countries need to be more 
organised, by ensuring a greater social and financial cooperation and integrated 
economy.  
Two other interviewees emphasised the need to embrace common projects as a 
move towards a single currency, (J and I). Two interviewees strongly advocated idea 
of sharing on monetary matters is an effective move towards to a single currency area, 
K and L mentioned. One interviewee stated the need for significant change in 
economic structure because all the countries within the GCC have identical 
economies, unlike EU model where there is diversity; some countries in EU are 
agricultural countries, some are service-providing/commercial-oriented countries 
while some others are industrial countries and there are some other countries with 
commercial services only (interviewee M). 
  There has been a significant progress made towards achieving the goal of a 
full-fledged GCC currency union. Existing economic framework of the GCC bloc 
could therefore be enhanced for fast-track a movement towards a single currency area 
through a number of polices and plans. The GCC countries have achieved an 
intraregional mobility of goods, labour, and capital and the next step is to strengthen 
the monetary regulations and supervision of the financial systems in the region. All 
member countries with exception of Kuwait have pegged their national currencies to 
the US dollar and they also have a harmonised a common external tariff and a 
common market. In the same vein, it expected that the investment funds (individual 
and government) and the accumulated wealth in the GCC bloc can be invested in the 
region’s economy rather than investing in US economy. All these economic 
frameworks would facilitate and encourage increasing trade competitiveness and 
financial integration, and facilitate foreign direct investment before the take-off of a 
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single currency area (Frankel and Rose, 2000; Buiter, 2008). Five themes that 
emerged on how existing economic framework of the GCC bloc can enhanced the 
move farwards to a single currency area are presented in Table 7.13. 
Table 7-13: Thematic Analysis of Question 11 




Interviewee  Interviewee by types 
 
Economist Banker Policy 
maker 
Cultural and religious 
relations  




5 A, D, E, G 
and H 
3 2 0 
Common projects 2 J and I 0 1 1 
Idea-sharing 2 K and L 0 0 2 
Change of economic 
structure 
1 M 0 0 1 
 
In view of the content and thematic analyses above, 3 interviewees noted that 
existing ecoonomc framework of the GCC bloc could enhance a move towards a 
single currency area through cultural and religious relations; 5 interviewees noted that 
existing economic framework of the GCC bloc could enhance move towards a single 
currency area through economic cooperation and integration; 2 interviewees noted 
that existing economic framework of the GCC bloc could enhance move towards a 
single currency area through common projects; 2 interviewees noted that existing 
economic framework of the GCC bloc could enhance move towards a single currency 
area through idea-sharing and 1 interviewee noted that existing economic framework 
of the GCC bloc could enhance move towards a single currency area through change 
of economic structure. 
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7.3. Findings  
In this section, the main findings of the qualitative study are briefly discussed 
and summarised in Table 7.14.  This table shows the general themes of all the 
interview questions and the interviewees’ answers in terms of economic and political 
issues. In the table, one star on the question refers to the question is purely political, 
two stars the questions refers to purely economic and the three stars refers both of 
them.  In general, the interviewees are clearly affected by their backgrounds with 
regard to their answers. Usually the politician looked to the issue from political point 
of view while the economists view it as an economic. For example, the answers of 
questions 1 and 9 are agreed by all that interviewees to be related to economic issues. 
Whilst, questions 3, 4, 5 and 11 were agreed by most the interviewees to be related to 
political issues. In addition, Bankers in their answers usually were according to the 
theme of the question. This series of questions highlighted that closer relations 
between the countries in all areas of activity need to be developed including religious, 
institutional and policy exchanges. Also from the interview analysis, it is clear that the 
GCC countries believe in the single currency and this needs more effective level of 
cooperation on common business initiatives, military and open borders agreement. 
Furthermore, the interview analysis confimed that the GCC countries have a very 
important role to bring the establishment of a single currency by weighting the costs 
and the benefits and this task is purely left for the policymakers in GCC countries. 
Even thought there are some answers related to the economic issue but it is clear the 





Table 7-14 Summary of the Thematic Analysis 
 Politic Theme Economic Theme 
Economist Banker Policy 
maker 
Economist Banker Policy 
maker 
**Q1 0 0 0 5 4 4 
***Q2 0 2 3 5 2 1 
*Q3 2 2 3 3 2 1 
*Q4 2 3 4 3 1 0 
*Q5 0 0 0 5 4 4 
***Q6 3 4 4 2 0 0 
***Q7 0 2 4 5 2 0 
***Q8 0 0 0 5 4 4 
**Q9 0 0 0 5 4 4 
***Q10 5 4 4 0 0 0 
*Q11 0 1 4 5 3 0 
7.4. Summary  
This chapter investigated the effect of the last two prerequisite factors of 
OCA, which are policy integration and political factors on starting up the single 
currency agenda. The qualitative research method was used relying on interviews as 
sources of data collection. The collected data were analysed using CA and TA 
techniques. In order to ensure the reliability and the validity of the study a pilot study 
was carried out between the 6th and 30th June 2014. After the pilot, the main 
interviews were carried out between 15th October 2014 and 15th January 2015. The 
researcher elicits the views of thirteen professionals with different career and 
discipline. These provisional includes economists, bankers and politics with extensive 
knowledge and expertise in GCC’s single currency agenda.  
Based on the analysis of the interviewees’ opinions, the inhibiting factors, 
which responsible for the delay of adopting the single currency union were identified. 
Even though all interviewees are agreed upon the strategic impotence of 
implementing the single currency, but they have different views regarding to main 
causes of delaying this strategic project. These causes include conflicting economic 
and foreign policies, lack of political will, procrastination and fear of domination by 
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Saudi Arabia in the region. 8 interviewees believed that the differences in economic 
and foreign policy of the GCC bloc were the main cause of the delay while 5 
interviewees believed that the delay was due to lack of political will. Also 7 
interviewees thought that the fear of the loss of sovereignty made some of the GGC 
countries tend to procrastination. One of the main causes was also highlighted by 5 
interviewees, which is the fear of Saudi Arabia’s domination.  
In order to overcome these obstacles, the interviewees have made several 
valuable recommendations. One of the main recommendations was regarding to 
partial loss of sovereignty. The interviewees thought this kind of sovereignty loss is 
considered to be natural and the GCC countries should cope with it and move 
forward. The next recommendation is based on the progress, which already has been 
made as the interviewees confidant in the structure of the currency union project and 
all it needs genuine political will of all member countries. Also the interviewees 
recommended that the exit the common economic institutions should be operated in 
the favour of achieving the single currency. Last but not least all interviewees advised 
that the GCC countries should value the benefits of the currency union and the 
negative consequences could be treated in the future.  
To sum up, it is clear that the single currency project is very strategic and 
important to move the region toward effective development in its economic and 
political system. It is very true that achieving this major goal is not easy task. There 
are many challenges and obstacles caused the delay of lunching this project. However, 
in my opinion the GCC countries should come together and create a more powerful 
region by adopting the single currency and they should put the mutual benefits and the 
interests of the region prior to their national benefits and interests. The initial purpose 
of the GCC was security, and closer economic integration was part of a political 
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decision to be a bulwark against the revolution in Iran in both military and economic 
terms. However, although the economies have now converged there is a new regional 




Chapter Eight  
Discussion of Quantitative and Qualitative Findings 
8.0. Introduction 
In this chapter integrated discussions of the current research findings are 
discussed and liked to each other. In section 8.1 the current research findings are 
analysed, discussed and clearly evaluated in the line with our research propositions 
and questions. Also in this section a clear connection between the qualitative and 
quantitative is presented and how this finding related to each other are critically 
discussed. In section 8.2 a new PEF is presented and supported a clear evidences from 
our finding and previous studies based on the relevant theories.  
8.1 Triangulation of Qualitative and Quantitative Findings 
In this section, a comprehensive discussion of the main findings of our 
research, which includes the finding of historical outcomes, quantitative and 
qualitative studies, is presented. Firstly, It was found that national currencies of the 
GCC countries are strongly connected to Islamic cultural norms and values back to 
Prophet Muhammed era. The prevalent currencies in the first Islamic State founded 
by prophet Muhammed in Madinah were Dinar (gold) and Dirham (silver).  
All Muslim countries adopted different currencies after the balkanisation of 
Ottoman empires into smaller states during 1960s. However, most of these countries 
they still naming their currencies by the traditional Muslim currency (Dinar and 
Dirham). Due to the strong connections to the Muslim history and culture the 
policymakers in MENA asked for more openness in political and economic 
institutions to achieve some kind of collaboration especially in single currency 
project.  This led to a new call was not a call for the adoption of a gold standard 
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system but it was a call for a single currency in the Gulf region, which driven by the 
theory of OCA. The historical finding provided deep insight into evidences that 
support the assertion for a single currency has cultural and religious link in the history 
of the Islamic State.   
The above discussion validate our propositions which states that “The Islamic 
culture and the history of GCC countries have a significant impact in supporting the 
idea of achieving the single currency project, (new dimension added to OCA)”. Also, 
this discussion provide a clear answer to our research question, which states that  
“The GCC countries have a common culture, language and history, to what extent 
these factors affect the achieving of the single currency in GCC?” 
Secondly the findings of the quantitative study that introduced in chapter six 
are evaluated. The quantitative analysis using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
and Johansen’s Trace tests indicate that there is cointegration between the 
independent variable and the dependent variables with regards to the OCA pre-
requisites. The results of cointegration test, when taking evaluated factors of Saudi 
Arabia as independent variables and the factors of other GCC countries as dependent 
variables, provided clear evidence that support the effectiveness of cointegration 
between the independent variables and the dependent variables. The obtained results 
showed that there were significant cointegrations between the dependent and the 
independent variable for each prerequisites of OCA theory among the GCC counties. 
The results indicated there was at least one conintegration exists, which means in 
terms of economic integration factors, the GCC countries are ready for the single 
currency but they need to pay more attention to improve their openness, which is a 
political consideration. Similarly, the qualitative chapter seven found that economic 
integration in the GCC bloc is an appropriate medium for single currency, but the 
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GCC lag behind in actualising a currency union due to number of challenges and 
difficulties. The above discussion confirmed the proposition that is states “there is 
economic convergence (in the six quantitative prerequisites factors of OCA) in the 
GCC countries”. Also this discussion answered our research question, which states 
that “is the GCC bloc appropriate medium for establishing economic integration?” 
Thirdly, chapter seven presents the qualitative study and the main findings are 
explained as follows. The study revealed that the adoption of a single currency in 
2010 was postponed due to unobvious reasons and the interviews showed that lack of 
political will was behind this procrastination. The interviewees believed that the delay 
was due to the recurring differences on foreign policies in the GCC and the different 
views in their respective economic, political and foreign policies. Comparing with the 
analytical study of OCA the common points on economic, monetary, customs and 
political issues for a single currency are already exist. 
The interviewees focused in their justification of the reasons that responsible 
for the delay on new challenging political events emerged especially in the Gulf 
region and generally in the Arab world such as Syria-Yemen-Libya revolutions, 
Iranian nuclear dispute, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism, which led to a 
conflicting foreign policy measures in the GCC. The consequences of adopting single 
currency in the GCC is still not clear for the members, which results in the GCC 
countries paying more attention to their internal socio-political challenges rather than 
the single currency agenda. All interviewees thought that the anxiety of the GCC 
countries from these consequences made them think that their economic integration is 
not appropriate for the single currency. The interviewees confirmed the rejection of 
the Proposition 3 of the study, which stated that “the GCC meets the criteria set for 
the OCA”, while the historical and analaytical studies confirmed the acceptance of 
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this Proposition. This provides clear answer to the research question, which states 
“Does the GCC meet the economic criteria for a single currency to be introduced?”. 
There is an economic framework in place for the GCC bloc, which includes 
the Gulf Monetary Council, but this framework still has not been exploited to make 
the GCC strategically move toward a single currency. The interviewees pointed out 
that to make the present economic framework effective for a single currency, the GCC 
countries need to initiate common projects, greater scientific alliance, social and 
financial cooperation and idea-sharing on monetary matters to build stronger 
integrated economy in the GCC bloc. Their views were based on that the GCC 
countries have already achieved an intraregional mobility of goods, labour, and 
capital, so the next step is to strengthen the monetary regulations and supervision of 
the financial systems in the region. If the existing economic framework worked 
effectively it would facilitate and encourage more trade competitiveness and financial 
integration, and facilitate foreign direct investment before the take-off of a single 
currency area as confirmed by (Rose 2000; Frankel and Rose 2000; Buiter 2008). 
Finally, the study indicated that the factors, which caused the delay in 
adopting the single currency in the GCC bloc, are interrelated and complicated. The 
first factor that accounted for the delay is linked to internal policies of each of the 
GCC countries as well as economic structural differences among them. For example, 
UAE structural economy is completely different from the reset especially in 
supporting FDI. Also Saudi Arabia’s economic structure differs from the others in the 
way that Saudi Arabia does not support the international tourism apart from Islamic 
religious visit. However, these differences in the economic structure do not mean that 
the absence of the economic cointegration as proved by the analytical study.  
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Interviewees pointed out that although Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are all Arab countries, but they have different 
priorities, political commitments, national policy and foreign policy. The conflect 
between the interests of the representatives of these GCC nations like ministers and 
the interests of the political leaders, who make the final decions, results in a confusion 
for planing the stage of single currency. In other words, the delay is linked to 
economic and foreign policy considerations. Aonther reason that may have caused the 
delay is the differences in the operational modalities for adoption of a single currency 
as each country has its own currency, exchange rate and financial challenges that 
needed to be resolved before adopting a full currency union. Faced with this type of 
picture, it will take a long time for the GCC countries to reach the stage of the single 
currency, this picture confirms the acceptance of Proposition 4, which stated that 
“political factors are responsible for the delay in the adoption of a single common 
currency in the GCC bloc”. Also this Proposition was confirmed by the analytical 
study, which indicated that the GCC countries are cointegrated in the diversification 
factor of OCA even though they have some different economic policies. Furthermore, 
the finding of chapter seven answered our research question, which states that “What 
are the political factors that affected the adoption of a single currency in the GCC?” 
From the above detailed discussion, the economic and political factors are 
affecting each other and they cannot be separated when studding and evaluating the 
requirements to achieve the OCA. It was found that in spite of present of an economic 
framework for the GCC bloc especially Gulf Monetary Council, the framework has 
not been exploited to make the GCC strategically move toward a single currency. The 
present economic framework presently allows an intraregional mobility of goods, 
labour, and capital but there is need for the GCC countries to initiate common 
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projects, greater scientific alliance, social and financial cooperation and idea-sharing 
on monetary matters to build stronger integrated economy in the GCC bloc.  
Political factors are responsible for the delay in the adoption of a single 
currency in the GCC bloc. The qualitative finding which revealed that the delay is 
linked to economic and foregin policy considerations as well as differences in the 
operational modalities for adoption of a single currency as each country has its own 
currency, exchange rate and financial challenges that needed to be resolved before 
adopting a full currency union. This fact is also supported by the quantitative research 
finding that the GCC countries are cointegrated in the diversification factor of OCA 
even though they have some different economic policies. 
The quantitative analytical findings showed that there was one or more 
cointegrations for each prerequisites of OCA theory among the GCC counties except 
for the openness factor, which means that the GCC countries should pay more 
attention to improve their openness, which is a political consideration. In chapter 
seven however, the qualitative findings showed that the GCC has not meet the set 
criteria and the single currency project in 2010 was not achieved yet due to lack of 
political will, recurring differences on economic, political and foreign policies. The 
delay was further worsened by events in the Gulf region such Arab Spring events and 
other events that effects Arab world as mentioned above, which led to a conflicting 
foreign policy measures in the GCC. The consequences of adopting single currency in 
the GCC is still not clear for the members, which results in the GCC countries paying 
more attention to their internal socio-political challenges rather than the single 
currency agenda. The anxiety of the GCC countries from these above-mentioned 
consequences made them think that their economic integration is not appropriate for 
the single currency.  
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8.2. Application of Political Economic Framework (PEF) 
Based on our quantitative and qualitative research, a new framework, which 
combined the economic and political factors together in a broader and workable 
framework, is presented in this section.  This framework can effectively applied to 
achieve the single currency in GCC countries. Our findings reveal that economic 
factors met all the requirements of a achieving the single currency project while 
political factors still need more attention.  However, satisfaction of economic factors 
cannot lead to OCA by its own and in the same time the stability in political factors 
without the satisfaction with economic factors are not enough to achieve the OCA. 
Therefore PEF is an obvious solution to this complicated issue as using this PEF both 
economic and political factors can be evaluated and balanced in the same time. In the 
flowing discussion, our new PEF is explored and supported by our research findings.  
According to the quantitative economic results, there was clear evidence that 
area of GCC countries is suitable for single currency project.  The economic factors 
that were investigated are listed below: 
1) Degree of Economic Openness,  
2) Mobility,  
3) Degree of Commodity of Diversification,  
4) Similarity of Structure of Production,  
Using Johansen’s trace tests for the above four factors of the OCA, our results 
clearly indicate that there is a great potential for achieving the single currency project 
in GCC countries. For the case of openness factor, the results showed that there is one 
cointegration between the independent and the dependent variables apart from Qatar. 
Qatar was excluded from this factor due to missing data. While for the case of 
mobility factor the results confirm that there are four cointegrations between the 
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independent variable and the dependent variables. Furthermore, our result showed 
there were two cointegrations among the variable for the degree of Commodity of 
Diversification. The strongest cointegration was found in the Similarity of Structure 
of Production factor as our results showed that there six cointegrations. From the 
above discussion and the numerical results, it can be clearly confirmed that GCC 
countries are absolutely suitable for the single currency project. 
On other hand, our qualitative political study that presented in chapter seven, 
the findings showed that the political factors have a significant effect in achieving the 
single currency in GCC. The findings of this qualitative study indicated that the lack 
of political will and the differences in economic and foreign policies among GCC 
countries results in significant delay of achieving the single currency as this was 
raised by all interviewees in their answers in question 2. Furthermore, there was no 
clear schedule for regular summits between the GCC countries, which caused clear 
lack of political cooperation among them as this was highlighted by 8 interviewees in 
their answers to question 3. Also one of the main finding was the fear losing 
sovereignty as this was raised by 7 interviewees in question 4. This leads to a slow 
economy in most of courtiers as pointed out by 6 interviewees in their answers to 
question 5.  
Based on the above discussion, the economic factors clearly indicate that the 
single currency is very achievable, whereas from interviewees’ point of views, the 
political factors have significant created unnecessary obstacle in front of GCC 
countries in achieving this project. From our research, the evidence it is clear there is 
a need for a new framework to achieve the single currency area. In this new workable 
framework, the economic and political factors are combined together to make a clear 
picture for GCC countries where they can achieve the single currency project. Using 
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our a new framework the economic and political factors can be both investigated and 
balanced in order to make it convenient for GCC countries in achieving their aim. 
8.4 Summary  
The historical study findings clearly showed that there was strong connection 
between the history of the region and the single currency project. The study showed 
the start of having different currencies among the Muslim countries was back to 
1920s. This means the region with different currencies is seen as to be unusual 
situation. This led to very emotional and serious calls to be united again under a single 
currency so the region can be restored back to the normality. The historical study 
made us to dig deeply in what were the obstacles that face the region for not achieving 
this project.  
We started studying the economic factors in terms of OCA factors using the 
quantitative method. The finding showed that the GCC countries are economically 
ready to the single currency. This was clear from our results, which showed that there 
is at least on cointegration between the dependent and independent factor of OCA.  
This raised an obvious question why the single currency project has not been 
achieving yet. The qualitative finding of the current research provided us with a clear 
answer, which can be stated in one phrase “the lack of political well”.  
In order to have fair evaluations of the factors that caused the delay of 
achieving the SC, a new framework is introduced. This new framework combines the 
economic and political factors together for the case investigating the single currency 
area. Our new framework clearly showed that economic and political factors are 
affecting each other and cannot be segregated.     
156 
 
Chapter Nine  
Conclusions and Future Studies 
 
The GCC bloc was founded in 1981 for economic and political cooperation 
and the objective of forming single currency has remained as an aim for a very long 
time (since the 1980s) despite the internal and the external challenges and issues. The 
final stage of achieving a common currency was initially proposed in 1999. However, 
it was delayed due to political and economic concerns and precautions. The aim of 
this research was to investigate the reasons behind the delay of achieving the single 
currency and whether this delay was due to lack of economic convergence of the 
region or due to political issues.  
The foundation for the research was based on the OCA theory. The research 
framework was designed according to the prerequisite factors of OCA, namely, 
degree of economic openness, mobility, degree of commodity of diversification, 
similarity of structure of production, price and wage flexibility, similarity of inflation 
rates, degree of policy integration and political factors. Before investigating the OCA 
theory, a comprehensive historical study of the single currency in the region was 
carried out, which results in adding the historical factor as new dimension contextual 
framework to the application of the OCA theory. 
This new contextual embedding to the analysis provides evidence that 
supports the assertion for a single currency has cultural and religious link in the 
history of the Islamic State. To achieve the major aim of the research firstly 
investigated the suitability of the region through a comprehensive quantitative study 
of the first six quantitative prerequisites of the theory using the cointegration method. 
Secondly the political issues were investigated through a qualitative study of the last 
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two prerequisite of the OCA theory by interviewing carefully selected interviewees 
who have a sufficient understanding of single currency issues and challenges.  
9.0. Summary and Discussion  
In this section, the main reached results and findings of the qualitative and 
quantitative study are discussed and summarised. In chapter three, the historical factor 
was investigated and studied in the light of the suitability of the GCC to form a single 
currency, which led to adding a new dimension of OCA theory in analysing the 
economic integration in GCC bloc. In this chapter, the historical connection between 
the Dinar currency system and the single currency agenda in the Gulf States was 
examined.  
In order to carry out this task, the study adopted qualitative research method 
and the required information and facts were sourced from the historical documents 
and research articles. These approaches were in line with the research methodology 
for qualitative and explorative research.  
Two major findings from the historical analysis were deducted. The first was 
that there is a strong historical connection between the Dinar currency system and the 
single currency system in the GCC due to their religious and cultural connection to 
Muslim countries especially in the Middle East and North Africa (often called 
MENA). The region has had a single currency from the first Islamic state to 1924 and 
after about 90 years without a common currency there are still strong cultural links to 
the concept of the Dinar and may be seen as a reunification of the currency.  
The second finding indicated that the aim of the GCC countries to have a 
single currency was naturally motivated by Islamic heritage where the region was at a 
vantage position in the world. The study found out that from monetary and fiscal 
policy viewpoints, the adoption of Dinar as the official currency system during the 
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time Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) is predicated upon the fact that gold 
and silver currencies are have intrinsic value and have guaranteed stability proportion 
guided by the influence of the law of demand and supply.  
Further historical reports revealed that after a period of consolidation, the 
prevalent Byzantine/Roman Dinar and Persian Dirham were replaced with a new 
single one, which is Islamically-compliant. Furthermore the historical research found 
the evidence that Khalifah Abdul Malik Bn Marwan initiated the first minted Dinar 
and Dirham in Islamic history. Finally the study revealed that the use of Dinar in 
Islamic world ended in 1924 sequel to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Thereafter 
several calls had been made for the reintroduction of Dinar without much success.  
Based on the findings of the historical study, the region is considered to be 
naturally suitable for a single currency. This gives the research the motivation to 
investigate the suitability of the GCC bloc to from OCA using a quantitative study in 
chapter six, the application of the OCA analysis indicated that there were no 
significant economic reasons preventing the region from adopting a single currency. 
However, this major goal has not been achieved yet due to the political challenges and 
issues, which investigated in chapter seven.  
In chapter seven, the major aim was to identify the obvious and hidden reasons 
behind the delay of forming single currency through a very precise and 
comprehensive qualitative study. In this qualitative study, thirteen senior 
professionals, policymakers and academics with different career and discipline were 
interviewed. These include economists, bankers and politicians with extensive 
knowledge and expertise in GCC’s single currency agenda. The qualitative study was 
carried out using two methods namely, content analysis (CA) and thematic analysis 
(TA). CA is popularly method employed in analysing qualitative and quantitative 
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data, although it is commonly used to manage qualitative data. CA is simply an 
analytical tool for providing meanings to open-ended questions or interview 
responses. TA is a tool includes five specific steps used for interpreting different 
themes/sub-themes that have been identified after transcription and coding of raw data 
from interviews. These steps are: Familiarisation with the data, Generation of 
preliminary codes/categorisations, searching for common themes by reading, 
reviewing and fine-tuning the themes from the voice or text data, Refinement of the 
themes, Production of final report from the themes/codes. Based on the interviewee’s 
opinions and their responses to the interview’s questions, the main findings are 
highlighted and discussed.  
All interviewees shared the same opinion on the impotence of achieving the 
single currency within the GCC countries. However, the interviewees stated many 
challenges and obstacles, which made the interruption to lunching the strategic 
project. The first challenge faced the GCC counters was the confliction in the 
economic and foreign policies of the GCC countries. The interviewees provided some 
remedy to this challenge by advising the GCC countries to surrender part of their 
forging policy and economic structures to a central authority, which govern the 
region. It is well known that the most valuable identity of any country is the 
sovereignty, interviewees thought there is considerable fear from losing the 
sovereignty in all GCC countries, which results in delaying the single currency 
project.  
The Interviewees recommended that the GCC countries should cope with the 
partial loss of sovereignty is one the consequences of monetary integration, but this 
sacrifice brings a significant reword to all the members. It is obvious from the 
interviewees’ opinions that the most of GCC countries tend to make excuses to delay 
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the commencing date of the single currency union and the interviewees believe this 
kind of procrastination due to the lack of political will. In chapter seven, the research 
came up with an important conclusion based on the interviewees’ opinions, the single 
currency project faces real challenges and obstacles that other studies have not 
identified. It was also clear that although there is little prospect of an imminent 
adoption of a single currency the project ambitions remain resolute but effective 
planning and hard work from all the members is needed to keep this project alive and 
overcome the underlying political issues when the region has less conflicts in the 
future. 
9.1. Contributions of the Research  
The study adopted an integrated theoretical framework and sequential mixed 
research methods (qualitative and quantitative methods), mixed research approach 
(inductive and deductive) and mixed techniques (interview and secondary data). The 
research has contributed to an existing body of knowledge on a GCC single currency 
region by providing the empirical evidences for delay in implementing a single 
currency.  
The delay of a single currency is a combination of economic and political 
factors. The economic factor is an absence of cointegration in the inflation factor of 
OCA while the political factor has a complex dynamic linked to the fear of losing 
autonomy over monetary and fiscal policy measures, the fear of surrendering 
sovereignty to supra-national institutions due to security concerns. On the other hand 
the historical and cultural factors support the single currency.  
The research concludes with far reaching recommendations on the 
circumstances needed by GCC to move forward toward the single currency. The 
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contributions of this research are further explained below as theoretical, 
methodological and empirical contributions. 
9.1.1. Theoretical Contributions  
Previous studies focused largely on the six economic elements of the eight 
prerequisites of OCA. Political events in the Gulf region for the decade up to 2016 
have underscored the significant effect of political factors on delaying the 
commencement of a single currency in the GCC countries. Therefore, this research 
looked at the political and historic factors, which affect the greater economic 
integration. The political issues that have delayed the single currency agenda include 
the mutual suspicion leading to conflicting economic and foreign policies among 
member countries and the lack of political will among GCC countries. It is important 
to note that there is not a linked set of political factors that can be easily resolved, but 
layers of issues such as regional stability, security threats to the GCC, fear of loss of 
economic sovereignty, loss of political autonomy and fear of domination by the Saudi 
Arabia.  
The OCA theory identifies eight preconditions for economic integration, while 
the Social Contract/Theory of political integration identified four preconditions for a 
political integration. By applying the OCA theory in the economic integration the 
research proposed a politico-economic framework (PEF) as an optimum framework 
for understanding the dynamics of the common currency agenda in the Arab Gulf 
Region with specific reference to the GCC. The PEF was developed on the basis that 
the delay in creating single currency area is linked to political disagreement and the 
pursuit of national economic interests outweigh the pursuit of mutual benefits of 
economic integration. This theoretical contribution indicated that the delay in 
adopting a single currency in the GCC region is mainly due to the political factor.  
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The study found out that in order to expedite action on the adoption of a single 
currency in the region, it is necessary for member countries to play special role for its 
realisation through a unified economic, political and foreign policy measures with 
mutual trust. 
9.1.2. Methodological Contributions  
The current research provided an effective methodological contribution that 
can be applied in the research in the field of economic integration. First, this research 
alternates between two philosophical approaches– single reality and multiple realities. 
This methodology is different from the conventional philosophies as it combines the 
two dominant philosophies (positivism and interpretivism) and it can be called the 
emerged philosophy. For the quantitative approach, the positivism was a single reality 
because the findings from scientific and experimental process are objective, which 
means that either the GCC countries capable of satisfying the prerequisite for OCA or 
not.   
However, for the qualitative approach, the interpretivism is multiple realities 
because the viewpoints sought through interviews are multiple perceptions, i.e., 
subjective. This new methodological approach of adopting the interpretivism provided 
a complete, a comprehensive explanation and understanding of the issues regarding to 
the delay in adopting common currency in the GCC region, by researching key policy 
makers as well as economists and financiers. 
9.1.3. Historical Contributions  
This study explored the historical connection between the Dinar currency 
system and the contemporary move by the GCC to embrace a single currency for the 
first time. Since the first Islamic state up to 1924 the Dinar served as the unifying 
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medium of exchange across Muslim world. Colonisation of the Muslim world into 
small independent states made these nations adopt their own national currencies 
within the last 90 years. The historical analysis established that the modern calls for 
the formation of economic and political blocs in the Gulf region have had religious 
and cultural connections with the Dinar currency system. The call for a return to the 
dinar is for cultural reasons. Therefore, the formation of the GCC in 1981 was initially 
political and later moved to have a single currency is a pointer to the fact that the 
history of having the independent currencies is relatively recent compared to the long 
history of a single currency. 
9.1.4. Empirical Contributions  
The empirical study on the single currency area in the GCC was used to test 
relationships among the eight OCA prerequisites. As a contribution to optimum 
currency theory and economic integration, the research proposes a politico-economic 
framework (PEF), which is hinged on two theories (OCA and Social Contract 
Theories) as the ideal framework for understanding the dynamics of the common 
currency agenda in the GCC. The choice of PEF was made because the delay in 
creating single currency area is linked to political disagreement and the pursuit of 
national economic interests as opposed to the pursuit of collective benefits of 
economic integration.   
The research examined the long-term relationship among macroeconomic 
variables of OCA in the GCC region using an econometric analysis. The econometric 
analysis allows the use of computer programs to process large dataset with accurate 
results. The most important variables used in the data analysis are the trade openness 
indicators, the current account net, expressed in millions of dollars and as percentages 
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of GDP, the Diversification index of exports and imports by country, the Indicator of 
similarity in merchandise trade structures and the Consumer Price Indices.  
Within the Johnsen Cointegration tests, Saudi Arabia was chosen as the 
dependent variable as it is the largest economy in the GCC region. In the final 
analysis, the results have confirmed the existence of cointegration, in specified 
economic variables apart from the Consumer Price Indices, between these member 
countries, which means that there exist long run relationship in data. There are some 
deviations appeared over the shorter period of time, but these are temporary. 
Therefore, these findings suggest that there are prospects of economic integration in 
region. Similarly, in Johansen cointegration test, the vectors are considered constant 
while in real cases, they can change over time due to different factors.  
9.1.5. Political Factor Contribution  
Based on historical and the analytical studies the economic integration in GCC 
was found to be appropriate medium for single currency. However, in reality the GCC 
is still has not achieved this stage due to a number of challenges and difficulties. This 
study investigated the actual reasons behind this delay in achieving the next stage of 
single currency project, which made this research to go beyond the typical studies and 
combine for the first time the economic, cultural and political factors. The political 
factor was investigated through the quantitative research tool using a semi-structured 
interview. Based on the interviewees’ thoughts and views, the study provided strong 
evidence that the political factor was the main cause of the delay. 
9.2. Limitation of the Study 
This research investigated the economic and political factors, which have 
significant effect on OCA as well as the historical factor. The findings of this research 
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have contributed to the body of research in the field of economics. Further 
investigations were carried out based on the quantitative method to assess the 
suitability of GCC countries to form OCA. However, in this research, the researcher 
faced some challenges and limitations. These limitations are listed below: 
1) There was some degree of information shortage due to security restrictions 
and lack of free speech in GCC countries, which meant that certain 
information could not be used, and some information was withheld from the 
researcher, particularly in relation to the security agenda of the GCC and its 
integration policies 
2) The aim of the quantitative study was to interview highly ranked people who 
work specially on the OCA issue. The interviews focused on 13 highly ranked 
officials in the GCC, academics (economists and politicians) and bankers, but 
interviewing with those who make the final political decisions was not 
possible. 
There were some missing raw data for some of GCC countries (Qatar for the 
Openness factor and Oman and UAE for the Inflation factor) for some years, which 
meant the cointegration analysis relating to inflation was not complete and robust. 
9.3. Recommendations and Future Studies 
The research has come up with several recommendations and remarks for the 
GCC countries to consider in their plans to achieve the stage of the single currency. 
The research provided clear evidence that even though there are many political as 
well as some economic issues facing the achieving of the single currency, whilst these 
issues can be resolved through systematic procedures and measures, there needs to be 
a period of stability coinciding with increased political will. On the other hand the 
research confirmed that the main obstacle for the GCC in moving forward toward the 
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single currency was purely political. The study also found out if there was genuine 
political will from all the GCC countries the single currency stage can be 
systematically reached. The research provided many economic and political 
recommendations listed below: 
1) For sustained progression towards a single currency area, there is a need for 
implementation of free trade area agreement for the free movement of goods 
and other factors, thereby promoting more intra-regional trade. In order to 
have better convergence of macroeconomic fundamentals, the GCC countries 
need to develop the current central bank so that in future it can take on 
additional roles, which would formulate and implement monetary policy 
measures for the region. Other supra-national institutions for coordination of 
fiscal policy measures are similarly necessary.  
2) Several studies identified high structural convergence in production structure, 
low factor mobility and lack of price and wage flexibility in the GCC 
countries. For a beneficial monetary union, it is suggested that sound policies 
be formulated and implemented to promote structural diversification, more 
factor mobility and price wage flexibility as part of the GCC move towards 
greater integration.  
3) Moreover, the need for genuine political will has been identified as a vital 
precondition for monetary union. This requires that the governments establish 
a regular framework of development that allows the member nations to discuss 
the processes to surrender to the supra-national political institutions of the 




4) As a matter of urgency, the GCC countries need to know that adopting a single 
currency union requires that governments of member nations must surrender 
to supra-national economic institutions including a central bank to coordinate 
all regional activities.  
5) In order to achieve the above recommendations it is necessary for member 
countries to play the special role for its realisation through a unified economic, 
political and foreign policy measures; while at the same time ensuring 
individual country priorities and concerns are addressed and stable 
mechanisms for future dispute resolution are established. 
6) It is also recommended that all GCC countries should diversify their 
economies to allow for improved regional trade relations, which is one of the 
catalysts for smooth adoption of a single currency union.     
7) Finally, the fear of domination by Saudi Arabia should be diffused when 
addressing the political and economic institutional frameworks above.  
The present study focused only on the GCC bloc, it is suggested that the next 
interesting step is to examine the viability of a single currency area in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region, which has bigger area and more heterogeneous 
countries but with the same cultural and historic foundations and compare it with the 
GCC.  
This study investigated the macroeconomic and political factors in GCC bloc, 
it is suggested that the implications of macroeconomic policy and a single currency on 
the microeconomic factors such as the Dividend Policy of Companies Listed on 
Emerging Stock Exchanges in the GCC countries would be useful to add to the 
macroeconomic analysis. This area of research has received little attention from 
researchers. This kind of study will strengthen the process of industrial development 
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in the GCC bloc, as it would improve understanding of the impact of government 
ownership, free cash flow, firm size, growth rate, growth opportunity, business risk, 
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2009 0.225 0.299 0.204 0.298 0.225 0.477 -0.648 -0.525 -0.690 -0.526 -0.648 -0.322 
2010 0.229 0.258 0.202 0.289 0.228 0.440 -0.641 -0.589 -0.695 -0.540 -0.641 -0.357 
2011 0.229 0.249 0.216 0.307 0.251 0.446 -0.641 -0.604 -0.665 -0.513 -0.600 -0.351 
2012 0.240 0.278 0.222 0.330 0.225 0.457 -0.620 -0.556 -0.654 -0.482 -0.647 -0.340 
2013 0.234 0.281 0.216 0.310 0.216 0.455 -0.631 -0.552 -0.666 -0.508 -0.666 -0.342 
2014 0.202 0.248 0.179 0.263 0.191 0.388 -0.695 -0.605 -0.746 -0.580 -0.720 -0.411 




Inflation (Price and Wage Flexibility and the Consumer Price Index) 
 









1980 70.84146647 65.23282496 38.27203965 33.27090771 1.850 1.814 1.583 1.522 
1981 72.8243065 72.63322594 41.09451898 36.10578842 1.862 1.861 1.614 1.558 
1982 73.56787151 79.08720601 44.29035689 38.16381836 1.867 1.898 1.646 1.582 
1983 73.70869822 81.43799344 46.38005038 39.21088622 1.868 1.911 1.666 1.593 
1984 72.55955229 81.70054893 46.92615694 39.64415568 1.861 1.912 1.671 1.598 
1985 70.3401234 79.54694754 47.62550769 40.40237724 1.847 1.901 1.678 1.606 
1986 68.08689609 77.72047547 48.07966774 40.70845586 1.833 1.891 1.682 1.610 
1987 67.03351233 76.36425181 48.3945149 41.80159377 1.826 1.883 1.685 1.621 
1988 67.6418837 76.59596842 49.10501068 43.72551649 1.830 1.884 1.691 1.641 
1989 68.34038416 77.73410586 50.74611663 45.16845854 1.835 1.891 1.705 1.655 
1990 69.75991737 78.45651645 55.73630468 46.52394955 1.844 1.895 1.746 1.668 
1991 73.15102446 79.05625355 60.78500414 48.57904883 1.864 1.898 1.784 1.686 
1992 73.09469378 78.91994966 60.45343944 50.06571639 1.864 1.897 1.781 1.700 
1993 73.86642413 80.92361678 60.68469886 49.62846122 1.868 1.908 1.783 1.696 
1994 74.28327118 81.58469062 62.22271326 50.28434397 1.871 1.912 1.794 1.701 
1995 77.89970101 83.79076901 63.89446805 51.77101153 1.892 1.923 1.805 1.714 
1996 78.85168954 83.41184421 66.16526831 54.31013871 1.897 1.921 1.821 1.735 
1997 78.89675409 85.44004602 66.6166421 56.93575683 1.897 1.932 1.824 1.755 
1998 78.61510068 85.12687932 66.7030161 58.61615243 1.896 1.930 1.824 1.768 
1999 77.55545215 84.03079586 68.69797681 59.89498291 1.890 1.924 1.837 1.777 
2000 76.68295331 83.43850231 69.94343413 60.88345091 1.885 1.921 1.845 1.784 
2001 75.82984334 82.43092249 70.85269878 61.77925004 1.880 1.916 1.850 1.791 
2002 76.00434311 82.02244418 71.48218968 61.92752024 1.881 1.914 1.854 1.792 
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2003 76.45028696 83.32957477 72.16938392 63.32990921 1.883 1.921 1.858 1.802 
2004 76.70234217 85.29027064 73.07046519 67.63592294 1.885 1.931 1.864 1.830 
2005 77.23876739 87.4960535 76.0977569 73.59762057 1.888 1.942 1.881 1.867 
2006 78.94369474 89.25251023 78.42407552 82.30849482 1.897 1.951 1.894 1.915 
2007 82.23463109 92.15916698 82.72559672 93.63263135 1.915 1.965 1.918 1.971 
2008 90.35016287 95.40870212 91.48020654 107.7244783 1.956 1.980 1.961 2.032 
2009 94.92787343 98.07586463 95.69707401 102.4855374 1.977 1.992 1.981 2.011 
2010 100 100 100 100 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 
2011 105.8235911 99.63555225 104.9053356 101.9163899 2.025 1.998 2.021 2.008 
2012 108.8776202 102.3800669 108.2616179 103.818746 2.037 2.010 2.034 2.016 
2013 112.6951565 105.7642246 111.1876076 107.0699038 2.052 2.024 2.046 2.030 
2014 115.7047095 108.568241 114.4219449 110.3703061 2.063 2.036 2.059 2.043 
























Openness, Mobility, Degree of commodity diversification, Similarity of structure 


































Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_BAHRAIN) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.582727  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.653730  
 5% level  -2.957110  
 10% level  -2.617434  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_BAHRAIN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 10:47   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2013   
Included observations: 32 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_BAHRAIN(-1)) -1.007571 0.180480 -5.582727 0.0000 
C 0.022927 0.012907 1.776313 0.0858 
     
     
R-squared 0.509538     Mean dependent var -0.001728 
Adjusted R-squared 0.493189     S.D. dependent var 0.096372 
S.E. of regression 0.068608     Akaike info criterion -2.460361 
Sum squared resid 0.141211     Schwarz criterion -2.368752 
Log likelihood 41.36577     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.429995 
F-statistic 31.16684     Durbin-Watson stat 1.946240 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004    
     







Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_KUWAIT) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.215202  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.653730  
 5% level  -2.957110  
 10% level  -2.617434  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_KUWAIT,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 10:51   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2013   
Included observations: 32 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_KUWAIT(-1)) -1.119773 0.180167 -6.215202 0.0000 
C 0.029268 0.033609 0.870831 0.3908 
     
     
R-squared 0.562865     Mean dependent var 0.002350 
Adjusted R-squared 0.548294     S.D. dependent var 0.280522 
S.E. of regression 0.188536     Akaike info criterion -0.438591 
Sum squared resid 1.066378     Schwarz criterion -0.346982 
Log likelihood 9.017449     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.408225 
F-statistic 38.62874     Durbin-Watson stat 2.079653 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
     






Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_OMAN) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.132796  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.653730  
 5% level  -2.957110  
 10% level  -2.617434  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_OMAN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 10:54   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2013   
Included observations: 32 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_OMAN(-1)) -1.250108 0.175262 -7.132796 0.0000 
C 0.043578 0.016552 2.632725 0.0133 
     
     
R-squared 0.629065     Mean dependent var -0.001959 
Adjusted R-squared 0.616701     S.D. dependent var 0.139537 
S.E. of regression 0.086389     Akaike info criterion -1.999451 
Sum squared resid 0.223892     Schwarz criterion -1.907842 
Log likelihood 33.99121     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.969085 
F-statistic 50.87678     Durbin-Watson stat 2.030266 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     






Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.255437  0.0022 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.653730  
 5% level  -2.957110  
 10% level  -2.617434  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 10:58   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2013   
Included observations: 32 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA(-
1)) 
-0.752590 0.176854 -4.255437 0.0002 
C 0.011585 0.019741 0.586836 0.5617 
     
     
R-squared 0.376413     Mean dependent var -0.001891 
Adjusted R-squared 0.355626     S.D. dependent var 0.137315 
S.E. of regression 0.110227     Akaike info criterion -1.512096 
Sum squared resid 0.364497     Schwarz criterion -1.420487 
Log likelihood 26.19353     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.481730 
F-statistic 18.10874     Durbin-Watson stat 1.808569 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000188    
     








Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_UAE) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.742239  0.0006 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.653730  
 5% level  -2.957110  
 10% level  -2.617434  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_UAE,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 11:00   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2013   
Included observations: 32 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_UAE(-1)) -0.851929 0.179647 -4.742239 0.0000 
C 0.033199 0.015484 2.144164 0.0402 
     
     
R-squared 0.428450     Mean dependent var 0.001295 
Adjusted R-squared 0.409398     S.D. dependent var 0.102651 
S.E. of regression 0.078888     Akaike info criterion -2.181109 
Sum squared resid 0.186700     Schwarz criterion -2.089500 
Log likelihood 36.89774     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.150743 
F-statistic 22.48883     Durbin-Watson stat 1.996072 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000048    
     





Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 11:08    
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2013    
Included observations: 32 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA LOG_BAHRAIN LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN 
LOG_UAE  
 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      
None *  0.680444  84.14213  69.81889  0.0024  
At most 1  0.579476  47.63583  47.85613  0.0524  
At most 2  0.352316  19.91575  29.79707  0.4286  
At most 3  0.167270  6.016457  15.49471  0.6936  
At most 4  0.004956  0.158994  3.841466  0.6901  
      
      
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      
None *  0.680444  36.50629  33.87687  0.0237  
At most 1 *  0.579476  27.72009  27.58434  0.0480  
At most 2  0.352316  13.89929  21.13162  0.3734  
At most 3  0.167270  5.857463  14.26460  0.6316  
At most 4  0.004956  0.158994  3.841466  0.6901  
      
      
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_UAE  
 7.400900 -14.23452  6.338823  9.145429 -10.43880  
 10.36998 -3.946429 -3.982360  0.914674 -2.365492  
-3.858685 -4.991451  4.698111 -22.03518  20.97109  
 2.441910 -27.44822  0.734274  10.64727  4.642152  
-2.927403  21.92550 -2.546838 -21.15187  6.261017  
      
      
      
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.041139 -0.030523  0.020318 -0.003422 -0.003713 
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.022632 -0.000993  0.017047  0.001479 -0.002960 
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-0.123442  0.039062 -0.025912 -0.004976 -0.004759 
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.025244  0.006373  0.027902 -0.011095 -0.002084 
D(LOG_UAE) -0.020885 -0.003697  0.008878 -0.009928 -0.002922 
      
200 
 
      
      
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  271.6177   
      
      





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_UAE  
 1.000000 -1.923350  0.856494  1.235718 -1.410477  
  (0.62239)  (0.17082)  (0.52528)  (0.38287)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.304464     
  (0.11866)     
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.167495     
  (0.07899)     
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-0.913584     
  (0.18963)     
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.186832     
  (0.09583)     
D(LOG_UAE) -0.154568     
  (0.07783)     
      
      
      
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  285.4777   
      
      





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000 -0.690030 -0.194856  0.063548  
   (0.15832)  (0.52707)  (0.41689)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -0.804078 -0.743793  0.766384  
   (0.12106)  (0.40302)  (0.31878)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.620983  0.706046    
  (0.18887)  (0.21899)    
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.177788  0.326068    
  (0.13596)  (0.15764)    
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-0.508513  1.602987    
  (0.31089)  (0.36046)    
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.120740  0.334191    
  (0.16416)  (0.19033)    
D(LOG_UAE) -0.192902  0.311877    
  (0.13364)  (0.15495)    
      
      
      
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  292.4274   
      
      





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  9.049561 -8.672244  
    (2.42392)  (1.99674)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  10.02854 -9.413259  
    (2.89153)  (2.38195)  
201 
 
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  13.39713 -12.66002  
    (3.79594)  (3.12697)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.699385  0.604629 -0.043762   
  (0.18979)  (0.22230)  (0.12601)   
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.243567  0.240980 -0.059417   
  (0.13461)  (0.15767)  (0.08937)   
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-0.408527  1.732326 -1.059775   
  (0.31742)  (0.37180)  (0.21075)   
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.228403  0.194921 -0.054316   
  (0.15460)  (0.18108)  (0.10264)   
D(LOG_UAE) -0.227158  0.267564 -0.075957   
  (0.13762)  (0.16120)  (0.09137)   
      
      
      
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  295.3561   
      
      





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.717107  
     (0.05352)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.597537  
     (0.04562)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.883098  
     (0.07640)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.879063  
     (0.02940)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.707740  0.698543 -0.046274 -0.888295  
  (0.19273)  (0.44955)  (0.12630)  (0.37228)  
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.239956  0.200391 -0.058331 -0.567768  
  (0.13680)  (0.31909)  (0.08964)  (0.26424)  
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-0.420678  1.868908 -1.063429 -0.575207  
  (0.32244)  (0.75209)  (0.21129)  (0.62282)  
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.255497  0.499466 -0.062463 -0.957996  
  (0.15428)  (0.35987)  (0.10110)  (0.29801)  
D(LOG_UAE) -0.251401  0.540070 -0.083247 -0.495709  
  (0.13731)  (0.32029)  (0.08998)  (0.26524)  
      








Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_BAHRAIN) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.111026  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_BAHRAIN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/22/17   Time: 09:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2015   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_BAHRAIN(-1)) -1.310947 0.184354 -7.111026 0.0000 
C -0.156980 0.435496 -0.360461 0.7209 
     
     
R-squared 0.612435     Mean dependent var -0.187247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.600323     S.D. dependent var 4.016509 
S.E. of regression 2.539237     Akaike info criterion 4.758627 
Sum squared resid 206.3272     Schwarz criterion 4.848413 
Log likelihood -78.89665     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.789246 
F-statistic 50.56670     Durbin-Watson stat 1.964898 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     






Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_KUWAIT) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.511863  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.646342  
 5% level  -2.954021  
 10% level  -2.615817  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_KUWAIT,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/22/17   Time: 09:51   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2015   
Included observations: 33 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_KUWAIT(-1)) -1.478750 0.227086 -6.511863 0.0000 
D(LOG_KUWAIT(-
1),2) 
0.480094 0.160613 2.989129 0.0055 
C 0.016747 0.287557 0.058238 0.9539 
     
     
R-squared 0.613483     Mean dependent var -0.010834 
Adjusted R-squared 0.587715     S.D. dependent var 2.572372 
S.E. of regression 1.651706     Akaike info criterion 3.928002 
Sum squared resid 81.84394     Schwarz criterion 4.064048 
Log likelihood -61.81203     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.973777 
F-statistic 23.80808     Durbin-Watson stat 2.005899 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
     






Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_OMAN) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.651446  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_OMAN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/22/17   Time: 09:52   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2015   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_OMAN(-1)) -1.379931 0.180349 -7.651446 0.0000 
C -0.202603 0.542435 -0.373507 0.7112 
     
     
R-squared 0.646583     Mean dependent var -0.228328 
Adjusted R-squared 0.635539     S.D. dependent var 5.239053 
S.E. of regression 3.162849     Akaike info criterion 5.197846 
Sum squared resid 320.1156     Schwarz criterion 5.287632 
Log likelihood -86.36338     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.228465 
F-statistic 58.54462     Durbin-Watson stat 1.986052 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     






Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_QATAR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.415523  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_QATAR,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/22/17   Time: 09:54   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2015   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_QATAR(-1)) -0.958375 0.176968 -5.415523 0.0000 
C 0.005623 0.276892 0.020308 0.9839 
     
     
R-squared 0.478215     Mean dependent var -0.016121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.461909     S.D. dependent var 2.200776 
S.E. of regression 1.614373     Akaike info criterion 3.852793 
Sum squared resid 83.39838     Schwarz criterion 3.942578 
Log likelihood -63.49747     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.883412 
F-statistic 29.32789     Durbin-Watson stat 1.997150 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000006    
     






Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.300613  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/22/17   Time: 09:55   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2015   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA(-
1)) 
-1.119157 0.211137 -5.300613 0.0000 
C -0.273424 0.516082 -0.529807 0.5999 
     
     
R-squared 0.467523     Mean dependent var -0.281644 
Adjusted R-squared 0.450883     S.D. dependent var 4.060917 
S.E. of regression 3.009238     Akaike info criterion 5.098273 
Sum squared resid 289.7764     Schwarz criterion 5.188059 
Log likelihood -84.67064     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.128893 
F-statistic 28.09650     Durbin-Watson stat 1.744937 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000008    
     




Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_UAE) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.137255  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.646342  
 5% level  -2.954021  
 10% level  -2.615817  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_UAE,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/22/17   Time: 09:56   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2015   
Included observations: 33 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_UAE(-1)) -1.418066 0.231059 -6.137255 0.0000 
D(LOG_UAE(-1),2) 0.440248 0.164501 2.676262 0.0119 
C 0.027891 0.090637 0.307717 0.7604 
     
     
R-squared 0.588907     Mean dependent var -0.002235 
Adjusted R-squared 0.561501     S.D. dependent var 0.785015 
S.E. of regression 0.519831     Akaike info criterion 1.615883 
Sum squared resid 8.106736     Schwarz criterion 1.751929 
Log likelihood -23.66207     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.661658 
F-statistic 21.48808     Durbin-Watson stat 1.909379 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
     





Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
Date: 03/22/17   Time: 10:03     
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2015     
Included observations: 34 after adjustments    
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend    
Series: LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA LOG_BAHRAIN LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)    
       
       
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       
None *  0.806363  148.7388  95.75366  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.627327  92.91864  69.81889  0.0003   
At most 2 *  0.529427  59.35878  47.85613  0.0029   
At most 3 *  0.415471  33.72943  29.79707  0.0167   
At most 4  0.228215  15.47317  15.49471  0.0504   
At most 5 *  0.178024  6.665479  3.841466  0.0098   
       
       
 Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)   
       
       
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       
None *  0.806363  55.82013  40.07757  0.0004   
At most 1  0.627327  33.55987  33.87687  0.0545   
At most 2  0.529427  25.62935  27.58434  0.0871   
At most 3  0.415471  18.25626  21.13162  0.1205   
At most 4  0.228215  8.807687  14.26460  0.3025   
At most 5 *  0.178024  6.665479  3.841466  0.0098   
       
       
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):    
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
-0.140747 -0.198731  0.838259  0.238791 -0.287117  0.756204  
 0.223720 -0.013691  0.213895 -0.389347  0.266661 -2.078223  
 0.340957 -0.469889  0.011822 -0.535191  0.093438  0.735527  
 0.147007 -0.878269  0.094523  0.762546  0.017565 -1.709022  
-0.050121  0.432314 -0.035547  0.207295 -0.562948  0.092736  
 0.235227  0.155621 -0.100110  0.119530 -0.045671 -0.552977  
       
       
       
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):     
       
       
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.054305  0.659384  0.240293 -0.039785  0.328135 -1.064305 
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.048124  0.433109  0.397941  0.926790 -0.106264 -0.351635 
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 





-0.456159  1.471348  0.677988 -0.313835 -0.533889 -0.424566 
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 0.279159 -0.117256  0.721162 -0.159786  0.394214 -0.026974 
D(LOG_UAE) -0.042269  0.337096 -0.034678  0.021613  0.058242  0.008462 
       
       
       
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -325.3039    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  1.411966 -5.955768 -1.696591  2.039947 -5.372771  
  (0.68574)  (0.59062)  (0.68981)  (0.42893)  (1.77888)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
 0.007643      
  (0.07630)      
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
 0.006773      
  (0.05097)      
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
 0.161627      
  (0.02133)      
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.064203      
  (0.07234)      
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
-0.039291      
  (0.03672)      
D(LOG_UAE)  0.005949      
  (0.01235)      
       
       
       
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -308.5240    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.668965 -1.738517  1.227166 -9.126700  
   (0.51071)  (0.56421)  (0.40053)  (1.67575)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -4.691851  0.029693  0.575638  2.658654  
   (0.51374)  (0.56757)  (0.40291)  (1.68571)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
 0.155161  0.001765     
  (0.13915)  (0.10487)     
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
 0.103668  0.003634     
  (0.09305)  (0.07013)     
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
 0.182849  0.226913     
  (0.03976)  (0.02997)     
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.393373  0.070509     
  (0.11241)  (0.08472)     
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
-0.065523 -0.053872     
  (0.06868)  (0.05176)     
D(LOG_UAE)  0.081364  0.003785     
  (0.01525)  (0.01150)     
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3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -295.7093    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.718753  1.212110 -7.718366  
    (0.46460)  (0.31435)  (1.38672)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.108918  0.681237 -7.218825  
    (0.45974)  (0.31106)  (1.37222)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.029543  0.022507 -2.105241  
    (0.18517)  (0.12528)  (0.55268)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
 0.237090 -0.111146  0.098358    
  (0.22621)  (0.26762)  (0.45368)    
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
 0.239349 -0.183354  0.057004    
  (0.14810)  (0.17521)  (0.29702)    
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
 0.184064  0.225239 -0.942282    
  (0.06490)  (0.07678)  (0.13016)    
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.624538 -0.248070 -0.059651    
  (0.17428)  (0.20618)  (0.34952)    
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 0.180362 -0.392738  0.217452    
  (0.09405)  (0.11126)  (0.18861)    
D(LOG_UAE)  0.069541  0.020080  0.036261    
  (0.02472)  (0.02925)  (0.04958)    
       
       
       
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -286.5812    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  2.023752 -20.23229  
     (0.56684)  (2.77340)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.732671 -8.011841  
     (0.26997)  (1.32093)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.036458 -2.320338  
     (0.10441)  (0.51085)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.472227 -7.280816  
     (0.23513)  (1.15043)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
 0.231242 -0.076205  0.094597 -0.428637   
  (0.23896)  (0.53258)  (0.45633)  (0.54399)   
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
 0.375594 -0.997325  0.144607  0.313625   
  (0.13273)  (0.29583)  (0.25347)  (0.30217)   
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
 0.193608  0.168221 -0.936145 -0.263550   
  (0.06832)  (0.15226)  (0.13046)  (0.15553)   
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.578402  0.027562 -0.089316 -1.283959   
  (0.18197)  (0.40557)  (0.34750)  (0.41426)   
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 0.156872 -0.252403  0.202349 -0.395489   
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  (0.09833)  (0.21914)  (0.18777)  (0.22384)   
D(LOG_UAE)  0.072718  0.001097  0.038304 -0.106300   
  (0.02605)  (0.05806)  (0.04974)  (0.05930)   
       
       
       
5 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -282.1774    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -11.05078  
      (1.74599)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -4.687803  
      (0.74937)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -2.154933  
      (0.35088)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -5.138379  
      (0.67650)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -4.536876  
      (0.85411)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
 0.214795  0.065653  0.082933 -0.360616  0.028454  
  (0.23858)  (0.57443)  (0.45325)  (0.55055)  (0.36031)  
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
 0.380920 -1.043264  0.148384  0.291597  0.242593  
  (0.13319)  (0.32069)  (0.25303)  (0.30735)  (0.20115)  
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
 0.181508  0.272592 -0.944727 -0.213504  0.220570  
  (0.06521)  (0.15701)  (0.12389)  (0.15048)  (0.09848)  
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.605161 -0.203246 -0.070337 -1.394632  0.881711  
  (0.17666)  (0.42535)  (0.33562)  (0.40766)  (0.26680)  
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 0.137114 -0.081979  0.188336 -0.313770 -0.268764  
  (0.09235)  (0.22235)  (0.17544)  (0.21310)  (0.13947)  
D(LOG_UAE)  0.069799  0.026276  0.036233 -0.094227  0.066378  
  (0.02568)  (0.06182)  (0.04878)  (0.05925)  (0.03878)  
       







Degree of Commodity Diversification 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_BAHRAIN) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.032197  0.0066 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_BAHRAIN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 12:04   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_BAHRAIN(-1)) -1.072774 0.266052 -4.032197 0.0009 
C -0.002664 0.002932 -0.908407 0.3764 
     
     
R-squared 0.488854     Mean dependent var -0.001121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.458787     S.D. dependent var 0.017227 
S.E. of regression 0.012673     Akaike info criterion -5.799356 
Sum squared resid 0.002730     Schwarz criterion -5.699941 
Log likelihood 57.09388     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.782531 
F-statistic 16.25861     Durbin-Watson stat 1.837171 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000865    
     





Null Hypothesis: D(LOG__KUWAIT) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.303763  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG__KUWAIT,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 12:07   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG__KUWAIT(-1)) -1.338824 0.212385 -6.303763 0.0000 
C -0.002331 0.001404 -1.659913 0.1153 
     
     
R-squared 0.700374     Mean dependent var -0.000527 
Adjusted R-squared 0.682749     S.D. dependent var 0.010637 
S.E. of regression 0.005992     Akaike info criterion -7.297649 
Sum squared resid 0.000610     Schwarz criterion -7.198234 
Log likelihood 71.32766     Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.280824 
F-statistic 39.73742     Durbin-Watson stat 2.192159 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000008    
     





Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_OMAN) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.741775  0.0015 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_OMAN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 12:13   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_OMAN(-1)) -1.109739 0.234035 -4.741775 0.0002 
C -0.000602 0.003597 -0.167311 0.8691 
     
     
R-squared 0.569451     Mean dependent var 0.000865 
Adjusted R-squared 0.544124     S.D. dependent var 0.023137 
S.E. of regression 0.015622     Akaike info criterion -5.381000 
Sum squared resid 0.004149     Schwarz criterion -5.281585 
Log likelihood 53.11950     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.364175 
F-statistic 22.48443     Durbin-Watson stat 2.015732 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000189    
     





Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_QATAR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.210090  0.0353 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_QATAR,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 12:54   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_QATAR(-1)) -0.835967 0.260419 -3.210090 0.0051 
C -0.000306 0.001951 -0.156609 0.8774 
     
     
R-squared 0.377396     Mean dependent var 0.001018 
Adjusted R-squared 0.340772     S.D. dependent var 0.010240 
S.E. of regression 0.008314     Akaike info criterion -6.642362 
Sum squared resid 0.001175     Schwarz criterion -6.542948 
Log likelihood 65.10244     Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.625537 
F-statistic 10.30468     Durbin-Watson stat 1.688536 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005135    
     






Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.489965  0.0025 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 12:55   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA(-
1)) 
-1.068275 0.237925 -4.489965 0.0003 
C -0.001894 0.001782 -1.062925 0.3027 
     
     
R-squared 0.542516     Mean dependent var 0.000175 
Adjusted R-squared 0.515605     S.D. dependent var 0.010778 
S.E. of regression 0.007501     Akaike info criterion -6.848169 
Sum squared resid 0.000957     Schwarz criterion -6.748754 
Log likelihood 67.05760     Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.831344 
F-statistic 20.15979     Durbin-Watson stat 2.013118 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000323    
     







Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_UAE) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.669912  0.0019 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.857386  
 5% level  -3.040391  
 10% level  -2.660551  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 18 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_UAE,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 12:57   
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2015   
Included observations: 18 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_UAE(-1)) -1.626129 0.348214 -4.669912 0.0003 
D(LOG_UAE(-1),2) 0.404859 0.220643 1.834901 0.0864 
C -0.013250 0.004581 -2.892349 0.0112 
     
     
R-squared 0.662247     Mean dependent var 0.001583 
Adjusted R-squared 0.617213     S.D. dependent var 0.023041 
S.E. of regression 0.014256     Akaike info criterion -5.512326 
Sum squared resid 0.003048     Schwarz criterion -5.363931 
Log likelihood 52.61093     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.491864 
F-statistic 14.70555     Durbin-Watson stat 2.313070 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000291    
     





Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:01     
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015     
Included observations: 19 after adjustments    
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend    
Series: LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA LOG__KUWAIT LOG_BAHRAIN LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)    
       
       
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       
None *  0.997712  229.0325  95.75366  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.968684  113.5093  69.81889  0.0000   
At most 2  0.769901  47.70016  47.85613  0.0517   
At most 3  0.557296  19.78452  29.79707  0.4375   
At most 4  0.198703  4.302279  15.49471  0.8777   
At most 5  0.004900  0.093329  3.841466  0.7600   
       
       
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)   
       
       
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       
None *  0.997712  115.5233  40.07757  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.968684  65.80911  33.87687  0.0000   
At most 2 *  0.769901  27.91564  27.58434  0.0454   
At most 3  0.557296  15.48224  21.13162  0.2565   
At most 4  0.198703  4.208950  14.26460  0.8367   
At most 5  0.004900  0.093329  3.841466  0.7600   
       
       
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):    
       







LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 75.17211 -414.9772  3.566258  105.3056  41.87517  50.98085  
 187.8799 -251.1393 -12.92620 -111.5392  157.0049  3.994540  
-217.3224  139.4766  109.0450 -69.93752  176.5323 -69.94502  
 208.9859  280.3468 -44.88773 -15.25744 -140.6737 -67.78739  
 105.8858 -224.9420  65.86286 -21.98031 -56.21371  36.78992  
 111.6308 -182.1207  78.27001  41.60335 -76.47040  38.95351  
       
       
       
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):     
       
       
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.000220  0.000155  0.002151 -0.002000 -0.000538 -1.71E-05 
D(LOG__KUW
AIT) 
 0.001726  0.000454 -0.001390 -0.001913  0.001113 -0.000134 
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.001132 -0.000650 -0.006200 -0.002014 -0.002972  6.60E-05 






-0.002865 -0.001607 -0.002049  0.000879  0.002616 -0.000154 
D(LOG_UAE)  0.003374 -0.005497  0.001468  0.001691 -0.002146 -0.000426 
       
       
       
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  469.1222    
       
       







LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000 -5.520361  0.047441  1.400860  0.557057  0.678188  
  (0.11524)  (0.02855)  (0.03374)  (0.05101)  (0.02251)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.016575      
  (0.08697)      
D(LOG__KUW
AIT) 
 0.129750      
  (0.09924)      
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.085058      
  (0.23001)      
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.163087      
  (0.20369)      
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
-0.215386      
  (0.15829)      
D(LOG_UAE)  0.253615      
  (0.22596)      
       
       
       
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  502.0267    
       
       







LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000 -0.105940 -1.230936  0.924683 -0.188631  
   (0.05230)  (0.06463)  (0.09034)  (0.02566)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -0.027785 -0.476743  0.066595 -0.157022  
   (0.01124)  (0.01389)  (0.01941)  (0.00551)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
 0.012475  0.052668     
  (0.23394)  (0.56074)     
D(LOG__KUW
AIT) 
 0.214992 -0.830211     
  (0.26571)  (0.63691)     
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.207126  0.632718     
  (0.61790)  (1.48110)     
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.810618 -0.401252     
  (0.44795)  (1.07373)     
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
-0.517365  1.592663     
  (0.41468)  (0.99397)     
D(LOG_UAE) -0.779143 -0.019559     
  (0.50747)  (1.21640)     
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3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  515.9846    
       
       







LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.550243  1.358590 -0.293558  
    (0.08214)  (0.11957)  (0.03189)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.560487  0.180394 -0.184541  
    (0.01855)  (0.02700)  (0.00720)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -3.014032  4.095772 -0.990440  
    (0.32301)  (0.47021)  (0.12539)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.454951  0.352659  0.231753    
  (0.28418)  (0.48301)  (0.10514)    
D(LOG__KUW
AIT) 
 0.517037 -1.024062 -0.151265    
  (0.36953)  (0.62806)  (0.13672)    
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
 1.140318 -0.232065 -0.671739    
  (0.71693)  (1.21853)  (0.26525)    
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.070976  0.073447  0.296399    
  (0.58244)  (0.98994)  (0.21549)    
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
-0.072106  1.306898 -0.212858    
  (0.58020)  (0.98614)  (0.21466)    
D(LOG_UAE) -1.098240  0.185236  0.243198    
  (0.73298)  (1.24581)  (0.27119)    
       
       
       
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  523.7257    
       
       







LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.007644 -0.289623  
     (0.16917)  (0.06869)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.313565 -0.183119  
     (0.06092)  (0.02474)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  1.439497 -0.982790  
     (0.41799)  (0.16972)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.881303  0.002538  
     (0.11183)  (0.04541)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.872918 -0.208029  0.321528 -0.160375   
  (0.26984)  (0.42904)  (0.08820)  (0.12579)   
D(LOG__KUW
AIT) 
 0.117345 -1.560235 -0.065416  0.257539   
  (0.40042)  (0.63666)  (0.13088)  (0.18667)   
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
 0.719321 -0.796817 -0.581314  0.417678   
  (0.84848)  (1.34906)  (0.27732)  (0.39554)   
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.682472  0.893747  0.165057 -1.089196   
  (0.63611)  (1.01139)  (0.20791)  (0.29654)   
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 0.111618  1.553358 -0.252319  0.007429   
  (0.70292)  (1.11763)  (0.22975)  (0.32769)   
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D(LOG_UAE) -0.744818  0.659338  0.167287  0.839907   
  (0.87698)  (1.39437)  (0.28664)  (0.40883)   
       
       
       
5 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  525.8302    
       
       







LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.292522  
      (0.02933)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.302020  
      (0.02430)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.436945  
      (0.09125)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.331644  
      (0.06127)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.379191  
      (0.06042)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.929839 -0.087106  0.286122 -0.148558  0.706299  
  (0.27432)  (0.44937)  (0.09844)  (0.12380)  (0.20579)  
D(LOG__KUW
AIT) 
 0.235197 -1.810600  0.007891  0.233074  0.104635  
  (0.39732)  (0.65086)  (0.14258)  (0.17931)  (0.29806)  
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
 0.404666 -0.128369 -0.777035  0.482995 -0.793497  
  (0.81626)  (1.33717)  (0.29292)  (0.36837)  (0.61236)  
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.588246  1.093920  0.106446 -1.069636  0.962070  
  (0.65479)  (1.07264)  (0.23497)  (0.29550)  (0.49122)  
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 0.388577  0.964991 -0.080046 -0.050064 -1.004726  
  (0.66868)  (1.09541)  (0.23996)  (0.30177)  (0.50164)  
D(LOG_UAE) -0.972060  1.142086  0.025939  0.887079 -0.579815  
  (0.88011)  (1.44175)  (0.31583)  (0.39719)  (0.66025)  
       






Similarity of Structure of Production 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_BAHRAIN) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.380790  0.0032 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_BAHRAIN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:15   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_BAHRAIN(-1)) -1.059420 0.241833 -4.380790 0.0004 
C 0.000681 0.007839 0.086813 0.9318 
     
     
R-squared 0.530274     Mean dependent var -0.000345 
Adjusted R-squared 0.502643     S.D. dependent var 0.048432 
S.E. of regression 0.034156     Akaike info criterion -3.816450 
Sum squared resid 0.019833     Schwarz criterion -3.717035 
Log likelihood 38.25627     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.799625 
F-statistic 19.19132     Durbin-Watson stat 2.035313 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000408    
     







Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_KUWAIT) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.121960  0.0007 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_KUWAIT,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:16   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_KUWAIT(-1)) -1.163459 0.227151 -5.121960 0.0001 
C 0.005272 0.007984 0.660338 0.5179 
     
     
R-squared 0.606795     Mean dependent var 0.002424 
Adjusted R-squared 0.583666     S.D. dependent var 0.053806 
S.E. of regression 0.034718     Akaike info criterion -3.783820 
Sum squared resid 0.020491     Schwarz criterion -3.684405 
Log likelihood 37.94629     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.766995 
F-statistic 26.23448     Durbin-Watson stat 1.925335 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000085    
     





Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_OMAN) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.593107  0.0020 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_OMAN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:19   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_OMAN(-1)) -1.078243 0.234752 -4.593107 0.0003 
C -0.000358 0.011160 -0.032079 0.9748 
     
     
R-squared 0.553766     Mean dependent var -0.002541 
Adjusted R-squared 0.527517     S.D. dependent var 0.070709 
S.E. of regression 0.048603     Akaike info criterion -3.110952 
Sum squared resid 0.040159     Schwarz criterion -3.011538 
Log likelihood 31.55405     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.094127 
F-statistic 21.09663     Durbin-Watson stat 2.018060 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000259    
     





Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_QATAR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.024214  0.0067 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_QATAR,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:21   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_QATAR(-1)) -0.965612 0.239950 -4.024214 0.0009 
C 0.001223 0.008593 0.142301 0.8885 
     
     
R-squared 0.487864     Mean dependent var -0.001137 
Adjusted R-squared 0.457738     S.D. dependent var 0.050748 
S.E. of regression 0.037370     Akaike info criterion -3.636581 
Sum squared resid 0.023741     Schwarz criterion -3.537166 
Log likelihood 36.54752     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.619756 
F-statistic 16.19430     Durbin-Watson stat 1.880822 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000880    
     





Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.979356  0.0074 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:23   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA(-
1)) 
-0.930775 0.233901 -3.979356 0.0010 
C 0.002129 0.007606 0.279899 0.7829 
     
     
R-squared 0.482264     Mean dependent var -0.001860 
Adjusted R-squared 0.451809     S.D. dependent var 0.044387 
S.E. of regression 0.032864     Akaike info criterion -3.893553 
Sum squared resid 0.018361     Schwarz criterion -3.794138 
Log likelihood 38.98875     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.876728 
F-statistic 15.83528     Durbin-Watson stat 2.032572 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000970    
     





Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_UAE) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.835803  0.0012 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 19 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_UAE,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:24   
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_UAE(-1)) -1.140925 0.235933 -4.835803 0.0002 
C 0.007676 0.007288 1.053189 0.3070 
     
     
R-squared 0.579052     Mean dependent var 0.001216 
Adjusted R-squared 0.554290     S.D. dependent var 0.046778 
S.E. of regression 0.031230     Akaike info criterion -3.995602 
Sum squared resid 0.016580     Schwarz criterion -3.896188 
Log likelihood 39.95822     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.978778 
F-statistic 23.38499     Durbin-Watson stat 1.808630 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000155    
     





Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:28     
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2015     
Included observations: 19 after adjustments    
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend    
Series: LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA LOG_BAHRAIN LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)    
       
       
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       
None *  0.981333  198.3274  95.75366  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.912212  122.6886  69.81889  0.0000   
At most 2 *  0.825166  76.46493  47.85613  0.0000   
At most 3 *  0.755417  43.33048  29.79707  0.0008   
At most 4 *  0.411637  16.57466  15.49471  0.0343   
At most 5 *  0.289608  6.496842  3.841466  0.0108   
       
       
 Trace test indicates 6 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)   
       
       
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05    
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**   
       
       
None *  0.981333  75.63871  40.07757  0.0000   
At most 1 *  0.912212  46.22372  33.87687  0.0011   
At most 2 *  0.825166  33.13445  27.58434  0.0087   
At most 3 *  0.755417  26.75581  21.13162  0.0073   
At most 4  0.411637  10.07782  14.26460  0.2069   
At most 5 *  0.289608  6.496842  3.841466  0.0108   
       
       
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level   
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level   
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values    
       
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):    
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 37.15945  12.28652 -15.54178  17.96155 -53.02639  32.19423  
-47.31938  31.48720 -5.990721  25.13091  6.839836 -7.070266  
 12.65761 -17.27365  99.66812 -21.89668 -30.44412 -61.10845  
 51.99172 -10.07349  1.132678  2.607440 -7.693347 -16.92767  
 33.02269 -62.64115  32.86819  11.77982 -22.12852 -7.293889  
-61.76222 -4.486635  43.65782  17.75385  6.683830 -2.025886  
       
       
       
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):     
       
       
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.013883  0.002962 -0.005383 -0.009408 -0.005400 -0.000124 
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.009392 -0.003027 -0.005804 -0.012913  0.008435 -0.001211 
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
 0.000688  0.001991 -0.019504 -0.015434 -0.002156 -0.006095 






 0.019437 -0.008142 -0.002540 -0.018624 -0.010466 -0.002843 
D(LOG_UAE) -0.007265  0.011668  0.006196 -0.008088 -0.001177 -0.008906 
       
       
       
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  303.2108    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.330643 -0.418246  0.483364 -1.426996  0.866381  
  (0.07397)  (0.12842)  (0.04654)  (0.05935)  (0.08038)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.515881      
  (0.17229)      
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.349016      
  (0.23799)      
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
 0.025557      
  (0.33988)      
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.757923      
  (0.32583)      
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 0.722253      
  (0.32489)      
D(LOG_UAE) -0.269951      
  (0.26529)      
       
       
       
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  326.3226    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000 -0.237383  0.146615 -1.001286  0.628384  
   (0.09133)  (0.04133)  (0.05267)  (0.06618)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -0.547002  1.018466 -1.287520  0.719799  
   (0.20937)  (0.09475)  (0.12075)  (0.15171)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.656030 -0.077315     
  (0.27374)  (0.15378)     
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.205772 -0.210716     
  (0.38140)  (0.21426)     
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-0.068637  0.071129     
  (0.54913)  (0.30849)     
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.120963 -0.674447     
  (0.46765)  (0.26271)     
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 1.107532 -0.017564     
  (0.50488)  (0.28363)     
D(LOG_UAE) -0.822085  0.278143     
  (0.37376)  (0.20997)     
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3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  342.8899    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.130930 -1.103168  0.484186  
    (0.03910)  (0.04450)  (0.03794)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.982323 -1.522285  0.387525  
    (0.10269)  (0.11687)  (0.09966)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.066076 -0.429185 -0.607447  
    (0.06036)  (0.06869)  (0.05858)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-0.724172  0.015678 -0.338538    
  (0.26133)  (0.16134)  (0.42951)    
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.279233 -0.110466 -0.414333    
  (0.37460)  (0.23127)  (0.61568)    
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-0.315515  0.408039 -1.966570    
  (0.42914)  (0.26494)  (0.70531)    
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.029064 -0.799860  1.121265    
  (0.45854)  (0.28309)  (0.75364)    
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 1.075386  0.026305 -0.506427    
  (0.51378)  (0.31719)  (0.84442)    
D(LOG_UAE) -0.743658  0.171115  0.660552    
  (0.36426)  (0.22488)  (0.59868)    
       
       
       
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  356.2678    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.893083  1.335272  
     (0.13654)  (0.15094)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -7.448750  6.772928  
     (0.92533)  (1.02292)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.030542 -1.036960  
     (0.07885)  (0.08717)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  6.033113 -6.500310  
     (0.95030)  (1.05052)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-1.213330  0.110453 -0.349195 -0.081578   
  (0.25486)  (0.12431)  (0.31987)  (0.12013)   
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.950591  0.019611 -0.428959 -0.151365   
  (0.37736)  (0.18405)  (0.47361)  (0.17787)   
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-1.117970  0.563516 -1.984052  0.449214   
  (0.41887)  (0.20429)  (0.52570)  (0.19744)   
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
 0.032196 -0.811729  1.122600 -0.860542   
  (0.59983)  (0.29256)  (0.75283)  (0.28273)   
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
 0.107083  0.213916 -0.527523  0.151542   
  (0.49829)  (0.24303)  (0.62538)  (0.23487)   
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D(LOG_UAE) -1.164164  0.252589  0.651391  0.005988   
  (0.43475)  (0.21204)  (0.54565)  (0.20492)   
       
       
       
5 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  361.3067    
       
       





LOG_KUWAIT LOG_OMAN LOG_QATAR LOG_UAE  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.509192  
      (0.07747)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.484516  
      (0.10717)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.066718  
      (0.04783)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.622145  
      (0.11670)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.974317  
      (0.07937)  
       
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)    
D(LOG_SAUD
I_ARABIA) 
-1.391660  0.448730 -0.526691 -0.145192  1.112194  
  (0.23623)  (0.20068)  (0.28845)  (0.10787)  (0.17870)  
D(LOG_BAHR
AIN) 
-0.672032 -0.508790 -0.151704 -0.051998  0.566707  
  (0.34258)  (0.29103)  (0.41831)  (0.15643)  (0.25915)  
D(LOG_KUW
AIT) 
-1.189172  0.698580 -2.054921  0.423815  0.737391  
  (0.44917)  (0.38159)  (0.54848)  (0.20511)  (0.33979)  
D(LOG_OMA
N) 
-0.295717 -0.189707  0.796221 -0.977515  0.979117  
  (0.59365)  (0.50433)  (0.72490)  (0.27108)  (0.44909)  
D(LOG_QATA
R) 
-0.238546  0.869544 -0.871535  0.028249 -0.634136  
  (0.46328)  (0.39357)  (0.56570)  (0.21155)  (0.35046)  
D(LOG_UAE) -1.203048  0.326347  0.612689 -0.007883  0.364674  
  (0.46888)  (0.39833)  (0.57254)  (0.21410)  (0.35470)  
       








Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_BAHRAIN) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.377596  0.0015 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_BAHRAIN,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:43   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2015   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_BAHRAIN(-1)) -0.435692 0.099528 -4.377596 0.0001 
C 0.001695 0.001320 1.284009 0.2084 
     
     
R-squared 0.374552     Mean dependent var -0.001140 
Adjusted R-squared 0.355007     S.D. dependent var 0.008350 
S.E. of regression 0.006706     Akaike info criterion -7.114507 
Sum squared resid 0.001439     Schwarz criterion -7.024721 
Log likelihood 122.9466     Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.083888 
F-statistic 19.16335     Durbin-Watson stat 2.000465 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000120    
     







Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_KUWAIT) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.313577  0.0018 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.646342  
 5% level  -2.954021  
 10% level  -2.615817  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_KUWAIT,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2015   
Included observations: 33 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_KUWAIT(-1)) -0.728493 0.168884 -4.313577 0.0002 
D(LOG_KUWAIT(-
1),2) 
0.306489 0.163682 1.872468 0.0709 
C 0.009427 0.002868 3.286833 0.0026 
     
     
R-squared 0.383534     Mean dependent var -0.000562 
Adjusted R-squared 0.342436     S.D. dependent var 0.011931 
S.E. of regression 0.009675     Akaike info criterion -6.352046 
Sum squared resid 0.002808     Schwarz criterion -6.216000 
Log likelihood 107.8088     Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.306271 
F-statistic 9.332247     Durbin-Watson stat 1.940510 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000706    
     







Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_QATAR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.399266  0.0180 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_QATAR,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 13:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2015   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_QATAR(-1)) -0.509738 0.149955 -3.399266 0.0018 
C 0.007002 0.003393 2.063543 0.0473 
     
     
R-squared 0.265297     Mean dependent var -0.000806 
Adjusted R-squared 0.242337     S.D. dependent var 0.016730 
S.E. of regression 0.014562     Akaike info criterion -5.563762 
Sum squared resid 0.006786     Schwarz criterion -5.473977 
Log likelihood 96.58396     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.533143 
F-statistic 11.55501     Durbin-Watson stat 1.728164 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001826    
     







Null Hypothesis: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.435630  0.1400 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/20/17   Time: 14:30   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2015   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
D(LOG_SAUDI_ARABIA(-
1)) 
-0.310232 0.127372 -2.435630 0.0206 
C 0.001868 0.001681 1.110979 0.2749 
     
     
R-squared 0.156392     Mean dependent var -7.66E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.130029     S.D. dependent var 0.009248 
S.E. of regression 0.008626     Akaike info criterion -6.611005 
Sum squared resid 0.002381     Schwarz criterion -6.521219 
Log likelihood 114.3871     Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.580385 
F-statistic 5.932292     Durbin-Watson stat 2.076957 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.020616    
     











About Issues on GCC/Monetary and Political Policies 
 
 
1) Do you think the GCC countries believe in a single currency for the region? 
2) Why do you think it has taken too many years to actualise this agenda?   
3) Do you think GCC countries have special roles to play in bringing a single 
currency to reality? If yes, what are these roles? If no why do you think they 
have no roles?  
4) How important is the possible loss of sovereignty of monetary and fiscal 
policies be responsible for the delay in adopting a single currency?  
5) How important is the fear of domination by Saudi Arabia be responsible for 
the delay in adopting a single currency? 
6) Do you think UAE and Oman will join a single currency? What are the key 
factors for these e.g. economic or political reasons?  
7) When do you think a single currency will be adopted? Why was it  not 
implemented in 2010? 
8) What countries do you think will be more affected by CU? In what ways?  
9) How important is united currency in economic development to GCC? 
10) What can GCC region learn from EU in terms of the single currency? 
11) How can the existing economic framework of the GCC region enhanced the 
move towards a single currency area? 
Expected time for each interview is 60 minutes. 
Interviewer  
Abdussalam Aljadani Email; P10361512@my365.dmu.ac.uk 
Research Student, De Montfort University, UK 
 
 
Strategically Using the Issue Affecting the Adoption of a Common Currency for Uniting 
and Developing the Arab Gulf Region  
I am a research student in the Faculty of Business and Law, Department of Accounting & Finance, 
De Montfort University, Leicester, United Kingdom. Currently, I am undertaking a research study 
on the above title. This semi-structured interview is being conducted to generate information from 





Telecommunication Industry. Please be assured that information generated is purely 
for this researc , and will be ated with the utmost confidentiality it deserves. Your 
cooperation is hereby solicited.  Kindly give sincere response to the questions. Thank you for 













 النقدية والسياسيةحول المسائل المتعلقة بدول مجلس التعاون الخليجي / السياسات 
 
 هل تعتقد أن دول حكومات دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي تؤمن بفوائد العملة الموحدة للمنطقة؟ (1)
 في اعتقادك لماذا هذا التأخير لتطبيق الوحدة النقدية للواقع؟  (2)
هل تعتقد أن دول الخليج لها دور ملموس لتطبية فكرة الوحدة النقدية للواقع؟ إذا نعم، ما هي هاذي  (3)
 الدوار؟ إذا ال، في إعتقادك لماذا ليس لها ادوار؟ا
ما مدى أهمية الخسارة المحتملة لسيادة سياسات نقدية ومالية تكون مسئولة عن التأخير في  (4)
  إعتماد عملة واحدة؟
ما مدى أهمية الخوف من هيمنة السعودية كونها متهمه أنها مسئوله عن التأخير في إعتماد  (5)
 عملة واحدة؟
دولة اإلمارات العربية المتحدة وسلطنة عمان ستنظم للوحدة النقدية؟ ما هي  هل تعتقد أن (6)
 العوامل الرئيسية هل هي اقتصادية أم سياسية؟
 م؟2010متى تعتقد سيتم إعتماد العملة الخليجية؟ لماذا لم يتم اعتمادها عام  (7)
 ما هي الدول التي تعتقد أنها سوف تكون أكثر تأثر بالوحدة النقدية؟ كيف؟ (8)
ا مدى أهمية العملة الموحدة من خالل وجهة نظرك في التنمية االقتصادية و تنويع دول م (9)
 مجلس التعاون الخليجي؟ 
 ماذا يمكن أن نتعلم من االتحاد األوروبي من حيث العملة الموحدة؟ (11)
كيف يمكن لإلطار االقتصادي الحالي لدول مجلس التعاون الخليجي تعزيز التحرك  (11)
 نحو الوحدة النقدية؟
 
Expected time for each interview is 60 minutes. 
Interviewer  
Abdussalam Aljadani Email; P10361512@my365.dmu.ac.uk 
Research Student, De Montfort University, UK 
 
  
 الخليجي التعاون مجلس لدول موحدة عملة إعتماد تمس التي الرئيسية العقبات /البحث موضوع
 .المتحدة بالمملكة فورت ديمونت بجامعة ، (مالي اقتصاد) والمالية المحاسبة قسم والقانون، األعمال كلية في دكتوراة طالب أنا
 طريق عن المشتركة العملة نظرية عناصر احد لقياس يسعى الجزء هذا أن كما .أعاله الموضوع في بحث بعمل اآلن أقوم
 مشتركة عملة تبني تواجه التي (السياسية العوامل) المشكلة عن بيانات جمع إلى تهدف التي (مهيكلة/منظمة شبه) المقابالت
 معها التعامل وسيتم فقط، العلمي البحث لغرض ستستخدم البيانات أن إلى أشير أن أود .العربي الخليج منطقة وتطوير لتوحيد
 .تعاونكم لكم شاكر .األسئلة جميع على اإلجابة تتم أن وأتمنى معنا، تعاونكم ألتمس .تستحقها التي السرية من عالي أساس على
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